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Pascal's Pensées

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)

[56] P. 28, l. 29. Quod crebro, etc.—Cicero, De Divin., ii, 49. [57] P. 29, l. 1. Spongia solis.—The spots on the sun. Pascal sees in them the beginning of the darkening of the sun, and thinks that there will therefore come a day when there will be no sun. [58] P. 29, l. 15. Custom is a second nature, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 22. [59] P. 29, l. 19. Omne animal.—See Genesis vii, 14. [60] P. 30, l. 22. Hence savages, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 22. [61] P. 32, l. 3. A great part of Europe, etc.—An allusion to the Reformation. [62] P. 33, l. 13. Alexander's chastity.—Pascal apparently has in mind Alexander's treatment of Darius's wife and daughters after the battle of Issus. [63] P. 34, l. 17. Lustravit lampade terras.—Part of Cicero's translation of two lines from Homer, Odyssey, xviii, 136. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. Tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse Jupiter auctiferas lustravit lampade terras. [64] P. 34, l. 32. Nature gives, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 19. [65] P. 37, l. 23. Our nature consists, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 13. [66] P. 38, l. 1. Weariness.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [67] P. 38, l. 8. Cæsar was too old, etc.—See Montaigne, Essais, ii, 34. [68] P. 38, l. 30. A mere trifle, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 4. [69] P. 40, l. 21. Advice given to Pyrrhus.—Ibid., i, 42. [70] P. 41, l. 2. They do not know, etc.—Ibid., i, 19. [71] P. 44, l. 14. They are, etc.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, i, 38.

[72] P. 46, l. 7. Those who write, etc.—A thought of Cicero in Pro Archia, mentioned by Montaigne, Essais, i, 41. [73] P. 47, l. 3. Ferox gens.—Livy, xxxiv, 17. Montaigne, Essais, i, 40. [74] P. 47, l. 5. Every opinion, etc.—Montaigne, ibid. [75] P. 47, l. 12. 184.—This is a reference to Montaigne, Essais, i, 40. See also ibid., iii, 10. [76] P. 48, l. 8. I know not what (Corneille).—See Médée, II, vi, and Rodogune, I, v. [77] P. 48, l. 22. In omnibus requiem quæsivi.—Eccles. xxiv, II, in the Vulgate. [78] P. 50, l. 5. The future alone is our end.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 3. [79] P. 50, l. 14. Solomon.—Considered by Pascal as the author of Ecclesiastes. [80] P. 50, l. 20. Unconscious of approaching fever.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, i, 19. [81] P. 50, l. 22. Cromwell.—Cromwell died in 1658 of a fever, and not of the gravel. The Restoration took place in 1660, and this fragment was written about that date. [82] P. 50, l. 28. The three hosts.—Charles I was beheaded in 1649; Queen Christina of Sweden abdicated in 1654; Jean Casimir, King of Poland, was deposed in 1656. [83] P. 50, l. 32. Macrobius.—A Latin writer of the fifth century. He was a Neo-Platonist in philosophy. One of his works is entitled Saturnalia. [84] P. 51, l. 5. The great and the humble, etc.—See Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [85] P. 53, l. 5. Miton.—A man of fashion in Paris known to Pascal. [86] P. 53, l. 15. Deus absconditus.—Is. xiv, 15.

[87] P. 60, l. 26. Fascinatio nugacitatis.—Book of Wisdom iv, 12. [88] P. 61, l. 10. Memoria hospitis, etc.—Book of Wisdom v, 15. [89] P. 62, l. 5. Instability.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, iii, 12. [90] P. 66, l. 19. Foolishness, stultitium.—I Cor. i, 18. [91] P. 71, l. 5. To prove Divinity from the works of nature.—A traditional argument of the Stoics like Cicero and Seneca, and of rationalist theologians like Raymond Sebond, Charron, etc. It is the argument from Design in modern philosophy. [92] P. 71, l. 27. Nemo novit, etc.—Matthew xi, 27. In the Vulgate, it is Neque patrem quis novit, etc. Pascal's biblical quotations are often incorrect. Many seem to have been made from memory. [93] P. 71, l. 30. Those who seek God find Him.—Matthew vii, 7. [94] P. 72, l. 3. Vere tu es Deus absconditus.—Is. xiv, 15. [95] P. 72, l. 22. Ne evacuetur crux Christi.—I Cor. i, 17. In the Vulgate we haveut non instead of ne. [96] P. 72, l. 25. The machine.—A Cartesian expression. Descartes considered animals as mere automata. According to Pascal, whatever does not proceed in us from reflective thought is a product of a necessary mechanism, which has its root in the body, and which is continued into the mind in imagination and the passions. It is therefore necessary for man so to alter, and adjust this mechanism, that it will always follow, and not obstruct, the good will. [97] P. 73, l. 3. Justus ex fide vivit.—Romans i, 17.

[98] P. 73, l. 5. Fides ex auditu.—Romans x, 17. [99] P. 73, l. 12. The creature.—What is purely natural in us. [100] P. 74, l. 15. Inclina cor meum, Deus.—Ps. cxix, 36. [101] P. 75, l. 11. Unus quisque sibi Deum fingit.—See Book of Wisdom xv, 6, 16. [102] P. 76, l. 34. Eighth beatitude.—Matthew v, 10. It is to the fourth beatitude that the thought directly refers. [103] P. 77, l. 6. One thousand and twenty-eight.—The number of the stars according to Ptolemy's catalogue. [104] P. 77, l. 29. Saint Augustine.—Epist. cxx, 3. [105] P. 78, l. 1. Nisi efficiamini sicut parvuli.—Matthew xviii, 3. [106] P. 80, l. 20. Inclina cor meum, Deus, in....—Ps. cxix, 36. [107] P. 80, l. 22. Its establishment.—The constitution of the Christian Church. [108] P. 81, l. 20. The youths and maidens and children of the Church would prophesy.—Joel ii, 28. [109] P. 83, l. 11. On what, etc.—See Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [110] P. 84, l. 16. Nihil amplius ... est.—Ibid. Cicero, De Finibus, v, 21. [111] P. 84, l. 17. Ex senatus ... exercentur.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 1. Seneca, Letters, 95. [112] P. 84, l. 18. Ut olim ... laboramus.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 13. Tacitus, Ann., iii, 25. [113] P. 84, l. 20. The interest of the sovereign.—The view of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, i, 338. [114] P. 84, l. 21. Another, present custom.—The doctrine of the Cyrenaics. Montaigne, Essais, iii, 13. [115] P. 84, l. 24. The mystical foundation of its authority.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 13. See also ii, 12.

[116] P. 85, l. 2. The wisest of legislators.—Plato. See Republic, ii, 389, and v, 459. [117] P. 85, l. 4. Cum veritatem, etc.—An inexact quotation from St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, iv, 27. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [118] P. 85, l. 17. Veri juris.—Cicero, De Officiis, iii, 17. Montaigne, Essais, iii, I. [119] P. 86, l. 9. When a strong man, etc.—Luke xi, 21. [120] P. 86, l. 26. Because he who will, etc.—See Epictetus, Diss., iii, 12. [121] P. 88, l. 19. Civil wars are the greatest of evils.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 11. [122] P. 89, l. 5. Montaigne.—Essais, i, 42. [123] P. 91, l. 8. Savages laugh at an infant king.—An allusion to a visit of some savages to Europe. They were greatly astonished to see grown men obey the child king, Charles IX. Montaigne, Essais, i, 30. [124] P. 92, l. 8. Man's true state.—See Montaigne, Essais, i, 54. [125] P. 95, l. 3. Omnis ... vanitati.—Eccles. iii, 19. [126] P. 95, l. 4. Liberabitur.—Romans viii, 20-21. [127] P. 95, l. 4. Saint Thomas.—In his Commentary on the Epistle of St. James. James ii, 1. [128] P. 96, l. 9. The account of the pike and frog of Liancourt.—The story is unknown. The Duc de Liancourt led a vicious life in youth, but was converted by his wife. He became one of the firmest supporters of Port-Royal. [129] P. 97, l. 18. Philosophers.—The Stoics. [130] P. 97, l. 24. Epictetus.—Diss., iv, 7.

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  • The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature · William James (1842–1910) · Lecture III. The Reality Of The Unseen.

    The truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere, articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclusion. Then, indeed, our intuitions and our reason work together, and great world-ruling systems, like that of the Buddhist or of the Catholic philosophy, may grow up. Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but its showy translation into formulas. The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument is but a surface exhibition. Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow. If a person feels the presence of a living God after the fashion shown by my quotations, your critical arguments, be they never so superior, will vainly set themselves to change his faith. Please observe, however, that I do not yet say that it is better that the subconscious and non-rational should thus hold primacy in the religious realm. I confine myself to simply pointing out that they do so hold it as a matter of fact. So much for our sense of the reality of the religious objects. Let me now say a brief word more about the attitudes they characteristically awaken.

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  • The Consolation of Philosophy · Boethius (480–524) · IV.

    Then said she: 'This debate about providence is an old one, and is vigorously discussed by Cicero in his "Divination"; thou also hast long and earnestly pondered the problem, yet no one has had diligence and perseverance enough to find a solution. And the reason of this obscurity is that the movement of human reasoning cannot cope with the simplicity of the Divine foreknowledge; for if a conception of its nature could in any wise be framed, no shadow of uncertainty would remain. With a view of making this at last clear and plain, I will begin by considering the arguments by which thou art swayed. First, I inquire into the reasons why thou art dissatisfied with the solution proposed, which is to the effect that, seeing the fact of foreknowledge is not thought the cause of the necessity of future events, foreknowledge is not to be deemed any hindrance to the freedom of the will. Now, surely the sole ground on which thou arguest the necessity of the future is that things which are foreknown cannot fail to come to pass. But if, as thou wert ready to acknowledge just now, the fact of foreknowledge imposes no necessity on things future, what reason is there for supposing the results of voluntary action constrained to a fixed issue? Suppose, for the sake of argument, and to see what follows, we assume that there is no foreknowledge. Are willed actions, then, tied down to any necessity in this case?' 'Certainly not.'

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. / SECT. I. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON.

    If we desire similar instances, it will not be very difficult to find them. The present subject of metaphysics will supply us abundantly. The same argument, which would have been esteemed convincing in a reasoning concerning history or politics, has little or no influence in these abstruser subjects, even though it be perfectly comprehended; and that because there is required a study and an effort of thought, in order to its being comprehended: And this effort of thought disturbs the operation of our sentiments, on which the belief depends. The case is the same in other subjects. The straining of the imagination always hinders the regular flowing of the passions and sentiments. A tragic poet, that would represent his heroes as very ingenious and witty in their misfortunes, would never touch the passions. As the emotions of the soul prevent any subtile reasoning and reflection, so these latter actions of the mind are equally prejudicial to the former. The mind, as well as the body, seems to be endowed with a certain precise degree of force and activity, which it never employs in one action, but at the expense of all the rest. This is more evidently true, where the actions are of quite different natures; since in that case the force of the mind is not only diverted, but even the disposition changed, so as to render us incapable of a sudden transition from one action to the other, and still more of performing both at once. No wonder, then, the conviction, which arises from a subtile reasoning, diminishes in proportion to the efforts, which the imagination makes to enter into the reasoning, and to conceive it in all its parts. Belief, being a lively conception, can never be entire, where it is not founded on something natural and easy.

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  • Phaedo · Plato (-428–-348) · INTRODUCTION.

    6. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always prone to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may serve to embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we cannot reason from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the inward. The progress of physiological science, without bringing us nearer to the great secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the relations of body and mind, and in this we have the advantage of the ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of immortality is to be discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have been content to rest their belief in another life on the agreement of the more enlightened part of mankind, and on the inseparable connection of such a doctrine with the existence of a God—also in a less degree on the impossibility of doubting about the continued existence of those whom we love and reverence in this world. And after all has been said, the figure, the analogy, the argument, are felt to be only approximations in different forms to an expression of the common sentiment of the human heart. That we shall live again is far more certain than that we shall take any particular form of life.

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  • A Vindication of the Rights of Woman With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects · Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) · Section 12

    I must therefore venture to doubt, whether what has been thought an axiom in morals, may not have been a dogmatical assertion made by men who have coolly seen mankind through the medium of books, and say, in direct contradiction to them, that the regulation of the passions is not always wisdom. On the contrary, it should seem, that one reason why men have superiour judgment and more fortitude than women, is undoubtedly this, that they give a freer scope to the grand passions, and by more frequently going astray, enlarge their minds. If then by the exercise of their own reason, they fix on some stable principle, they have probably to thank the force of their passions, nourished by FALSE views of life, and permitted to overleap the boundary that secures content. But if, in the dawn of life, we could soberly survey the scenes before us as in perspective, and see every thing in its true colours, how could the passions gain sufficient strength to unfold the faculties? Let me now, as from an eminence, survey the world stripped of all its false delusive charms. The clear atmosphere enables me to see each object in its true point of view, while my heart is still. I am calm as the prospect in a morning when the mists, slowly dispersing, silently unveil the beauties of nature, refreshed by rest. In what light will the world now appear? I rub my eyes and think, perchance, that I am just awaking from a lively dream.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics

    I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers—Sulzer among the rest—that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason—the existence of a Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary, that this will never be the case. For on what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the objects of experience and their internal possibility? But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability. For, as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things which transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore, rest assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not, then, have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm indifference.

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