Pascal's Pensées
Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)
[7] P. 5, l. 24. Cleobuline.—Princess, and afterwards Queen of Corinth, figures in the romance of Mademoiselle de Scudéry, entitled Artamène ou le Grand Cyrus. She is enamoured of one of her subjects, Myrinthe. But she "loved him without thinking of love; and remained so long in that error, that this affection was no longer in a state to be overcome, when she became aware of it." The character is supposed to have been drawn from Christina of Sweden. [8] P. 6, l. 21. Rivers are, etc.—Apparently suggested by a chapter in Rabelais: How we descended in the isle of Odes, in which the roads walk. [9] P. 6, l. 30. Salomon de Tultie.—A pseudonym adopted by Pascal as the author of the Provincial Letters. [10] P. 7, l. 7. Abstine et sustine.—A maxim of the Stoics. [11] P. 7, l. 8. Follow nature.—The maxim in which the Stoics summed up their positive ethical teaching. [12] P. 7, l. 9. As Plato.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, iii, 9. [13] P. 9, l. 29. We call this jargon poetical beauty.—According to M. Havet, Pascal refers here to Malherbe and his school. [14] P. 10, l. 23. Ne quid nimis.—Nothing in excess, a celebrated maxim in ancient Greek philosophy. [15] P. 11, l. 26. That epigram about two one-eyed people.—M. Havet points out that this is not Martial's, but is to be found in Epigrammatum Delectus, published by Port-Royal in 1659.
Lumine Æon dextro, capta est Leonilla sinistro, Et potis est forma vincere uterque deos. Blande puer, lumen quod habes concede parenti, Sic tu cæcus Amor, sic erit ilia Venus. [16] P. 11, l. 29. Ambitiosa recidet ornamenta.—Horace, De Arte Poetica, 447. [17] P. 13, l. 2. Cartesian.—One who follows the philosophy of Descartes (1596-1650), "the father of modern philosophy." [18] P. 13, l. 8. Le Maître.—A famous French advocate in Pascal's time. His Plaidoyers el Harangues appeared in 1657. Plaidoyer VI is entitled Pour un fils mis en religion par force, and on the first page occurs the word répandre: "Dieu qui répand des aveuglements et des ténèbres sur les passions illégitimes." Pascal's reference is probably to this passage. [19] P. 13, l. 12. The Cardinal.—Mazarin. He was one of those statesmen who do not like condolences. [20] P. 14, l. 12. Saint Thomas.—Thomas Aquinas (1223-74), one of the greatest scholastic philosophers. [21] P. 14, l. 16. Charron.—A friend of Montaigne. His Traité de la Sagesse (1601), which is not a large book, contains 117 chapters, each of which is subdivided. [22] P. 14, l. 17. Of the confusion of Montaigne.—The Essays of Montaigne follow each other without any kind of order. [23] P. 14, l. 27. Mademoiselle de Gournay.—The adopted daughter of Montaigne. She published in 1595 an edition of his Essais, and, in a Preface (added later), she defends him on this point. [24] P. 15, l. 1. People without eyes.—Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [25] P. 15, l. 1. Squaring the circle.—Ibid., ii, 14.
[26] P. 15, l. 1. A greater world.—Ibid., ii, 12. [27] P. 15, l. 2. On suicide and on death.—Ibid., ii, 3. [28] P. 15, l. 3. Without fear and without repentance.—Ibid., iii., 2. [29] P. 15, l. 7. (730, 231).—These two references of Pascal are to the edition of the Essais of Montaigne, published in 1636. [30] P. 16, l. 32. The centre which is everywhere, and the circumference nowhere.—M. Havet traces this saying to Empedocles. Pascal must have read it in Mlle de Gournay's preface to her edition of Montaigne's Essais. [31] P. 18, l. 33. I will speak of the whole.—This saying of Democritus is quoted by Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [32] P. 18, l. 37. Principles of Philosophy.—The title of one of Descartes's philosophical writings, published in 1644. See note on p. 13, l. 8 above. [33] P. 18, l. 39. De omni scibili.—The title under which Pico della Mirandola announced nine hundred propositions which he proposed to uphold publicly at Rome in 1486. [34] P. 19, l. 26. Beneficia eo usque læta sunt.—Tacitus, Ann., lib. iv, c. xviii. Compare Montaigne, Essais, iii, 8. [35] P. 21, l. 35. Modus quo, etc.—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xxi, 10. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [36] P. 22, l. 8. Felix qui, etc.—Virgil, Georgics, ii, 489, quoted by Montaigne, Essais, iii, 10. [37] P. 22, l. 10. Nihil admirari, etc.—Horace, Epistles, I. vi. 1. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 10. [38] P. 22, l. 19. 394.—A reference to Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [39] P. 22, l. 20. 395.—Ibid.
[40] P. 22, l. 22. 399.—Ibid. [41] P. 22, l. 28. Harum sententiarum.—Cicero, Tusc., i, 11, Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [42] P. 22, l. 39. Felix qui, etc.—See above, notes on p. 22, l. 8 and l. 10. [43] P. 22, l. 40. 280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.—Essais, ii, 12. [44] P. 23, l. 1. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.—This reference is to Pascal's Traité du vide. [45] P. 23, l. 25. How comes it, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 8. [46] P. 23, l. 29. See Epictetus, Diss., iv, 6. He was a great Roman Stoic in the time of Domitian. [47] P. 24, l. 9. It is natural, etc.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, i, 4. [48] P. 24, l. 12. Imagination.—This fragment is suggestive of Montaigne. See Essais, iii, 8. [49] P. 25, l. 16. If the greatest philosopher, etc. See Raymond Sebond's Apologie, from which Pascal has derived his illustrations. [50] P. 26, l. 1. Furry cats.—Montaigne, Essais, ii, 8. [51] P. 26, l. 31. Della opinione, etc.—No work is known under this name. It may refer to a treatise by Carlo Flori, which bears a title like this. But its date (1690) is after Pascal's death (1662), though there may have been earlier editions. [52] P. 27, l. 12. Source of error in diseases.—Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [53] P. 27, l. 27. They rival each other, etc.—Ibid. [54] P. 28, l. 31. Næ iste, etc.—Terence, Heaut., IV, i, 8. Montaigne, Essais, iii, 1. [55] P. 28, l. 15. Quasi quidquam, etc.—Plin., ii, 7. Montaigne, ibid.
[56] P. 28, l. 29. Quod crebro, etc.—Cicero, De Divin., ii, 49. [57] P. 29, l. 1. Spongia solis.—The spots on the sun. Pascal sees in them the beginning of the darkening of the sun, and thinks that there will therefore come a day when there will be no sun. [58] P. 29, l. 15. Custom is a second nature, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 22. [59] P. 29, l. 19. Omne animal.—See Genesis vii, 14. [60] P. 30, l. 22. Hence savages, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 22. [61] P. 32, l. 3. A great part of Europe, etc.—An allusion to the Reformation. [62] P. 33, l. 13. Alexander's chastity.—Pascal apparently has in mind Alexander's treatment of Darius's wife and daughters after the battle of Issus. [63] P. 34, l. 17. Lustravit lampade terras.—Part of Cicero's translation of two lines from Homer, Odyssey, xviii, 136. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. Tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse Jupiter auctiferas lustravit lampade terras. [64] P. 34, l. 32. Nature gives, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 19. [65] P. 37, l. 23. Our nature consists, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 13. [66] P. 38, l. 1. Weariness.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [67] P. 38, l. 8. Cæsar was too old, etc.—See Montaigne, Essais, ii, 34. [68] P. 38, l. 30. A mere trifle, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 4. [69] P. 40, l. 21. Advice given to Pyrrhus.—Ibid., i, 42. [70] P. 41, l. 2. They do not know, etc.—Ibid., i, 19. [71] P. 44, l. 14. They are, etc.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, i, 38.
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Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XII. — APOLOGY FOR RAIMOND SEBOND.
The philosophers, methinks, have not much touched this string, no more than another of equal importance; they have this dilemma continually in their mouths, to console our mortal condition: “The soul is either mortal or immortal; if mortal, it will suffer no pain; if immortal, it will change for the better.”—They never touch the other branch, “What if she change for the worse?” and leave to the poets the menaces of future torments. But thereby they make themselves a good game. These are two omissions that I often meet with in their discourses. I return to the first. This soul loses the use of the sovereign stoical good, so constant and so firm. Our fine human wisdom must here yield, and give up her arms. As to the rest, they also considered, by the vanity of human reason, that the mixture and association of two so contrary things as the mortal and the immortal, was unimaginable:— Quippe etenim mortale terao jungere, et una Consentire putare, et fungi mutua posse, Desipere est. Quid enim diversius esse putandum est, Aut magis inter se disjunctum discrepitansque, Quam, mortale quod est, immortali atque perenni Junctum, in concilio, svas tolerare procellas? “The mortal and th’ eternal, then, to blend, And think they can pursue one common end, Is madness: for what things more diff’rent are. Distinct in nature, and disposed to jar? How can it then be thought that these should bear, When thus conjoined, of harms an equal share?” Moreover, they perceived the soul tending towards death as well as the body:—
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Worship Publique And Private / The End Of Worship / Attributes Of Divine Honour
Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God. Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God. Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take from him the care of Mankind; take from him his Honour: for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour. Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we can; because to Finite, it is easie to adde more. Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is Finite: Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite: Not to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes onely of things Finite: Nor to say he is this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is bounded, and Finite: Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to him Place:
Read in contextPhaedo · Plato (-428–-348) · PHAEDO
And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at the matter thus:—if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and this was wisdom—and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death. He would, indeed, replied Simmias.
Read in contextPhaedo · Plato (-428–-348) · PHAEDO
Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, may be left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:—You want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove this; and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality. Admitting the soul to be longlived, and to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality. This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, Cebes; and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · THE LIFE OF MONTAIGNE
The minute and constant watchfulness of Montaigne over his health and over himself might lead one to suspect that excessive fear of death which degenerates into cowardice. But was it not rather the fear of the operation for the stone, at that time really formidable? Or perhaps he was of the same way of thinking with the Greek poet, of whom Cicero reports this saying: “I do not desire to die; but the thought of being dead is indifferent to me.” Let us hear, however, what he says himself on this point very frankly: “It would be too weak and unmanly on my part if, certain as I am of always finding myself in the position of having to succumb in that way,—[To the stone or gravel.]—and death coming nearer and nearer to me, I did not make some effort, before the time came, to bear the trial with fortitude. For reason prescribes that we should joyfully accept what it may please God to send us. Therefore the only remedy, the only rule, and the sole doctrine for avoiding the evils by which mankind is surrounded, whatever they are, is to resolve to bear them so far as our nature permits, or to put an end to them courageously and promptly.”
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XI——OF CRUELTY
[“Montaigne stops here to make his excuse for thus naming the Epicureans with the Stoics, in conformity to the general opinion that the Epicureans were not so rigid in their morals as the Stoics, which is not true in the main, as he demonstrates at one view. This involved Montaigne in a tedious parenthesis, during which it is proper that the reader be attentive, that he may not entirely lose the thread of the argument. In some later editions of this author, it has been attempted to remedy this inconvenience, but without observing that Montaigne’s argument is rendered more feeble and obscure by such vain repetitions: it is a licence that ought not to be taken, because he who publishes the work of another, ought to give it as the other composed ft. But, in Mr Cotton’s translation, he was so puzzled with this enormous parenthesis that he has quite left it out”—Coste.]
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