Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
Here the Philosopher will have the Word Idea be only Understood for the Images of Material Things represented in a Corporeal Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper Idea of an Angel or God. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name Idea for whatever is immediately perceived by the Mind, so that when I Will, or Fear, because at the same time I perceive that I Will or Fear, this very Will or Fear are reckon’d by me among the number of Ideas; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of Perceptions in the Divine Mind, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in God: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by. And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the Idea of God for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them. Lastly, what is here added concerning the Creation of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand.
* But there are Other (Thoughts) That have Superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have alwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them Judgements. When any one Fears or Wills, he has certainly the Image of the Thing Fear’d, or Action Will’d, but what more a Willing or Fearing Man has in his Thoughts is not explain’d; and tho Fear be a Thought, yet I see not how it can be any other then the Thought of the Thing Fear’d; For what is the Fear of a Lion rushing on me, but the Idea of a Lion Rushing on me, and the Effect (which that Idea produces in the Heart) whereby the Man Fearing is excited to that Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of Flying is not Thought, it remains therefore that in Fear there is no other Thought, but that which consists in the likeness of the thing. And the same may be said of Will.
Moreover Affirmation and Negation are not without a voice and words, and hence ’tis that Brutes can neither affirme or deny not so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge. But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we affirme that a Man runs, we have not a thought different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running; Affirmation therefore or Negation superadds nothing to meer thoughts, unless perhaps it adds this thought, that the names of which an Affirmation consists are (to the Person affirming) the Names of the same thing; and this is not to comprehend in the thought more then the likeness of the thing, but it is only comprehending the same likeness twice. ANSWER. ’Tis self evident, That ’tis one thing to see a Lion and at the same time to fear him, and an other thing only to see him. So ’tis one thing to see a Man Running, and an other thing to Affirme within my self (which may be done without a voice) That I see him. But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.
* Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self. If there be no Idea of God, as it seems there is not (and here ’tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the Idea of my self (if I respect the Body) it proceeds from Sight, but (if the Soul) there is no Idea of a Soul, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body, that imparts to it Animal Motion, by which it perceives and moves, and this (whatever it be) without any Idea we call a Soul. ANSWER.
If there be an Idea of God (as ’tis manifest that there is) this whole Objection falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination, ’Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no Image thereof represented in the Phantasie, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an Idea.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. VI.
* But there are Other (Thoughts) That have Superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have alwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them Judgements. When any one Fears or Wills, he has certainly the Image of the Thing Fear’d, or Action Will’d, but what more a Willing or Fearing Man has in his Thoughts is not explain’d; and tho Fear be a Thought, yet I see not how it can be any other then the Thought of the Thing Fear’d; For what is the Fear of a Lion rushing on me, but the Idea of a Lion Rushing on me, and the Effect (which that Idea produces in the Heart) whereby the Man Fearing is excited to that Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of Flying is not Thought, it remains therefore that in Fear there is no other Thought, but that which consists in the likeness of the thing. And the same may be said of Will.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
Doubt. Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident, but looks rather like a sophism; for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence, I can easily perswade my self that the Existence of God may be distinguish’d from his Essence, so that I may Imagine God not to Exist. Solution. But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the Existence of God can no more be seperated from his Essence, then the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be seperated from the Essence of a Triangle, or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley; so that ’tis no less a Repugnancy to think of a God (that is, A Being infinitely perfect) who wants Existence (that is, who wants a Perfection) then to think of a Mountain, to which there is no Valley adjoyning. Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing, or a Mountain without a Vally? yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Vally, it does not from thence follow, that there Is a Mountain in the World; so supposing me to think of a God as Existing, yet does it not follow that God Really Exists. For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things, and as I may imagine a Winged Horse, tho no Horse has Wings, so I may imagine an existing God, tho no God exist.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. XIII.
’Tis true, To Affirm or Deny Propositions, to Defend or Oppose Propositions, are the Acts of the Will; but it does not from thence Follow that the Internal Assent depends on the Will. Wherefore the following Conclusion (so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that Privation consists which Constitutes Error) is not fully Demonstrated. ANSWER. ’Tis not much matter, Whether this expression, Great Light, be Argumentative or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all men know, that by light in the understanding is meant clearness of knowledge, which every one has not, that thinks he has; and this hinders not but this light in the Understanding may be very different from an obstinate Opinion taken up without clear perception. But when ’tis here said, That we assent to things clearly perceived whether we will or no, ’tis the same, as if it were said, that willing or nilling, we desire Good clearly known; whereas the word Nilling, finds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill the same thing.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.
Now as touching Ideas, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without Respect to any other Things, they cannot Properly be false; for Whether I Imagine a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as Certain that I Imagine one as t’other. Also in the Will and Affections I need not Fear any Falshood, For tho I should Wish for evil Things, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore Not true that I Wish for them. Wherefore there onely Remains my Judgments of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not deceived. Now the Chief and most usual Error that I discover in them is, That I Judge Those Ideas that are within me to be Conformable and like to certain things that are without Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain Modes of my Thought, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of Erring.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
Solution. ’Tis true the Sophism seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a Mountain but with a Vally, it does not from hence follow, that a Mountain or Vally do Exist, but this will follow, that whether a Mountain or a Vally do or do not Exist, yet they cannot be seperated: so from hence that I cannot think of God but as Existing, it follows that Existence is Inseperable from God, and therefore that he Really Exists; Not because my Thought does all this, or Imposes any necessity on any Thing, but contrarily, because the necessity of the thing it self (viz. of Gods Existence) Determines me to think thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a God without Existence (that is, A Being absolutely perfect without the Cheif Perfection) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either with or without Wings. Doubt. And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose God Existing, after I have supposed him endowed with all Perfections, seeing Existence is one of them; but that my First Position (viz. His Absolute Perfection) is not necessary. Thus, for example, ’tis not necessary for me to think all Quadrilateral Figures inscribed in a Circle; But supposing that I think so, I am then necessitated to Confess a Rhombe Inscribed therein, and yet this is evidently False.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. II. Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind.
I am a Thinking Thing. ’Tis True; for because I think or have a Phantasme (whether I am awake or asleep) it follows that I am Thinking, for I Think and I am Thinking signifie the same Thing. Because I Think, it follows That I am, for whatever Thinks cannot be Nothing. But when he Adds, That is, a Mind, a Soul, an Understanding, Reason, I question his Argumentation; for it does not seem a Right Consequence to say, I am a Thinking Thing, therefore I am a Thought, neither, I am an Understanding Thing, therefore I am the Understanding. For in the same manner I may Conclude, I am a Walking Thing, therefore I am the Walking it self. Wherefore D.Cartes Concludes that an Understanding Thing and Intellection (which is the Act of an Understanding Thing) are the same; or at least that an Understanding Thing and the Intellect (which is the Power of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet all Philosophers distinguish the subject from its Faculties and Acts, that is, from its Properties and Essence, for the Thing it self is one thing, and its Essence is an other. It may be therefore that a Thinking Thing is the Subject of a Mind, Reason, or Understanding, and therefor it may be a Corporeal Thing, the Contrary Whereof is here Assumed and not Proved; and yet this Inference is the Foundation of that Conclusion which D.Cartes would Establish. * Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the foregoing Meditations here Objected against.
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