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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

Wherefore, to say that God is Independent, is only to say That God is in the Number of those things, the Original whereof I do not Imagine: and so to say that God is Infinite, is the same as if we say That He is in the Number of Those Things whose Bounds we do not Conceive: And thus any Idea of God is Exploded, for What Idea can we have without Beginning or Ending? Omniscient or Understanding all things, Here I desire to know, by what Idea, Des-Cartes understands Gods Understanding? Almighty, I desire also to know by What Idea Gods Power is understood? For Power is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For my Part, I understand Power from the Image or Memory of past Actions, arguing with my self thus, He did so, therefore he was able (or had Power) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have Power to do so. But now all these are Ideas that may arise from external Objects.

Creatour of all things, I can frame an Image of Creation from what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that shape and size he now bears; an other Idea then this no man can have at the word Creatour; But the Possibility of Imagining a Creation is not sufficient to prove that the world was created. And therefore tho it were Demonstrated that some Infinite Independent Almighty Being did exist, yet it will not from thence follow that a Creatour exists; unless one can think this to be a right inference, we believe that there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the world was Created thereby. Moreover when he says, that the Idea of God, and of our Soul is Innate or born in us, I would fain know, whether the Souls of those that sleep soundly do think unless they dream; If not, then at that time they have no Ideas, and consequently no Idea is Innate, for what is Innate to us is never Absent from us. ANSWER. None of Gods Attributes can proceed from outward objects as from a Pattern, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in External, that is, Corporeal things; Now ’tis manifest that whatever we think of in him differing or unlike what we find in them proceeds not from them, but from a cause of that very diversity in our Thought.

And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces Gods Understanding from outward Things, and yet I can easily explain what Idea I have thereof, by saying, that by the Idea of Gods Understanding I conceive whatever is the Form of any Perception; For who is there that does not perceive that he understands something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an Idea of understanding, and by enlarging it Indefinitely he forms the Idea of Gods Understanding. And so of his other Attributes. And seeing we have made use of that Idea of God which is in us to demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain’d in this Idea such an Immense Power, that we conceive it a contradiction for God to Exist, and yet that any thing should Be besides Him, which was not Created by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from God, were Created by God. Lastly when we assert, that some Ideas are Innate or natural to us, we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no Idea would be Innate) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of producing them.

* The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, viz, having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my mind. Wherefore seeing ’tis not demonstrated that we have an Idea of God, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that God is Inconceivable, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an Idea of Him, it follows, that the Existence of God is not demonstrated, much less the Creation. ANSWER. When God is said to be Inconceiveable ’tis understood of an Adequate full conception. But I am ’een tired with often repeating, how notwithstanding we may have an Idea of God. So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my demonstration.

* By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being, Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God. ’Tis Certain that Ignorance is only a Defect, and that there is no Occasion of any Positive Faculty to make us Ignorant. But this position is not so clear in Relation to Error, for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot Err, for this Reason only, because they have not the Faculties of Reasoning or Imagination; from whence ’tis Natural for us to Conclude, That to Err there is requisite a Faculty of Judging, or at least of Imagining, both which Faculties are Positive, and given to all Creatures subject to Error, and to Them only. Moreover Des-Cartes says thus, I find (my Errors) to Depend on two concurring Causes, viz. on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of Choosing, or Freedom of my Will. Which seems Contradictious to what he said before; And here also we may note, that Freedom of Will is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists. ANSWER.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 1

    *****Note—Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.) that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:—

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  • Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 3

    APPENDIX: In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.

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  • Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality

    To such a conclusion the reflecting man must come with respect to all the things which can be presented to him: it is probably to be met with even in persons of the commonest understanding, who, as is well known, are very much inclined to suppose behind the objects of the senses something else invisible and acting of itself. They spoil it, however, by presently sensualizing this invisible again; that is to say, wanting to make it an object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit the wiser. Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes himself from everything else, even from himself as affected by objects, and that is reason. This being pure spontaneity is even elevated above the understanding. For although the latter is a spontaneity and does not, like sense, merely contain intuitions that arise when we are affected by things (and are therefore passive), yet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions than those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense under rules and, thereby, to unite them in one consciousness, and without this use of the sensibility it could not think at all; whereas, on the contrary, reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I call ideas [ideal conceptions] that it thereby far transcends everything that the sensibility can give it, and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of understanding, and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding itself.

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  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION III / OF THE NECESSITY OF THE WAGER

    We know then the existence and nature of the finite, because we also are finite and have extension. We know the existence of the infinite, and are ignorant of its nature, because it has extension like us, but not limits like us. But we know neither the existence nor the nature of God, because He has neither extension nor limits. But by faith we know His existence; in glory we shall know His nature. Now, I have already shown that we may well know the existence of a thing, without knowing its nature. Let us now speak according to natural lights. If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who will dare to undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who have no affinity to Him.

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  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE CREED OF A SAVOYARD PRIEST

    Thus it is that, in the contemplation of God in his works, and in the study of such of his attributes as it concerned me to know, I have slowly grasped and developed the idea, at first partial and imperfect, which I have formed of this Infinite Being. But if this idea has become nobler and greater it is also more suited to the human reason. As I approach in spirit the eternal light, I am confused and dazzled by its glory, and compelled to abandon all the earthly notions which helped me to picture it to myself. God is no longer corporeal and sensible; the supreme mind which rules the world is no longer the world itself; in vain do I strive to grasp his inconceivable essence. When I think that it is he that gives life and movement to the living and moving substance which controls all living bodies; when I hear it said that my soul is spiritual and that God is a spirit, I revolt against this abasement of the divine essence; as if God and my soul were of one and the same nature! As if God were not the one and only absolute being, the only really active, feeling, thinking, willing being, from whom we derive our thought, feeling, motion, will, our freedom and our very existence! We are free because he wills our freedom, and his inexplicable substance is to our souls what our souls are to our bodies. I know not whether he has created matter, body, soul, the world itself. The idea of creation confounds me and eludes my grasp; so far as I can conceive of it I believe it; but I know that he has formed the universe and all that is, that he has made and ordered all things. No doubt God is eternal; but can my mind grasp the idea of eternity? Why should I cheat myself with meaningless words? This is what I do understand; before things were—God was; he will be when they are no more, and if all things come to an end he will still endure. That a being beyond my comprehension should give life to other beings, this is merely difficult and beyond my understanding; but that Being and Nothing should be convertible terms, this is indeed a palpable contradiction, an evident absurdity.

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  • An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECTION II / OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

    14. To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient. First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds to it.

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