Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. rest quiet. So when I feel pain in my Foot, the consideration of Physicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of Nerves dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being continued like Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are drawn in the Foot, they also draw the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certain motion, which is ordain’d by Nature to affect the mind with a sense of Pain, as being in the Foot. But because these Nerves must pass through the Shin, the Thighs, the Loins, the Back, the Neck, before they can reach the Brain from the Foot, it may so happen, that tho that part of them, which is in the Foot were not touch’d, but only some of their intermediate parts, yet the same motion, would be caused in the Brain, as when the Foot it self is ill affected, from whence ’twill necessarily follow, that the mind should perceive the same Pain. And thus may we think of any other Sense.
I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that part of the Brain, which immediately affects the mind, excites therein only one sort of sense, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all those Senses which it can cause, it should cause that which cheifly, and most frequently conduces to the conservation of an healthful Man; And experience witnesses, that to this very end all our senses are given us by Nature; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testifie the Power and Goodness of God. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the Nature of Man might have been so order’d by God, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing, viz. either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body. In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health. So of the Rest.
From all which ’tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the infinite Goodness of God) ’tis impossible but the Nature of Man as he consists of a mind and body should be deceivable. For if any cause should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, that self same motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled, the Pain would be felt as in the Foot, and the sense would be naturally deceived; for ’tis consonant to Reason (seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause hurtful to the Foot, than from any other) I say ’tis reasonable, that it should make known to the mind the Pain of the Foot, rather than of any other part. And so if a dryness of Throat arises (not as ’tis used from the necessity of drink for the conservation of the Body, but) from an unusual Cause, as it happens in a Dropsie, ’tis far better that it should then deceive us; then that it should alwayes deceive us when the Body is in Health, and so of the Rest.
And this consideration helps me very much, not only to understand the Errors to which my Nature is subject, but also to correct and avoid them. For seeing I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me falsly than truely in those things which conduce to the Bodies advantage; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one to Examine the same thing, as also I can use memory, which joyns present and past things together, and my understanding also, which hath already discovered to me all the causes of my Errors, I ought no longer to fear, that what my Senses daily represent to me should be false. But especially those extravagant Doubts of my First Meditation are to be turn’d off as ridiculous; and perticularly the chief of them, viz. That * of not distinguishing Sleep from Waking, for now I plainly discover a great difference, between them, for my Dreams are never conjoyned by my memory with the other actions of my life, as whatever happens to me awake is; and certainly if (while I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently disappear (as in Dreams) so that I could not tell from whence he came or where he went, I should rather esteem it a Spectre or Apparition feign’d in my Brain, then a true Man; but when such things occur, as I distinctly know from whence, where, and when they come, and I conjoyn the perception of them by my memory with the other Accidents of my life, I am certain they are represented to me waking and not asleep, neither ought I in the least to doubt of their Truth, if after I have called up all my senses, memory, and understanding to their Examination I find nothing in any of them, that clashes with other truths; For God not being a Deceiver, it follows, that In such things I am not deceived. But because the urgency of Action in the common occurrences of Affairs will not alwayes allow time for such an accurate examination, I must confess that Mans life is subject to many Errors about perticulars, so that the infirmity of our Nature must be acknowledged by Us. FINIS.
Among seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy, as being Penn’d by Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury, a Man famously known to the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and therefore ’tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance, so fares it with these Meditations which stand unshaken by the Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess’d that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. Hobbs’s Philosophy, especially His Book De Corpore and De Homine, The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore not Impertinently refer’d to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And this is the Reason that makes the Great Des-Cartes pass over many of these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the Hobbian Philosophy had he but known upon What Foundations it was Built.
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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.
I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that part of the Brain, which immediately affects the mind, excites therein only one sort of sense, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all those Senses which it can cause, it should cause that which cheifly, and most frequently conduces to the conservation of an healthful Man; And experience witnesses, that to this very end all our senses are given us by Nature; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testifie the Power and Goodness of God. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the Nature of Man might have been so order’d by God, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing, viz. either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body. In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health. So of the Rest.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.
But We often err even in those things to Which we are Impelled by Nature, as when sick men desire that Meat or Drink, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply’d, That they Err in this because their Nature is Corrupt. But this Answers not the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less Gods Creature then a Man in Health, and therefore ’tis as Absurd to Imagine a Deceitful Nature imposed by God on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the Laws of its Nature, when it is ill contrived, and tells the hours falsly, as when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if I consider the body of a Man as a meer Machine or Movement, made up and compounded of Bones, Nerves, Muscles, Veins, Blood, and Skin; so that, tho there were no mind in It, yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from the Will, and consequently from the Mind) I do easily acknowledge, that it would be as natural for him (if for example sake he were sick of a Dropsie) to suffer that Driness of his Throat which uses to bring into his mind the sense of Thirst, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his disease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to Drink, when ’tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that it Errs from its Nature, when it tells the Hours wrong, and so considering the Movement of a Mans Body as contrived for such Motions as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That also to Err from its Nature, if its Throat is Dry, when it has no want of Drink for its Preservation. Yet I Plainly discover, that this last Acceptation of Nature differs much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While, for this is only a Denomination extrinsick to the Things whereof ’tis spoken, and depending on my Thought, while it Compares a sick man, and a disorderly Clock with the Idea of an healthy man and a Rectified Clock. But by Nature in its former Acceptation I Understand something that is Really in the Things themselves, which therefore has something of Truth in it.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. XV. Against the Sixth Meditation. Of the Existence of Material Beings.
* And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe, that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from Corporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings exist. ’Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for their Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the fault of Deceit does not consist in the falsity of Words; but in the Injury done to the Person deceived. Let D. Cartes therefore consider whether this Proposition, God can upon no account deceive us, Universally taken be true; For if it be not true so universally taken, that Conclusion, Therefore Corporeal Beings exist, will not follow. ANSWER. ’Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, That we cannot be deceived on any account (for I willingly granted, that we may be often deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our Error argues that in God there is such a Will to Cheat us as would be contradictious to his Nature. And here again we have a wrong inference in this Objection.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.
if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. rest quiet. So when I feel pain in my Foot, the consideration of Physicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of Nerves dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being continued like Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are drawn in the Foot, they also draw the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certain motion, which is ordain’d by Nature to affect the mind with a sense of Pain, as being in the Foot. But because these Nerves must pass through the Shin, the Thighs, the Loins, the Back, the Neck, before they can reach the Brain from the Foot, it may so happen, that tho that part of them, which is in the Foot were not touch’d, but only some of their intermediate parts, yet the same motion, would be caused in the Brain, as when the Foot it self is ill affected, from whence ’twill necessarily follow, that the mind should perceive the same Pain. And thus may we think of any other Sense.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.
From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors? To which, I answer, that they proceed from hence only, that seeing the Will expatiates it self farther then the Understanding, I keep it not within the same bounds with my Understanding, but often extend it to those things which I Understand not, to which things it being Indifferent, it easily Declines from what is True and Good; and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth Exist, and found that from my setting my self to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly Understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly, by how much the less indifferent I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks, but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature, and it so happens that I doubt, whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature, or Whether they are both the same: but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways, and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either, or to Judge nothing of either; But this indifferency extends it self not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant, but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them; for tho never so probable Guesses incline me to one side, yet the Knowing that they are only Conjectures, and not indubitable reasons, is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced, when I supposed all those things (which formerly I assented to as most True) as very False, for this Reason only that I found my self able to doubt of them in some manner.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.
But tho Respecting only a Body sick of a Dropsie it be an Extrinsick Denomination to say, that its Nature is Corrupt, because it has a Dry Throat, and stands in no need of Drink; yet respecting the Whole Compound or Mind joyn’d to such a Body, ’tis not a meer Denomination, but a real Error of Nature for it to thirst when drink is hurtful to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how the Goodness of God suffers Nature so taken to be deceivable.
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