The Enchiridion
Epictetus (55–135)
The little book by Epictetus called Enchiridion or “manual” has played a disproportionately large role in the rise of modern attitudes and modern philosophy. As soon as it had been translated into the vernacular languages, it became a bestseller among independent intellectuals, among anti-Christian thinkers, and among philosophers of a subjective cast. Montaigne had a copy of the Enchiridion among his books. Pascal violently rejected the megalomaniac pride of the Stoic philosopher. Frederick the Great carried the book with him on all campaigns. It was a source of inspiration and encouragement to Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, in the serious illness which ended only in his death; many pages of his diaries contain passages copied from the Enchiridion. It has been studied and widely quoted by Scottish philosophers like Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson who valued Stoic moral philosophy for its reconciliation of social dependency and personal independence.
That there was a rebirth of Stoicism in the centuries of rebirth which marked the emergence of the modern age was not mere chance. Philosophical, moral, and social conditions of the time united to cause it. Roman Stoicism had been developed in times of despotism as a philosophy of lonely and courageous souls who had recognized the redeeming power of philosophical reason in all the moral and social purposes of life. Philosophy as a way of life makes men free. It is the last ditch stand of liberty in a world of servitude. Many elements in the new age led to thought which had structural affinity with Roman Stoicism. Modern times had created the independent thinker, the free intellectual in a secular civilization. Modern times had destroyed medieval liberties and had established the new despotism of the absolute state supported by ecclesiastical authority. Modern philosophies continued the basic trend in Stoicism in making the subjective consciousness the foundation of philosophy. The Stoic emphasis on moral problems was also appealing in an era of rapid transition when all the values which had previously been taken for granted were questioned and reconsidered.
While it is interesting to observe how varied were the effects produced by this small volume, this epitome of the Stoic system of moral philosophy, these effects seem still more remarkable when we consider that it was not intended to be a philosophical treatise on Stoicism for students. It was, rather, to be a guide for the advanced student of Stoicism to show him the best roads toward the goal of becoming a true philosopher. Thus Epictetus and his Enchiridion have a unique position in Roman Stoicism. Seneca and Marcus Aurelius had selected Stoic philosophy as the most adequate system for expressing their existential problems of independence, solitude, and history. In this enterprise, Seneca made tremendous strides toward the insights of social psychology as a by-product of his consciousness of decadence (in this he was close to Nietzsche), but he was not primarily concerned with the unity of the Stoic system. Marcus Aurelius changed the philosophical doctrine into the regimen of the lonesome ruler. In contrast to both, Epictetus was teaching Stoic philosophy as a doctrine and as a way of life. The Enchiridion is a summary of theoretical and applied Stoicism.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · NOTES
[40] P. 22, l. 22. 399.—Ibid. [41] P. 22, l. 28. Harum sententiarum.—Cicero, Tusc., i, 11, Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [42] P. 22, l. 39. Felix qui, etc.—See above, notes on p. 22, l. 8 and l. 10. [43] P. 22, l. 40. 280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.—Essais, ii, 12. [44] P. 23, l. 1. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.—This reference is to Pascal's Traité du vide. [45] P. 23, l. 25. How comes it, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 8. [46] P. 23, l. 29. See Epictetus, Diss., iv, 6. He was a great Roman Stoic in the time of Domitian. [47] P. 24, l. 9. It is natural, etc.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, i, 4. [48] P. 24, l. 12. Imagination.—This fragment is suggestive of Montaigne. See Essais, iii, 8. [49] P. 25, l. 16. If the greatest philosopher, etc. See Raymond Sebond's Apologie, from which Pascal has derived his illustrations. [50] P. 26, l. 1. Furry cats.—Montaigne, Essais, ii, 8. [51] P. 26, l. 31. Della opinione, etc.—No work is known under this name. It may refer to a treatise by Carlo Flori, which bears a title like this. But its date (1690) is after Pascal's death (1662), though there may have been earlier editions. [52] P. 27, l. 12. Source of error in diseases.—Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [53] P. 27, l. 27. They rival each other, etc.—Ibid. [54] P. 28, l. 31. Næ iste, etc.—Terence, Heaut., IV, i, 8. Montaigne, Essais, iii, 1. [55] P. 28, l. 15. Quasi quidquam, etc.—Plin., ii, 7. Montaigne, ibid.
Read in contextPascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · NOTES
[26] P. 15, l. 1. A greater world.—Ibid., ii, 12. [27] P. 15, l. 2. On suicide and on death.—Ibid., ii, 3. [28] P. 15, l. 3. Without fear and without repentance.—Ibid., iii., 2. [29] P. 15, l. 7. (730, 231).—These two references of Pascal are to the edition of the Essais of Montaigne, published in 1636. [30] P. 16, l. 32. The centre which is everywhere, and the circumference nowhere.—M. Havet traces this saying to Empedocles. Pascal must have read it in Mlle de Gournay's preface to her edition of Montaigne's Essais. [31] P. 18, l. 33. I will speak of the whole.—This saying of Democritus is quoted by Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [32] P. 18, l. 37. Principles of Philosophy.—The title of one of Descartes's philosophical writings, published in 1644. See note on p. 13, l. 8 above. [33] P. 18, l. 39. De omni scibili.—The title under which Pico della Mirandola announced nine hundred propositions which he proposed to uphold publicly at Rome in 1486. [34] P. 19, l. 26. Beneficia eo usque læta sunt.—Tacitus, Ann., lib. iv, c. xviii. Compare Montaigne, Essais, iii, 8. [35] P. 21, l. 35. Modus quo, etc.—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xxi, 10. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [36] P. 22, l. 8. Felix qui, etc.—Virgil, Georgics, ii, 489, quoted by Montaigne, Essais, iii, 10. [37] P. 22, l. 10. Nihil admirari, etc.—Horace, Epistles, I. vi. 1. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 10. [38] P. 22, l. 19. 394.—A reference to Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [39] P. 22, l. 20. 395.—Ibid.
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XI——OF CRUELTY
[“Montaigne stops here to make his excuse for thus naming the Epicureans with the Stoics, in conformity to the general opinion that the Epicureans were not so rigid in their morals as the Stoics, which is not true in the main, as he demonstrates at one view. This involved Montaigne in a tedious parenthesis, during which it is proper that the reader be attentive, that he may not entirely lose the thread of the argument. In some later editions of this author, it has been attempted to remedy this inconvenience, but without observing that Montaigne’s argument is rendered more feeble and obscure by such vain repetitions: it is a licence that ought not to be taken, because he who publishes the work of another, ought to give it as the other composed ft. But, in Mr Cotton’s translation, he was so puzzled with this enormous parenthesis that he has quite left it out”—Coste.]
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XI——OF CRUELTY
I borrow from the vulgar opinion, which is false, notwithstanding the witty conceit of Arcesilaus in answer to one, who, being reproached that many scholars went from his school to the Epicurean, but never any from thence to his school, said in answer, “I believe it indeed; numbers of capons being made out of cocks, but never any cocks out of capons.” —[Diogenes Laertius, Life of Archesilaus, lib. iv., 43.]—For, in truth, the Epicurean sect is not at all inferior to the Stoic in steadiness, and the rigour of opinions and precepts. And a certain Stoic, showing more honesty than those disputants, who, in order to quarrel with Epicurus, and to throw the game into their hands, make him say what he never thought, putting a wrong construction upon his words, clothing his sentences, by the strict rules of grammar, with another meaning, and a different opinion from that which they knew he entertained in his mind and in his morals, the Stoic, I say, declared that he abandoned the Epicurean sect, upon this among other considerations, that he thought their road too lofty and inaccessible; [“And those are called lovers of pleasure, being in effect lovers of honour and justice, who cultivate and observe all the virtues.”—Cicero, Ep. Fam., xv. i, 19.]
Read in contextSeneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER V. ANGER IS NEITHER WARRANTABLE NOR USEFUL.
It is high time to convince the world of the indignity and uselessness of this passion, when it has the authority and recommendation of no less than Aristotle himself, as an affection very much conducing to all heroic actions that require heat and vigor: now, to show, on the other side, that it is not in any case profitable, we shall lay open the obstinate and unbridled madness of it: a wickedness neither sensible of infamy nor of glory, without either modesty or fear; and if it passes once from anger into a hardened hatred, it is incurable. It is either stronger than reason, or it is weaker. If stronger, there is no contending with it; if weaker, reason will do the business without it. Some will have it that an angry man is good-natured and sincere; whereas, in truth, he only lays himself open out of heedlessness and want of caution. If it were in itself good the more of it the better; but in this case, the more the worse; and a wise man does his duty, without the aid of anything that is ill. It is objected by some, that those are the most generous creatures which are the most prone to anger. But, first, reason in man is impetuous in beasts. Secondly, without discipline it runs into audaciousness and temerity; over and above that, the same thing does not help all. If anger helps the lion, it is fear that saves the stag, swiftness the hawk, and flight the pigeon: but man has God for his example (who is never angry) and not the creatures. And yet it is not amiss sometimes to counterfeit anger; as upon the stage; nay, upon the bench, and in the pulpit, where the imitation of it is more effectual than the thing itself.
Read in contextThus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · Chapter II. The Academic Chairs of Virtue. / Chapter IV. The Despisers of the Body. / Chapter IX. The Preachers of Death. / Chapter XV. The Thousand and One Goals. / Chapter XVIII. Old and Young Women.
Almost the whole of this is quite comprehensible. It is a discourse against all those who confound virtue with tameness and smug ease, and who regard as virtuous only that which promotes security and tends to deepen sleep. Chapter IV. The Despisers of the Body. Here Zarathustra gives names to the intellect and the instincts; he calls the one “the little sagacity” and the latter “the big sagacity.” Schopenhauer’s teaching concerning the intellect is fully endorsed here. “An instrument of thy body is also thy little sagacity, my brother, which thou callest ‘spirit,’” says Zarathustra. From beginning to end it is a warning to those who would think too lightly of the instincts and unduly exalt the intellect and its derivatives: Reason and Understanding. Chapter IX. The Preachers of Death. This is an analysis of the psychology of all those who have the “evil eye” and are pessimists by virtue of their constitutions. Chapter XV. The Thousand and One Goals. In this discourse Zarathustra opens his exposition of the doctrine of relativity in morality, and declares all morality to be a mere means to power. Needless to say that verses 9, 10, 11, and 12 refer to the Greeks, the Persians, the Jews, and the Germans respectively. In the penultimate verse he makes known his discovery concerning the root of modern Nihilism and indifference,—i.e., that modern man has no goal, no aim, no ideals (see Note A). Chapter XVIII. Old and Young Women.
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