Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces Gods Understanding from outward Things, and yet I can easily explain what Idea I have thereof, by saying, that by the Idea of Gods Understanding I conceive whatever is the Form of any Perception; For who is there that does not perceive that he understands something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an Idea of understanding, and by enlarging it Indefinitely he forms the Idea of Gods Understanding. And so of his other Attributes. And seeing we have made use of that Idea of God which is in us to demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain’d in this Idea such an Immense Power, that we conceive it a contradiction for God to Exist, and yet that any thing should Be besides Him, which was not Created by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from God, were Created by God. Lastly when we assert, that some Ideas are Innate or natural to us, we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no Idea would be Innate) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of producing them.
* The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, viz, having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my mind. Wherefore seeing ’tis not demonstrated that we have an Idea of God, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that God is Inconceivable, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an Idea of Him, it follows, that the Existence of God is not demonstrated, much less the Creation. ANSWER. When God is said to be Inconceiveable ’tis understood of an Adequate full conception. But I am ’een tired with often repeating, how notwithstanding we may have an Idea of God. So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my demonstration.
* By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being, Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God. ’Tis Certain that Ignorance is only a Defect, and that there is no Occasion of any Positive Faculty to make us Ignorant. But this position is not so clear in Relation to Error, for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot Err, for this Reason only, because they have not the Faculties of Reasoning or Imagination; from whence ’tis Natural for us to Conclude, That to Err there is requisite a Faculty of Judging, or at least of Imagining, both which Faculties are Positive, and given to all Creatures subject to Error, and to Them only. Moreover Des-Cartes says thus, I find (my Errors) to Depend on two concurring Causes, viz. on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of Choosing, or Freedom of my Will. Which seems Contradictious to what he said before; And here also we may note, that Freedom of Will is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists. ANSWER.
Tho to make us Err there is requisite a Faculty of Reasoning (or rather of Judging, that is, of Affirming and Denying) because Error is the Defect thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that this Defect is any thing Real, for neither is Blindness a Real Thing, tho stones cannot be said to be Blind, for this Reason only, That they are incapable of sight. And I much wonder that in all these Objections I have not found one Right Inference. I have not here assumed any thing concerning the Freedom of Mans Will, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position. Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting Gods predisposal of Things cannot Comprehend, How their Freedom of Will Consists there-with, but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by Experience, That ’tis one and the same Thing to be Willing, and to be Free. But ’tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter.
* As for Example, When lately I set my self to examine Whether any Thing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting my self to examine such a Thing, it evidently follows, That I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I was thereunto. This expression, Great Light in the Understanding, is Metaphorical, and therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a Light, and has no less a Propension in his Will to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that really and truely knows a Thing. Wherefore this Light may be the cause of Defending and Holding an Opinion Obstinately, but never of knowing an Opinion Truly. Moreover not only the Knowledge of Truth, but Belief or Giving Assent, are not the Acts of the Will; for Whatever is proved by strong Arguments, or Credibly told, we Believe whether we will or no.
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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.
By which I understand that Error * (as it is Error) is not any real Being dependant on God, but it is only a Defect; And that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a faculty of Erring given me by God, but only it so happens that I Err meerly because the Judicative faculty, which he has given me, is not Infinite. But yet this Account is not fully satisfactory; for Error is not only a meer Negation, but ’tis a Privation, or a want of a certain Knowledge, which ought (as it were) to be in me. And when I consider the Nature of God, it seems impossible that he should give me any faculty which is not perfect in its kind, or which should want any of its due perfections; for if by how much the more skilful the Workman is, by so much the Perfecter Works proceed from him. What can be made by the Great Maker of all things which is not fully perfect? For I cannot Doubt but God may Create me so that I may never be deceived, neither can I doubt but that he Wills whatever is Best; Is it therefore better for me to be deceived, or not to be deceived?
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. XII. Against the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falshood.
Tho to make us Err there is requisite a Faculty of Reasoning (or rather of Judging, that is, of Affirming and Denying) because Error is the Defect thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that this Defect is any thing Real, for neither is Blindness a Real Thing, tho stones cannot be said to be Blind, for this Reason only, That they are incapable of sight. And I much wonder that in all these Objections I have not found one Right Inference. I have not here assumed any thing concerning the Freedom of Mans Will, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position. Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting Gods predisposal of Things cannot Comprehend, How their Freedom of Will Consists there-with, but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by Experience, That ’tis one and the same Thing to be Willing, and to be Free. But ’tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.
Furthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what these Errors of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my Imperfection) * I find them to depend on two concurring Causes, on my faculty of Knowing, and on my faculty of Choosing or Freedome of my Will, that is to say, from my Understanding, and my Will together. For by my Understanding alone I only perceive Ideas, whereon I make Judgments, wherein (precisely so taken) there can be no Error, properly so called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things, whose Ideas I have not in Me, yet I am not properly to be said Deprived of them, but only negatively wanting them; and I cannot prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of Knowing. And tho I understand him to be a skilful Workman, yet I cannot Think, that he ought to have put all those perfections in each Work of his singly, with which he might have endowed some of them. Neither can I complain that God has not given me a Will, or Freedom of Choise, large and perfect enough; for I have experienced that ’tis Circumscribed by no Bounds.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.
I have also found in my self a Judicative faculty, which certainly (as all other things I possess) I have received from God; and seeing he will not deceive me, he has surely given me such a Judgement, that I can never Err, whilst I make a Right Use of it. Of which truth I can make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That therefore I can never Err; for if whatever I have, I have from God, and if he gave me no Faculty of Erring, I may seem not to be able to Err. And truly so it is whilst I think upon God, and wholly convert my self to the consideration of him, I find no occasion of Error or Deceit; but yet when I return to the Contemplation of my self, I find my self liable to Innumerable Errors. Enquiring into the cause of which, I find in my self an Idea, not only a real and positive one of a God, that is, of a Being infinitely perfect, but also (as I may so speak) a Negative Idea of Nothing; that is to say, I am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect Being and No-being, that as I am Created by the Highest Being, I have nothing in Me by which I may be deceived or drawn into Error; but as I pertake in a manner of Nothing, or of a No-Being, that is, as I my self am not the Highest Being, and as I want many perfections, ’tis no Wonder that I should be Deceived.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.
From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors? To which, I answer, that they proceed from hence only, that seeing the Will expatiates it self farther then the Understanding, I keep it not within the same bounds with my Understanding, but often extend it to those things which I Understand not, to which things it being Indifferent, it easily Declines from what is True and Good; and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth Exist, and found that from my setting my self to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly Understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly, by how much the less indifferent I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks, but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature, and it so happens that I doubt, whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature, or Whether they are both the same: but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways, and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either, or to Judge nothing of either; But this indifferency extends it self not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant, but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them; for tho never so probable Guesses incline me to one side, yet the Knowing that they are only Conjectures, and not indubitable reasons, is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced, when I supposed all those things (which formerly I assented to as most True) as very False, for this Reason only that I found my self able to doubt of them in some manner.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.
Neither can it be objected, that I cannot comprehend an Infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God, which I can neither conceive, nor in the least think upon; for it is of the very nature of an Infinite not to be apprehendable by me who am finite. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my Idea of God to be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct Idea of all those Ideas I have, upon this account, that I understand that God is not to be understood, and that I judge that whatever I clearly perceive and know Implys any perfection, as also perhaps other innumerable perfections, which I am ignorant of, are in God either formally or eminently. Doubt. But perhaps I am something more then I take my self to be, and perhaps all these perfections which I attribute to God, are potentially in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my Knowledge may be encreased, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not encrease by degrees in Infinitum, nor why by my knowledge so encreased I may not attain to the other perfections of God; nor lastly, why the power or aptitude of having these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the Idea of them in me.
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