Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
* As for Example, When lately I set my self to examine Whether any Thing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting my self to examine such a Thing, it evidently follows, That I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I was thereunto. This expression, Great Light in the Understanding, is Metaphorical, and therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a Light, and has no less a Propension in his Will to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that really and truely knows a Thing. Wherefore this Light may be the cause of Defending and Holding an Opinion Obstinately, but never of knowing an Opinion Truly. Moreover not only the Knowledge of Truth, but Belief or Giving Assent, are not the Acts of the Will; for Whatever is proved by strong Arguments, or Credibly told, we Believe whether we will or no.
’Tis true, To Affirm or Deny Propositions, to Defend or Oppose Propositions, are the Acts of the Will; but it does not from thence Follow that the Internal Assent depends on the Will. Wherefore the following Conclusion (so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that Privation consists which Constitutes Error) is not fully Demonstrated. ANSWER. ’Tis not much matter, Whether this expression, Great Light, be Argumentative or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all men know, that by light in the understanding is meant clearness of knowledge, which every one has not, that thinks he has; and this hinders not but this light in the Understanding may be very different from an obstinate Opinion taken up without clear perception. But when ’tis here said, That we assent to things clearly perceived whether we will or no, ’tis the same, as if it were said, that willing or nilling, we desire Good clearly known; whereas the word Nilling, finds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill the same thing.
* As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal, which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this, that many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle. If a Triangle be no where, I understand not how it can have any Nature, for what is no where, is not, and therefore has not a Being, or any Nature. A Triangle in the Mind arises from a Triangle seen, or from one made up of what has been seen, but when once we have given the name of a Triangle to a thing (from which we think the Idea of a Triangle arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the name continues; In the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, and when we have given this other name (viz. Having its three Angles equal to two right ones) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the World, yet the Name would still continue, and this Proposition, A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones, would be eternally true. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroy’d.
This Proposition likewise, A Man is an Animal, will be true to Eternity, because the Word Animal will eternally signifie what the Word Man signifies; but certainly if Mankind perish, Humane Nature will be no longer. From whence ’tis Manifest, That Essence as ’tis distinguish’d from Existence is nothing more than the Copulation of Names by this word Is, and therefore Essence without Existence is meerly a Fiction of our own; and as the Image of a Man in the Mind is to a Man, so it seems Essence is to Existence. Or as this Proposition Socrates is a Man, is to this, Socrates Is or Exists, so is the Essence of Socrates to his Existence. Now this Proposition, Socrates is a Man, when Socrates does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the Names, and the word Is carries under it the Image of the unity of the thing, which is called by these Two Names. ANSWER. The Difference between Essence and Existence is known to all Men. And what is here said of Eternal Names instead of Eternal Truth, has been long ago sufficiently rejected.
* And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe, that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from Corporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings exist. ’Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for their Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the fault of Deceit does not consist in the falsity of Words; but in the Injury done to the Person deceived. Let D. Cartes therefore consider whether this Proposition, God can upon no account deceive us, Universally taken be true; For if it be not true so universally taken, that Conclusion, Therefore Corporeal Beings exist, will not follow. ANSWER. ’Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, That we cannot be deceived on any account (for I willingly granted, that we may be often deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our Error argues that in God there is such a Will to Cheat us as would be contradictious to his Nature. And here again we have a wrong inference in this Objection.
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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable Ideas of certain things, which tho perhaps they exist no where without Me, yet they cannot Be said to be Nothing; and tho they are Thought upon by me at my will and pleasure, yet they are not made by Me, but have their own True and Immutable Natures. As when, for example, * I Imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure Exists no where out of my Thoughts, nor ever will Exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is Immutable and Eternal, which is neither made by me, nor depends on my mind, as appears for that many properties may be demonstrated of this Triangle, viz. That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now clearly know whether I will or not, tho before I never thought on them, when I imagine a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this Idea of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of sense, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a Triangular Shape; for I can think of Innumerable other Figures, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my senses, and yet I can Demonstrate various properties of them, as well as of a Triangle, which certainly are all true, seeing I know them clearly, and therefore they are something, and not a meer Nothing, for ’tis Evident that what is true is something.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
Solution. For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a God; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a First and Cheif Being, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an Idea thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of Perfections, tho I do not at that time count them over, or Remark each single One; which necessity is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider Existence to be a Perfection) conclude Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a Triangle, yet whenever I please to Consider of a Right-lined Figure having only three Angles, I am then necessitated to allow it all those Requisites from which I may argue rightly, That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be inscribed within a Circle, I am not at all necessitated to think that all Quadrilateral Figures are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I clearly and distinctly Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these False suppositions, and True natural Ideas, the first and Chief; whereof is that of a God; For by many wayes I understand That not to be a Fiction depending on my Thought, but an Image of a True and Immutable Nature; As first, because I can think of no other thing but God to Whose Essence Existence belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine Two or More Gods, and supposing that he is now only One, I may plainly perceive it necessary for Him to Have been from Eternity, and will Be to Eternity; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in God, Which I cannot Change, and from which I cannot Detract.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. X.
Considering the Attributes of God, that from thence we may gather an Idea of God, and that we may enquire whether there be not something in that Idea which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover (if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the Venerable name of God proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that they should have any other Original then from Outward Objects. For by the Name of God I understand a Substance, that is, I understand that God Exists (not by an Idea, but by Reasoning) Infinite (that is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an Idea of Gods Infinity but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the Word Infinite. Independent, That is, I do not conceive any Cause from which God may proceed; from whence ’tis evident that I have no other Idea at the word Independent, but the memory of my own Ideas which at Different Times have Different Beginnings, and Consequently they must be Dependent.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
Doubt. Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident, but looks rather like a sophism; for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence, I can easily perswade my self that the Existence of God may be distinguish’d from his Essence, so that I may Imagine God not to Exist. Solution. But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the Existence of God can no more be seperated from his Essence, then the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be seperated from the Essence of a Triangle, or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley; so that ’tis no less a Repugnancy to think of a God (that is, A Being infinitely perfect) who wants Existence (that is, who wants a Perfection) then to think of a Mountain, to which there is no Valley adjoyning. Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing, or a Mountain without a Vally? yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Vally, it does not from thence follow, that there Is a Mountain in the World; so supposing me to think of a God as Existing, yet does it not follow that God Really Exists. For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things, and as I may imagine a Winged Horse, tho no Horse has Wings, so I may imagine an existing God, tho no God exist.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.
But that this may be made more Plain, I must first examine the difference between Imagination, and pure Intellection, or Understanding. So, for example, when I Imagine a Triangle, I do not only Understand that it is a figure comprehended by three Lines, but I also behold with the eye of my mind those three lines as it were before Me, and this is that which I call imagination. But if I convert my Thoughts to a Chiliogone, or Figure consisting of a Thousand Angles, I know as well that this Is a figure comprehended by a Thousand sides, as I know that a Triangle is a Figure Consisting of three sides; but I do not in the same Manner Imagine, or behold as present those thousand sides, as I do the three sides of a Triangle. And tho at the time when I so think of a Chiliogone, I may confusedly represent to my self some Figure (because whenever I Think of a Corporeal Object, I am used to Imagine some Shape or other) yet ’tis evident that this Representation is not a Chiliogone, because ’tis in nothing different from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a Milion-angled figure, or any other Figure of More sides; Neither does such a Confused Representation help me in the least to know those Properties, by which a Chiliogone differs from other Polygones or Manyangled Figures. But if a Question be put concerning a Pentagone, I know I may Understand its Shape, as I Understand the Shape, of a Chiliogone, without the help of Imagination, but I can also imagine it, by applying the Eye of my Mind to its Five sides, and to the Area or space contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a peculiar sort of Operation in the Mind to imagine a Thing, which I require not to Understand a Thing; which New Operation of the Mind plainly shews the difference between imagination and pure Intellection.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.
But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose Ideas I have within Me) are Really Existent without Me; And that is Thus: As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking, I acknowledge no Inequality between them, and they all proceed from me in the same Manner. But as one Represents one thing, an other, an other Thing, ’tis Evident there is a Great difference between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reallity in them, then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reallity, then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited. But Now, it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause, as there is in the Effect of that Cause; For from Whence can the effect have its Reallity, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause give it that Reallity, unless it self have it? And from hence it follows, that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing, Neither a Thing which is more Perfect (that is, Which has in it self more Reallity) proceed from That Which is Less Perfect.
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