Pascal's Pensées
Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)
Silence is the greatest persecution; the saints were never silent. It is true that a call is necessary; but it is not from the decrees of the Council that we must learn whether we are called, it is from the necessity of speaking. Now, after Rome has spoken, and we think that she has condemned the truth, and that they have written it, and after the books which have said the contrary are censured; we must cry out so much the louder, the more unjustly we are censured, and the more violently they would stifle speech, until there come a Pope who hears both parties, and who consults antiquity to do justice. So the good Popes will find the Church still in outcry. The Inquisition and the Society[379] are the two scourges of the truth. Why do you not accuse them of Arianism? For, though they have said that Jesus Christ is God, perhaps they mean by it not the natural interpretation, but as it is said, Dii estis. If my Letters are condemned at Rome, that which I condemn in them is condemned in heaven. Ad tuum, Domine Jesu, tribunal appello. You yourselves are corruptible. I feared that I had written ill, seeing myself condemned; but the example of so many pious writings makes me believe the contrary. It is no longer allowable to write well, so corrupt or ignorant is the Inquisition! "It is better to obey God than men."
I fear nothing; I hope for nothing. It is not so with the bishops. Port-Royal fears, and it is bad policy to disperse them; for they will fear no longer and will cause greater fear. I do not even fear your like censures, if they are not founded on those of tradition. Do you censure all? What! even my respect? No. Say then what, or you will do nothing, if you do not point out the evil, and why it is evil. And this is what they will have great difficulty in doing. Probability.—They have given a ridiculous explanation of certitude; for, after having established that all their ways are sure, they have no longer called that sure which leads to heaven without danger of not arriving there by it, but that which leads there without danger of going out of that road. 920 ... The saints indulge in subtleties in order to think themselves criminals, and impeach their better actions. And these indulge in subtleties in order to excuse the most wicked. The heathen sages erected a structure equally fine outside, but upon a bad foundation; and the devil deceived men by this apparent resemblance based upon the most different foundation. Man never had so good a cause as I; and others have never furnished so good a capture as you.... The more they point out weakness in my person, the more they authorise my cause.
You say that I am a heretic. Is that lawful? And if you do not fear that men do justice, do you not fear that God does justice? You will feel the force of the truth, and you will yield to it ... There is something supernatural in such a blindness. Digna necessitas.[380] Mentiris impudentissime ... Doctrina sua noscitur vir ... False piety, a double sin. I am alone against thirty thousand. No. Protect, you, the court; protect, you, deception; let me protect the truth. It is all my strength. If I lose it, I am undone. I shall not lack accusations, and persecutions. But I possess the truth, and we shall see who will take it away. I do not need to defend religion, but you do not need to defend error and injustice. Let God, out of His compassion, having no regard to the evil which is in me, and having regard to the good which is in you, grant us all grace that truth may not be overcome in my hands, and that falsehood ... 921 Probable.—Let us see if we seek God sincerely, by comparison of the things which we love. It is probable that this food will not poison me. It is probable that I shall not lose my action by not prosecuting it ... 922 It is not absolution only which remits sins by the sacrament of penance, but contrition, which is not real if it does not seek the sacrament. 923
People who do not keep their word, without faith, without honour, without truth, deceitful in heart, deceitful in speech; for which that amphibious animal in fable was once reproached, which held itself in a doubtful position between the fish and the birds ... It is important to kings and princes to be considered pious; and therefore they must confess themselves to you.
The following brief notes are mainly based on those of M. Brunschvicg. But those of MM. Faugère, Molinier, and Havet have also been consulted. The biblical references are to the Authorised English Version. Those in the text are to the Vulgate, except where it has seemed advisable to alter the reference to the English Version. [1] P. 1, l. 1. The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.—Pascal is here distinguishing the logical or discursive type of mind, a good example of which is found in mathematical reasoning, and what we should call the intuitive type of mind, which sees everything at a glance. A practical man of sound judgment exemplifies the latter; for he is in fact guided by impressions of past experience, and does not consciously reason from general principles. [2] P. 2, l. 34. There are different kinds, etc.—This is probably a subdivision of the discursive type of mind. [3] P. 3, l. 31. By rule.—This is an emendation by M. Brunschvicg. The MS. has sans règle. [4] P. 4, l. 3. I judge by my watch.—Pascal is said to have always carried a watch attached to his left wrist-band. [5] P. 5, l. 21. Scaramouch.—A traditional character in Italian comedy. [6] P. 5, l. 22. The doctor.—Also a traditional character in Italian comedy.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · What Each Of Them Contributes Thereunto
Seeing then it is Necessary that Faith, and Obedience (implyed in the word Repentance) do both concurre to our Salvation; the question by which of the two we are Justified, is impertinently disputed. Neverthelesse, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be Justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by Righteousnesse be understood the Justice of the Works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the Law of God. And therefore when wee are said to be Justified by Works, it is to be understood of the Will, which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it selfe, as well in good, as in evill men. And in this sense onely it is, that a man is called Just, or Unjust; and that his Justice Justifies him, that is, gives him the title, in Gods acceptation, of Just; and renders him capable of Living By His Faith, which before he was not. So that Justice Justifies in that that sense, in which to Justifie, is the same that to Denominate A Man Just; and not in the signification of discharging the Law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.
If I abstain from passing my Judgment, when I do not clearly and distinctly enough perceive what is Truth, ’tis evident that I do well, and that I am not deceived: But if I affirm or deny, then ’tis that I abuse the freedome of my will, and if I turn my self to that part which is false, I am deceived; but if I embrace the contrary Part, ’tis but by chance that I light on the Truth, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for ’tis Manifest by the light of Nature that the Perception of the Understanding ought to preceed the Determination of the Will. And ’tis in this abuse of Free-Will that That Privation consists, which Constitutes Error; I say there is a Privation in the Action as it proceeds from Me, but not in the Faculty which I have received from God; nor in the Action as it depends on him. Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a larger Intellective Faculty, or more Natural Light, for ’tis a necessary Incident to a finite Understanding that it should not Understand All things, and ’tis Incident to a Created Understanding to be Finite: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has bestowed upon me (tho he owed me nothing) then to think my self Robbed by him of those things which he never gave me.
Read in contextEmile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · BOOK IV
From the same principle it is plain that any man having reached old age without faith in God will not, therefore, be deprived of God’s presence in another life if his blindness was not wilful; and I maintain that it is not always wilful. You admit that it is so in the case of lunatics deprived by disease of their spiritual faculties, but not of their manhood, and therefore still entitled to the goodness of their Creator. Why then should we not admit it in the case of those brought up from infancy in seclusion, those who have led the life of a savage and are without the knowledge that comes from intercourse with other men. [Footnote: For the natural condition of the human mind and its slow development, cf. the first part of the Discours sur Inegalite.] For it is clearly impossible that such a savage could ever raise his thoughts to the knowledge of the true God. Reason tells that man should only be punished for his wilful faults, and that invincible ignorance can never be imputed to him as a crime. Hence it follows that in the sight of the Eternal Justice every man who would believe if he had the necessary knowledge is counted a believer, and that there will be no unbelievers to be punished except those who have closed their hearts against the truth.
Read in contextEssays — First Series · Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) · COMPENSATION
We feel defrauded of the retribution due to evil acts, because the criminal adheres to his vice and contumacy and does not come to a crisis or judgment anywhere in visible nature. There is no stunning confutation of his nonsense before men and angels. Has he therefore outwitted the law? Inasmuch as he carries the malignity and the lie with him he so far deceases from nature. In some manner there will be a demonstration of the wrong to the understanding also; but, should we not see it, this deadly deduction makes square the eternal account. Neither can it be said, on the other hand, that the gain of rectitude must be bought by any loss. There is no penalty to virtue; no penalty to wisdom; they are proper additions of being. In a virtuous action I properly am; in a virtuous act I add to the world; I plant into deserts conquered from Chaos and Nothing and see the darkness receding on the limits of the horizon. There can be no excess to love, none to knowledge, none to beauty, when these attributes are considered in the purest sense. The soul refuses limits, and always affirms an Optimism, never a Pessimism.
Read in contextThe Brothers Karamazov · Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881) · Chapter III. Peasant Women Who Have Faith
“Fear nothing and never be afraid; and don’t fret. If only your penitence fail not, God will forgive all. There is no sin, and there can be no sin on all the earth, which the Lord will not forgive to the truly repentant! Man cannot commit a sin so great as to exhaust the infinite love of God. Can there be a sin which could exceed the love of God? Think only of repentance, continual repentance, but dismiss fear altogether. Believe that God loves you as you cannot conceive; that He loves you with your sin, in your sin. It has been said of old that over one repentant sinner there is more joy in heaven than over ten righteous men. Go, and fear not. Be not bitter against men. Be not angry if you are wronged. Forgive the dead man in your heart what wrong he did you. Be reconciled with him in truth. If you are penitent, you love. And if you love you are of God. All things are atoned for, all things are saved by love. If I, a sinner, even as you are, am tender with you and have pity on you, how much more will God. Love is such a priceless treasure that you can redeem the whole world by it, and expiate not only your own sins but the sins of others.” He signed her three times with the cross, took from his own neck a little ikon and put it upon her. She bowed down to the earth without speaking.
Read in contextApology · Plato (-428–-348) · APOLOGY
But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be something wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal, instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure; and we ought not to encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not so—far otherwise. For I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.
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