Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
Moreover Affirmation and Negation are not without a voice and words, and hence ’tis that Brutes can neither affirme or deny not so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge. But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we affirme that a Man runs, we have not a thought different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running; Affirmation therefore or Negation superadds nothing to meer thoughts, unless perhaps it adds this thought, that the names of which an Affirmation consists are (to the Person affirming) the Names of the same thing; and this is not to comprehend in the thought more then the likeness of the thing, but it is only comprehending the same likeness twice. ANSWER. ’Tis self evident, That ’tis one thing to see a Lion and at the same time to fear him, and an other thing only to see him. So ’tis one thing to see a Man Running, and an other thing to Affirme within my self (which may be done without a voice) That I see him. But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.
* Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self. If there be no Idea of God, as it seems there is not (and here ’tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the Idea of my self (if I respect the Body) it proceeds from Sight, but (if the Soul) there is no Idea of a Soul, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body, that imparts to it Animal Motion, by which it perceives and moves, and this (whatever it be) without any Idea we call a Soul. ANSWER.
If there be an Idea of God (as ’tis manifest that there is) this whole Objection falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination, ’Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no Image thereof represented in the Phantasie, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an Idea.
* An other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomers, that is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions. At the same time we can certainly have but one Idea of the Sun, whether it be look’d at by our eyes, or collected by Ratiocination to be much bigger than it seems; for this last is not an Idea of the Sun, but a proof by Arguments, that the Idea of the Sun would be much larger, if it were look’d at nigher. But at different or several times the Ideas of the Sun may be diverse, as if at one time we look at it with our bare eye, at an other time through a Teloscope; but Astronomical arguments do not make the Idea of the Sun greater or less, but they rather tell us that the sensible Idea thereof is false. ANSWER. Here also (as before) what he says is not the Idea of the Sun, and yet is described, is that very thing which I call the Idea.
* For without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something more, or (as I may say) have more of objective Reality in them, then those that represent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which I understand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more objective reality, then those by which Finite substances are exhibited. I have before often noted that there can be no Idea of God or the Mind: I will now superadd, That neither can there be an Idea of Substance. For Substance (Which is only Matter Subject to Accidents and Changes) is Collected only by Reasoning, but it is not at all Conceived, neither does it represent to us any Idea. And if this be true, How can it be said, That those Ideas which represent to us Substances have in them something More, or More Objective Reality, then those which represent to us Accidents? Besides, Let Des-Cartes again Consider what he means by More Reality? Can Reality be increas’d or diminish’d? Or does he think that One Thing can be More A Thing then an other Thing? let him Consider how this can be Explain’d to our Understandings with that Perspicuity or Clearness which is requisite in all Demonstrations, and Which He Himself is used to present us with upon other Occasions. ANSWER.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · An Image What Phantasmes
It is also evident, that there can be no Image of a thing Infinite: for all the Images, and Phantasmes that are made by the Impression of things visible, are figured: but Figure is a quantity every way determined: And therefore there can bee no Image of God: nor of the Soule of Man; nor of Spirits, but onely of Bodies Visible, that is, Bodies that have light in themselves, or are by such enlightened.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF.
It is evident, that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions, concerning matter of fact; that is, concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities. It is also evident, that the idea, of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that when after the simple conception of any thing we would conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the existence, which we attribute to him, conceived by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them. But I go farther; and not content with asserting, that the conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it, I likewise maintain, that the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes. But as it is certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object, and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it.
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Conjecture Of The Time Past
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of GOD is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.
Read in contextAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECTION VII. / OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.
The same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by external objects, produce sensations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such a sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members: It is God himself, who is pleased to second our will, in itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself, in its internal operations. Our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and renders it present to us.
Read in contextEthics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 2
We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point. Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.
I believe this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist will be sufficient for the present purpose, and that without entering farther into these gloomy and obscure regions, I shall be able to shew, that this hideous hypothesis is almost the same with that of the immateriality of the soul, which has become so popular. To make this evident, let us[10] remember, that as every idea is derived from a preceding perception, it is impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically different from each other. Whatever difference we may suppose betwixt them, it is still incomprehensible to us; and we are obliged either to conceive an external object merely as a relation without a relative, or to make it the very same with a perception or impression. [10] Part II, Sect. 6.
Read in context