Leviathan
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
The Worship we exhibite to those we esteem to be but men, as to Kings, and men in Authority, is Civill Worship: But the worship we exhibite to that which we think to bee God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions be, is Divine Worship. To fall prostrate before a King, in him that thinks him but a Man, is but Civill Worship: And he that but putteth off his hat in the Church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the House of God, worshippeth with Divine Worship. They that seek the distinction of Divine and Civill Worship, not in the intention of the Worshipper, but in the Words douleia, and latreia, deceive themselves. For whereas there be two sorts of Servants; that sort, which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their Masters, as Slaves taken in war, and their Issue, whose bodies are not in their own power, (their lives depending on the Will of their Masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience,) and that are bought and sold as Beasts, were called Douloi, that is properly, Slaves, and their Service, Douleia: The other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their Masters) voluntarily; are called Thetes; that is, Domestique Servants; to whose service the Masters have no further right, than is contained in the Covenants made betwixt them. These two kinds of Servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by another, whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: And the word Latris, is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: So that Latreia signifieth generally all Service; but Douleia the service of Bondmen onely, and the condition of Slavery: And both are used in Scripture (to signifie our Service of God) promiscuously. Douleia, because we are Gods Slaves; Latreia, because wee Serve him: and in all kinds of Service is contained, not onely Obedience, but also Worship, that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signifie Honor.
An IMAGE (in the most strict signification of the word) is the Resemblance of some thing visible: In which sense the Phantasticall Formes, Apparitions, or Seemings of Visible Bodies to the Sight, are onely Images; such as are the Shew of a man, or other thing in the Water, by Reflexion, or Refraction; or of the Sun, or Stars by Direct Vision in the Air; which are nothing reall in the things seen, nor in the place where thy seem to bee; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of Sight, or by glasses; and are present oftentimes in our Imagination, and in our Dreams, when the object is absent; or changed into other colours, and shapes, as things that depend onely upon the Fancy. And these are the Images which are originally and most properly called Ideas, and IDOLS, and derived from the language of the Graecians, with whom the word Eido signifieth to See. They are also called PHANTASMES, which is in the same language, Apparitions. And from these Images it is that one of the faculties of mans Nature, is called the Imagination. And from hence it is manifest, that there neither is, nor can bee any Image made of a thing Invisible.
It is also evident, that there can be no Image of a thing Infinite: for all the Images, and Phantasmes that are made by the Impression of things visible, are figured: but Figure is a quantity every way determined: And therefore there can bee no Image of God: nor of the Soule of Man; nor of Spirits, but onely of Bodies Visible, that is, Bodies that have light in themselves, or are by such enlightened.
And whereas a man can fancy Shapes he never saw; making up a Figure out of the parts of divers creatures; as the Poets make their Centaures, Chimaeras, and other Monsters never seen: So can he also give Matter to those Shapes, and make them in Wood, Clay or Metall. And these are also called Images, not for the resemblance of any corporeall thing, but for the resemblance of some Phantasticall Inhabitants of the Brain of the Maker. But in these Idols, as they are originally in the Brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the Materiall Body made by Art, may be said to be the Image of the Phantasticall Idoll made by Nature.
But in a larger use of the word Image, is contained also, any Representation of one thing by another. So an earthly Soveraign may be called the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an earthly Soveraign. And many times in the Idolatry of the Gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their Materiall Idoll to the Idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the Image of it. For a Stone unhewn has been set up for Neptune, and divers other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their Gods. And at this day we see many Images of the Virgin Mary, and other Saints, unlike one another, and without correspondence to any one mans Fancy; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no more but by the Names onely, to represent the Persons mentioned in the History; to which every man applyeth a Mentall Image of his owne making, or none at all. And thus an Image in the largest sense, is either the Resemblance, or the Representation of some thing Visible; or both together, as it happeneth for the most part. But the name of Idoll is extended yet further in Scripture, to signifie also the Sunne, or a Starre, or any other Creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped for Gods.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. VII.
If there be an Idea of God (as ’tis manifest that there is) this whole Objection falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination, ’Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no Image thereof represented in the Phantasie, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an Idea.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. V. Against the Third Meditation of God.
* Some of These (viz. Humane Thoughts) are as it were the Images of Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when I Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God. When I Think on a Man I perceive an Idea made up of Figure and Colour, whereof I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of a Man or not; and so when I think on Heaven. But when I think on a Chimera, I perceive an Image or Idea, of which I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of any Animal not only at present Existing, but possible to Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not. But thinking on an Angel, there is offer’d to my Mind sometimes the Image of a Flame, sometimes the Image of a Pretty Little Boy with Wings, which I am certain has no Likeness to an Angel, and therefore that it is not the Idea of an Angel; But beleiving that there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the Thing Believed or supposed we Impose the Name of Angel; Whereas the Idea, under which I Imagine an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things. In the like manner at the Venerable Name of God, we have no Image or Idea of God, and therefore we are forbidden to Worship God under any Image, least we should seem to Conceive Him that is inconceivable.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT XIV. Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things.
* As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal, which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this, that many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle. If a Triangle be no where, I understand not how it can have any Nature, for what is no where, is not, and therefore has not a Being, or any Nature. A Triangle in the Mind arises from a Triangle seen, or from one made up of what has been seen, but when once we have given the name of a Triangle to a thing (from which we think the Idea of a Triangle arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the name continues; In the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, and when we have given this other name (viz. Having its three Angles equal to two right ones) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the World, yet the Name would still continue, and this Proposition, A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones, would be eternally true. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroy’d.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
This further is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas, belonging to anything but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as of other things, we are restrained to THOSE WE RECEIVE FROM SENSATION AND REFLECTION, is evident from hence,—That, in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another: though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds; which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness; or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. V. Against the Third Meditation of God.
Here the Philosopher will have the Word Idea be only Understood for the Images of Material Things represented in a Corporeal Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper Idea of an Angel or God. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name Idea for whatever is immediately perceived by the Mind, so that when I Will, or Fear, because at the same time I perceive that I Will or Fear, this very Will or Fear are reckon’d by me among the number of Ideas; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of Perceptions in the Divine Mind, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in God: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by. And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the Idea of God for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them. Lastly, what is here added concerning the Creation of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
Solution. ’Tis true the Sophism seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a Mountain but with a Vally, it does not from hence follow, that a Mountain or Vally do Exist, but this will follow, that whether a Mountain or a Vally do or do not Exist, yet they cannot be seperated: so from hence that I cannot think of God but as Existing, it follows that Existence is Inseperable from God, and therefore that he Really Exists; Not because my Thought does all this, or Imposes any necessity on any Thing, but contrarily, because the necessity of the thing it self (viz. of Gods Existence) Determines me to think thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a God without Existence (that is, A Being absolutely perfect without the Cheif Perfection) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either with or without Wings. Doubt. And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose God Existing, after I have supposed him endowed with all Perfections, seeing Existence is one of them; but that my First Position (viz. His Absolute Perfection) is not necessary. Thus, for example, ’tis not necessary for me to think all Quadrilateral Figures inscribed in a Circle; But supposing that I think so, I am then necessitated to Confess a Rhombe Inscribed therein, and yet this is evidently False.
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