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Pascal's Pensées

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)

You say that I am a heretic. Is that lawful? And if you do not fear that men do justice, do you not fear that God does justice? You will feel the force of the truth, and you will yield to it ... There is something supernatural in such a blindness. Digna necessitas.[380] Mentiris impudentissime ... Doctrina sua noscitur vir ... False piety, a double sin. I am alone against thirty thousand. No. Protect, you, the court; protect, you, deception; let me protect the truth. It is all my strength. If I lose it, I am undone. I shall not lack accusations, and persecutions. But I possess the truth, and we shall see who will take it away. I do not need to defend religion, but you do not need to defend error and injustice. Let God, out of His compassion, having no regard to the evil which is in me, and having regard to the good which is in you, grant us all grace that truth may not be overcome in my hands, and that falsehood ... 921 Probable.—Let us see if we seek God sincerely, by comparison of the things which we love. It is probable that this food will not poison me. It is probable that I shall not lose my action by not prosecuting it ... 922 It is not absolution only which remits sins by the sacrament of penance, but contrition, which is not real if it does not seek the sacrament. 923

People who do not keep their word, without faith, without honour, without truth, deceitful in heart, deceitful in speech; for which that amphibious animal in fable was once reproached, which held itself in a doubtful position between the fish and the birds ... It is important to kings and princes to be considered pious; and therefore they must confess themselves to you.

The following brief notes are mainly based on those of M. Brunschvicg. But those of MM. Faugère, Molinier, and Havet have also been consulted. The biblical references are to the Authorised English Version. Those in the text are to the Vulgate, except where it has seemed advisable to alter the reference to the English Version. [1] P. 1, l. 1. The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.—Pascal is here distinguishing the logical or discursive type of mind, a good example of which is found in mathematical reasoning, and what we should call the intuitive type of mind, which sees everything at a glance. A practical man of sound judgment exemplifies the latter; for he is in fact guided by impressions of past experience, and does not consciously reason from general principles. [2] P. 2, l. 34. There are different kinds, etc.—This is probably a subdivision of the discursive type of mind. [3] P. 3, l. 31. By rule.—This is an emendation by M. Brunschvicg. The MS. has sans règle. [4] P. 4, l. 3. I judge by my watch.—Pascal is said to have always carried a watch attached to his left wrist-band. [5] P. 5, l. 21. Scaramouch.—A traditional character in Italian comedy. [6] P. 5, l. 22. The doctor.—Also a traditional character in Italian comedy.

[7] P. 5, l. 24. Cleobuline.—Princess, and afterwards Queen of Corinth, figures in the romance of Mademoiselle de Scudéry, entitled Artamène ou le Grand Cyrus. She is enamoured of one of her subjects, Myrinthe. But she "loved him without thinking of love; and remained so long in that error, that this affection was no longer in a state to be overcome, when she became aware of it." The character is supposed to have been drawn from Christina of Sweden. [8] P. 6, l. 21. Rivers are, etc.—Apparently suggested by a chapter in Rabelais: How we descended in the isle of Odes, in which the roads walk. [9] P. 6, l. 30. Salomon de Tultie.—A pseudonym adopted by Pascal as the author of the Provincial Letters. [10] P. 7, l. 7. Abstine et sustine.—A maxim of the Stoics. [11] P. 7, l. 8. Follow nature.—The maxim in which the Stoics summed up their positive ethical teaching. [12] P. 7, l. 9. As Plato.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, iii, 9. [13] P. 9, l. 29. We call this jargon poetical beauty.—According to M. Havet, Pascal refers here to Malherbe and his school. [14] P. 10, l. 23. Ne quid nimis.—Nothing in excess, a celebrated maxim in ancient Greek philosophy. [15] P. 11, l. 26. That epigram about two one-eyed people.—M. Havet points out that this is not Martial's, but is to be found in Epigrammatum Delectus, published by Port-Royal in 1659.

Lumine Æon dextro, capta est Leonilla sinistro, Et potis est forma vincere uterque deos. Blande puer, lumen quod habes concede parenti, Sic tu cæcus Amor, sic erit ilia Venus. [16] P. 11, l. 29. Ambitiosa recidet ornamenta.—Horace, De Arte Poetica, 447. [17] P. 13, l. 2. Cartesian.—One who follows the philosophy of Descartes (1596-1650), "the father of modern philosophy." [18] P. 13, l. 8. Le Maître.—A famous French advocate in Pascal's time. His Plaidoyers el Harangues appeared in 1657. Plaidoyer VI is entitled Pour un fils mis en religion par force, and on the first page occurs the word répandre: "Dieu qui répand des aveuglements et des ténèbres sur les passions illégitimes." Pascal's reference is probably to this passage. [19] P. 13, l. 12. The Cardinal.—Mazarin. He was one of those statesmen who do not like condolences. [20] P. 14, l. 12. Saint Thomas.—Thomas Aquinas (1223-74), one of the greatest scholastic philosophers. [21] P. 14, l. 16. Charron.—A friend of Montaigne. His Traité de la Sagesse (1601), which is not a large book, contains 117 chapters, each of which is subdivided. [22] P. 14, l. 17. Of the confusion of Montaigne.—The Essays of Montaigne follow each other without any kind of order. [23] P. 14, l. 27. Mademoiselle de Gournay.—The adopted daughter of Montaigne. She published in 1595 an edition of his Essais, and, in a Preface (added later), she defends him on this point. [24] P. 15, l. 1. People without eyes.—Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [25] P. 15, l. 1. Squaring the circle.—Ibid., ii, 14.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE

    The reason, therefore, that some intuitive minds are not mathematical is that they cannot at all turn their attention to the principles of mathematics. But the reason that mathematicians are not intuitive is that they do not see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the exact and plain principles of mathematics, and not reasoning till they have well inspected and arranged their principles, they are lost in matters of intuition where the principles do not allow of such arrangement. They are scarcely seen; they are felt rather than seen; there is the greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do not of themselves perceive them. These principles are so fine and so numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is needed to perceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are perceived, without for the most part being able to demonstrate them in order as in mathematics; because the principles are not known to us in the same way, and because it would be an endless matter to undertake it. We must see the matter at once, at one glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least to a certain degree. And thus it is rare that mathematicians are intuitive, and that men of intuition are mathematicians, because mathematicians wish to treat matters of intuition mathematically, and make themselves ridiculous, wishing to begin with definitions and then with axioms, which is not the way to proceed in this kind of reasoning. Not that the mind does not do so, but it does it tacitly, naturally, and without technical rules; for the expression of it is beyond all men, and only a few can feel it.

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  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE

    THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE 1 The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.[1]—In the one the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use; so that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and one must have a quite inaccurate mind who reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it is almost impossible they should escape notice. But in the intuitive mind the principles are found in common use, and are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous, that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice. Now the omission of one principle leads to error; thus one must have very clear sight to see all the principles, and in the next place an accurate mind not to draw false deductions from known principles. All mathematicians would then be intuitive if they had clear sight, for they do not reason incorrectly from principles known to them; and intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could turn their eyes to the principles of mathematics to which they are unused.

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  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE

    Intuitive minds, on the contrary, being thus accustomed to judge at a single glance, are so astonished when they are presented with propositions of which they understand nothing, and the way to which is through definitions and axioms so sterile, and which they are not accustomed to see thus in detail, that they are repelled and disheartened. But dull minds are never either intuitive or mathematical. Mathematicians who are only mathematicians have exact minds, provided all things are explained to them by means of definitions and axioms; otherwise they are inaccurate and insufferable, for they are only right when the principles are quite clear. And men of intuition who are only intuitive cannot have the patience to reach to first principles of things speculative and conceptual, which they have never seen in the world, and which are altogether out of the common. 2 There are different kinds of right understanding;[2] some have right understanding in a certain order of things, and not in others, where they go astray. Some draw conclusions well from a few premises, and this displays an acute judgment. Others draw conclusions well where there are many premises. For example, the former easily learn hydrostatics, where the premises are few, but the conclusions are so fine that only the greatest acuteness can reach them.

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  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · NOTES

    [87] P. 60, l. 26. Fascinatio nugacitatis.—Book of Wisdom iv, 12. [88] P. 61, l. 10. Memoria hospitis, etc.—Book of Wisdom v, 15. [89] P. 62, l. 5. Instability.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, iii, 12. [90] P. 66, l. 19. Foolishness, stultitium.—I Cor. i, 18. [91] P. 71, l. 5. To prove Divinity from the works of nature.—A traditional argument of the Stoics like Cicero and Seneca, and of rationalist theologians like Raymond Sebond, Charron, etc. It is the argument from Design in modern philosophy. [92] P. 71, l. 27. Nemo novit, etc.—Matthew xi, 27. In the Vulgate, it is Neque patrem quis novit, etc. Pascal's biblical quotations are often incorrect. Many seem to have been made from memory. [93] P. 71, l. 30. Those who seek God find Him.—Matthew vii, 7. [94] P. 72, l. 3. Vere tu es Deus absconditus.—Is. xiv, 15. [95] P. 72, l. 22. Ne evacuetur crux Christi.—I Cor. i, 17. In the Vulgate we haveut non instead of ne. [96] P. 72, l. 25. The machine.—A Cartesian expression. Descartes considered animals as mere automata. According to Pascal, whatever does not proceed in us from reflective thought is a product of a necessary mechanism, which has its root in the body, and which is continued into the mind in imagination and the passions. It is therefore necessary for man so to alter, and adjust this mechanism, that it will always follow, and not obstruct, the good will. [97] P. 73, l. 3. Justus ex fide vivit.—Romans i, 17.

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  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE

    And in spite of that these persons would perhaps not be great mathematicians, because mathematics contain a great number of premises, and there is perhaps a kind of intellect that can search with ease a few premises to the bottom, and cannot in the least penetrate those matters in which there are many premises. There are then two kinds of intellect: the one able to penetrate acutely and deeply into the conclusions of given premises, and this is the precise intellect; the other able to comprehend a great number of premises without confusing them, and this is the mathematical intellect. The one has force and exactness, the other comprehension. Now the one quality can exist without the other; the intellect can be strong and narrow, and can also be comprehensive and weak. 3 Those who are accustomed to judge by feeling do not understand the process of reasoning, for they would understand at first sight, and are not used to seek for principles. And others, on the contrary, who are accustomed to reason from principles, do not at all understand matters of feeling, seeking principles, and being unable to see at a glance. 4 Mathematics, intuition.—True eloquence makes light of eloquence, true morality makes light of morality; that is to say, the morality of the judgment, which has no rules, makes light of the morality of the intellect. For it is to judgment that perception belongs, as science belongs to intellect. Intuition is the part of judgment, mathematics of intellect.

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  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION II / THE MISERY OF MAN WITHOUT GOD

    We cannot even see an advocate in his robe and with his cap on his head, without a favourable opinion of his ability. The imagination disposes of everything; it makes beauty, justice, and happiness, which is everything in the world. I should much like to see an Italian work, of which I only know the title, which alone is worth many books, Della opinione regina del mondo.[51] I approve of the book without knowing it, save the evil in it, if any. These are pretty much the effects of that deceptive faculty, which seems to have been expressly given us to lead us into necessary error. We have, however, many other sources of error. Not only are old impressions capable of misleading us; the charms of novelty have the same power. Hence arise all the disputes of men, who taunt each other either with following the false impressions of childhood or with running rashly after the new. Who keeps the due mean? Let him appear and prove it. There is no principle, however natural to us from infancy, which may not be made to pass for a false impression either of education or of sense.

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