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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

* As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal, which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this, that many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle. If a Triangle be no where, I understand not how it can have any Nature, for what is no where, is not, and therefore has not a Being, or any Nature. A Triangle in the Mind arises from a Triangle seen, or from one made up of what has been seen, but when once we have given the name of a Triangle to a thing (from which we think the Idea of a Triangle arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the name continues; In the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, and when we have given this other name (viz. Having its three Angles equal to two right ones) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the World, yet the Name would still continue, and this Proposition, A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones, would be eternally true. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroy’d.

This Proposition likewise, A Man is an Animal, will be true to Eternity, because the Word Animal will eternally signifie what the Word Man signifies; but certainly if Mankind perish, Humane Nature will be no longer. From whence ’tis Manifest, That Essence as ’tis distinguish’d from Existence is nothing more than the Copulation of Names by this word Is, and therefore Essence without Existence is meerly a Fiction of our own; and as the Image of a Man in the Mind is to a Man, so it seems Essence is to Existence. Or as this Proposition Socrates is a Man, is to this, Socrates Is or Exists, so is the Essence of Socrates to his Existence. Now this Proposition, Socrates is a Man, when Socrates does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the Names, and the word Is carries under it the Image of the unity of the thing, which is called by these Two Names. ANSWER. The Difference between Essence and Existence is known to all Men. And what is here said of Eternal Names instead of Eternal Truth, has been long ago sufficiently rejected.

* And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe, that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from Corporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings exist. ’Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for their Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the fault of Deceit does not consist in the falsity of Words; but in the Injury done to the Person deceived. Let D. Cartes therefore consider whether this Proposition, God can upon no account deceive us, Universally taken be true; For if it be not true so universally taken, that Conclusion, Therefore Corporeal Beings exist, will not follow. ANSWER. ’Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, That we cannot be deceived on any account (for I willingly granted, that we may be often deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our Error argues that in God there is such a Will to Cheat us as would be contradictious to his Nature. And here again we have a wrong inference in this Objection.

* For now I plainly discover a great difference between them (that is sleep and waking) for my Dreams are never conjoyn’d by my Memory, with the other Actions of my Life. I desire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man dreaming, that the doubts whether he dream or not, may not Dream, that he joyns his Dream to the Ideas of things past long since; if he may, than those Actions of his past life, may be thought as true if he were awake. Moreover because (as D. Cartes affirms) the Certainty and truth of all knowledge depends only on the knowledge of the True God, either an Atheist cannot from the Memory of his past life conclude that he is awake, or else ’tis possible for a man to know that he is awake without the Knowledge of the True God. ANSWER. A Man that dreams cannot really connect his dreams with the Ideas of past things, tho, I confess, he may dream that he so connects them; for whoever deny’d That a man when he is a sleep may be Deceived? But when he awakens he may easily discover his Error. An Atheist from the memory of his past life may collect that he is awake, but he cannot know, that this Sign is sufficient to make him certain, that he is not deceived, unless he know that he is created by a God that will not deceive him. FINIS.

A Catalogue of some Books sold by Benjamin Took at the Ship in St. Pauls Church-yard. Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri novem ejusdem narratio de vita Homeri, Gr. Lat. & H. Stephani Apologia pro Herodoto accesserunt huic Edition Chronologia Historia, & Tabula Geographica Herodotææ, necnon variantes Lectiones & notæ ex pluribus M. S. S. Cod. & Antiquis scriptoribus collectæ. fol. Francisci Suarez. Doct. Theol. Grau. Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore in decem libros distributus. fol. Thorndicius de Ratione ac Jure finiendi Controversias Ecclesiæ. fol. The Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by N. Causin, translated by Sir T. H. the fourth Edition. fol. The Works of the most Reverend John Bramhal, D. D. late L. Archbishop of Armagh, some of which never before printed, with the life of the Author, &c. fol. The History and Vindication of the Irish Remonstrance against all Calumnies and Censures in several Treatises. folio. A Collection of all the Statutes now in use in the Kingdom of Ireland, with Notes in the Margin. And likewise the Acts of Settlement and Explanation, with the rest of the Acts, made in the Reign of his Majesty that now is, to the dissolution of the Parliament, Aug. 7. 1666. Several Chyrurgical Treatises by Rich. Wiseman, Serjeant Chyrurgion. folio. The Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined, according to the light of Nature, written by Sir M. Hale, Kt. late Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench. folio. Sir Rich. Baker’s Chronicle of the Kings of England from the Romans Government to this time.

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  • Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 1

    *****Note—Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.) that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:—

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  • Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 2

    We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point. Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.

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  • Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 3

    I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop. xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection or change.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.

    This opinion is certainly very curious, and well worth our attention; but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this place, if we reflect a moment on our present purpose in taking notice of it. We have established it as a principle, that as all ideas are derived from impressions, or some precedent perceptions, it is impossible we can have any idea of power and efficacy, unless some instances can be produced, wherein this power is perceived to exert itself. Now, as these instances can never be discovered in body, the Cartesians, proceeding upon their principle of innate ideas, have had recourse to a supreme spirit or deity, whom they consider as the only active being in the universe, and as the immediate cause of every alteration in matter. But the principle of innate ideas being allowed to be false, it follows, that the supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are presented to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in our own minds. For if every idea be derived from an impression, the idea of a deity proceeds from the same origin; and if no impression, either of sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy, it is equally impossible to discover or even imagine any such active principle in the deity. Since these philosophers, therefore, have concluded, that matter cannot be endowed with any efficacious principle, because it is impossible to discover in it such a principle; the same course of reasoning should determine them to exclude it from the supreme being. Or if they esteem that opinion absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how they may avoid it; and that is, by concluding from the very first, that they have no adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object; since neither in body nor spirit, neither in superior nor inferior natures, are they able to discover one single instance of it.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART IV

    Finally, if there be still persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of the soul, by the reasons I have adduced, I am desirous that they should know that all the other propositions, of the truth of which they deem themselves perhaps more assured, as that we have a body, and that there exist stars and an earth, and such like, are less certain; for, although we have a moral assurance of these things, which is so strong that there is an appearance of extravagance in doubting of their existence, yet at the same time no one, unless his intellect is impaired, can deny, when the question relates to a metaphysical certitude, that there is sufficient reason to exclude entire assurance, in the observation that when asleep we can in the same way imagine ourselves possessed of another body and that we see other stars and another earth, when there is nothing of the kind. For how do we know that the thoughts which occur in dreaming are false rather than those other which we experience when awake, since the former are often not less vivid and distinct than the latter? And though men of the highest genius study this question as long as they please, I do not believe that they will be able to give any reason which can be sufficient to remove this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.

    Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless, esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.

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