Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
Here the Philosopher will have the Word Idea be only Understood for the Images of Material Things represented in a Corporeal Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper Idea of an Angel or God. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name Idea for whatever is immediately perceived by the Mind, so that when I Will, or Fear, because at the same time I perceive that I Will or Fear, this very Will or Fear are reckon’d by me among the number of Ideas; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of Perceptions in the Divine Mind, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in God: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by. And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the Idea of God for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them. Lastly, what is here added concerning the Creation of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand.
* But there are Other (Thoughts) That have Superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have alwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them Judgements. When any one Fears or Wills, he has certainly the Image of the Thing Fear’d, or Action Will’d, but what more a Willing or Fearing Man has in his Thoughts is not explain’d; and tho Fear be a Thought, yet I see not how it can be any other then the Thought of the Thing Fear’d; For what is the Fear of a Lion rushing on me, but the Idea of a Lion Rushing on me, and the Effect (which that Idea produces in the Heart) whereby the Man Fearing is excited to that Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of Flying is not Thought, it remains therefore that in Fear there is no other Thought, but that which consists in the likeness of the thing. And the same may be said of Will.
Moreover Affirmation and Negation are not without a voice and words, and hence ’tis that Brutes can neither affirme or deny not so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge. But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we affirme that a Man runs, we have not a thought different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running; Affirmation therefore or Negation superadds nothing to meer thoughts, unless perhaps it adds this thought, that the names of which an Affirmation consists are (to the Person affirming) the Names of the same thing; and this is not to comprehend in the thought more then the likeness of the thing, but it is only comprehending the same likeness twice. ANSWER. ’Tis self evident, That ’tis one thing to see a Lion and at the same time to fear him, and an other thing only to see him. So ’tis one thing to see a Man Running, and an other thing to Affirme within my self (which may be done without a voice) That I see him. But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.
* Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self. If there be no Idea of God, as it seems there is not (and here ’tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the Idea of my self (if I respect the Body) it proceeds from Sight, but (if the Soul) there is no Idea of a Soul, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body, that imparts to it Animal Motion, by which it perceives and moves, and this (whatever it be) without any Idea we call a Soul. ANSWER.
If there be an Idea of God (as ’tis manifest that there is) this whole Objection falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination, ’Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no Image thereof represented in the Phantasie, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an Idea.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Names Proper & Common Universall
When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man, He Is A Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth. Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Understanding
The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.
Read in contextThe social contract & discourses · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Every animal has ideas, since it has senses; it even combines those ideas in a certain degree; and it is only in degree that man differs, in this respect, from the brute. Some philosophers have even maintained that there is a greater difference between one man and another than between some men and some beasts. It is not, therefore, so much the understanding that constitutes the specific difference between the man and the brute, as the human quality of free-agency. Nature lays her commands on every animal, and the brute obeys her voice. Man receives the same impulsion, but at the same time knows himself at liberty to acquiesce or resist: and it is particularly in his consciousness of this liberty that the spirituality of his soul is displayed. For physics may explain, in some measure, the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas; but in the power of willing or rather of choosing, and in the feeling of this power, nothing is to be found but acts which are purely spiritual and wholly inexplicable by the laws of mechanism.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXII. OF MIXED MODES.
(4) Those signs put together, by affirmation or negation, otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie: what I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas. And it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever; which, however compounded and decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone afford us. How far then mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that, before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas, received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.
Read in contextThe Confessions of St. Augustine · of Hippo Augustine (354–430) · BOOK X
Is not this corporeal figure apparent to all whose senses are perfect? why then speaks it not the same to all? Animals small and great see it, but they cannot ask it: because no reason is set over their senses to judge on what they report. But men can ask, so that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; but by love of them, they are made subject unto them: and subjects cannot judge. Nor yet do the creatures answer such as ask, unless they can judge; nor yet do they change their voice (i.e., their appearance), if one man only sees, another seeing asks, so as to appear one way to this man, another way to that, but appearing the same way to both, it is dumb to this, speaks to that; yea rather it speaks to all; but they only understand, who compare its voice received from without, with the truth within. For truth saith unto me, "Neither heaven, nor earth, nor any other body is thy God." This, their very nature saith to him that seeth them: "They are a mass; a mass is less in a part thereof than in the whole." Now to thee I speak, O my soul, thou art my better part: for thou quickenest the mass of my body, giving it life, which no body can give to a body: but thy God is even unto thee the Life of thy life.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · BOOK II OF IDEAS / CHAPTER I. OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.
To suppose the soul to think, and the man not to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two persons in one man. And if one considers well these men’s way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that they do so. For those who tell us that the SOUL always thinks, do never, that I remember, say that a MAN always thinks. Can the soul think, and not the man? Or a man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of jargon in others. If they say the man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it, they may as well say his body is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask, How they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself? No man’s knowledge here can go beyond his experience.
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