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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the Truth of those things only, which appear to me clearly and distinctly. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to every Man, and some are only discover’d by Those that search more nighly, and enquire more carefully, yet when such truths are discover’d, they are esteem’d no less certain than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet the first Proposition is no less certainly believed when once ’tis perceived, then this Last. Thus in Reference to God; certainly, unless I am overrun with Prejudice, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with sensible Objects, I should acknowledge nothing before or easier then him; For what is more self-evident then that there is a Chief Being, or then that a God (to whose essence alone Existence appertains) does Exist? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet Now, I am not only equally certain of it, as of what seems most certain, but I perceive also that the Truth of other Things so depends on it, that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known.

For tho my nature be such, that during the time of my Clear and Distinct Perception, I cannot but believe it true; yet my Nature is such also, that I cannot fix the Intention of my Mind upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it clearly, and the Remembrance of what Judgement I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not know God) may easily move me in my Opinion; and by this means I shall never attain to the true and certain Knowledge of any Thing, but Wandring and Unstable opinions. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think True as long as I attend to the Demonstration thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the Consideration of its Proof (altho I remember that I have once Clearly perceived it) yet perhaps I may doubt of Its Truth, being as yet Ignorant of a God; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by Nature, as to be deceived in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most evidently, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things True and Certain, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a God; because at the same time I also Understand that all things Depend on Him, and that he is not a Deceiver; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I clearly and distinctly perceive are necessarily True; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it True, yet if I do but remember, that I have once clearly and distinctly perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me doubt, but that I have true and certain Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other Truths also which I remember that I have once Demonstrated, such as are Geometrical Propositions and the like.

What now can be Objected against me? shall I say, that I am so made by Nature, as to be often deceived? No; For I now Know that I cannot be deceived in those Things, which I clearly Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many Things True and Certain, which afterwards I found to be falsities? No; for I perceived none of those things clearly and distinctly, but being Ignorant of this Rule of Truth, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be Weak. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am asleep, and that what I now think of is no more True, then the Dreams of People asleep? But this it self moves not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were asleep, if any thing appear’d evident to my Understanding, ’twould be True. And Thus I Plainly see, that the Certainty and Truth of all Science Depends on the Knowledge of the True God, so that before I had Known Him, I did Know nothing; But now many things both of God himself, and of other Intellectual Things, as also of Corporeal nature, which is the Object of Mathematicks, may be Plainly Known and Certain to me.

It now remains that I examine whether any Corporeal Beings do Exist; And already I know that (as they are the Object of Pure Mathematicks) they May (at least) Exist, for I clearly and distinctly perceive them; and doubtless God is able to make, whatever I am able to perceive, and I never Judged any thing to be beyond his Power, but what was Repugnant to a distinct perception. Moreover, such Material Beings seem to Exist from the faculty of Imagination, which I find my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I attentively Consider what Imagination is, ’twill appear to be only a certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it; and if it be before it, It must Exist.

But that this may be made more Plain, I must first examine the difference between Imagination, and pure Intellection, or Understanding. So, for example, when I Imagine a Triangle, I do not only Understand that it is a figure comprehended by three Lines, but I also behold with the eye of my mind those three lines as it were before Me, and this is that which I call imagination. But if I convert my Thoughts to a Chiliogone, or Figure consisting of a Thousand Angles, I know as well that this Is a figure comprehended by a Thousand sides, as I know that a Triangle is a Figure Consisting of three sides; but I do not in the same Manner Imagine, or behold as present those thousand sides, as I do the three sides of a Triangle. And tho at the time when I so think of a Chiliogone, I may confusedly represent to my self some Figure (because whenever I Think of a Corporeal Object, I am used to Imagine some Shape or other) yet ’tis evident that this Representation is not a Chiliogone, because ’tis in nothing different from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a Milion-angled figure, or any other Figure of More sides; Neither does such a Confused Representation help me in the least to know those Properties, by which a Chiliogone differs from other Polygones or Manyangled Figures. But if a Question be put concerning a Pentagone, I know I may Understand its Shape, as I Understand the Shape, of a Chiliogone, without the help of Imagination, but I can also imagine it, by applying the Eye of my Mind to its Five sides, and to the Area or space contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a peculiar sort of Operation in the Mind to imagine a Thing, which I require not to Understand a Thing; which New Operation of the Mind plainly shews the difference between imagination and pure Intellection.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.

    For tho my nature be such, that during the time of my Clear and Distinct Perception, I cannot but believe it true; yet my Nature is such also, that I cannot fix the Intention of my Mind upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it clearly, and the Remembrance of what Judgement I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not know God) may easily move me in my Opinion; and by this means I shall never attain to the true and certain Knowledge of any Thing, but Wandring and Unstable opinions. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think True as long as I attend to the Demonstration thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the Consideration of its Proof (altho I remember that I have once Clearly perceived it) yet perhaps I may doubt of Its Truth, being as yet Ignorant of a God; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by Nature, as to be deceived in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most evidently, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things True and Certain, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a God; because at the same time I also Understand that all things Depend on Him, and that he is not a Deceiver; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I clearly and distinctly perceive are necessarily True; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it True, yet if I do but remember, that I have once clearly and distinctly perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me doubt, but that I have true and certain Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other Truths also which I remember that I have once Demonstrated, such as are Geometrical Propositions and the like.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.

    From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors? To which, I answer, that they proceed from hence only, that seeing the Will expatiates it self farther then the Understanding, I keep it not within the same bounds with my Understanding, but often extend it to those things which I Understand not, to which things it being Indifferent, it easily Declines from what is True and Good; and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth Exist, and found that from my setting my self to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly Understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly, by how much the less indifferent I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks, but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature, and it so happens that I doubt, whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature, or Whether they are both the same: but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways, and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either, or to Judge nothing of either; But this indifferency extends it self not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant, but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them; for tho never so probable Guesses incline me to one side, yet the Knowing that they are only Conjectures, and not indubitable reasons, is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced, when I supposed all those things (which formerly I assented to as most True) as very False, for this Reason only that I found my self able to doubt of them in some manner.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART IV

    But after the knowledge of God and of the soul has rendered us certain of this rule, we can easily understand that the truth of the thoughts we experience when awake, ought not in the slightest degree to be called in question on account of the illusions of our dreams. For if it happened that an individual, even when asleep, had some very distinct idea, as, for example, if a geometer should discover some new demonstration, the circumstance of his being asleep would not militate against its truth; and as for the most ordinary error of our dreams, which consists in their representing to us various objects in the same way as our external senses, this is not prejudicial, since it leads us very properly to suspect the truth of the ideas of sense; for we are not infrequently deceived in the same manner when awake; as when persons in the jaundice see all objects yellow, or when the stars or bodies at a great distance appear to us much smaller than they are. For, in fine, whether awake or asleep, we ought never to allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth of anything unless on the evidence of our reason. And it must be noted that I say of our reason, and not of our imagination or of our senses: thus, for example, although we very clearly see the sun, we ought not therefore to determine that it is only of the size which our sense of sight presents; and we may very distinctly imagine the head of a lion joined to the body of a goat, without being therefore shut up to the conclusion that a chimaera exists; for it is not a dictate of reason that what we thus see or imagine is in reality existent; but it plainly tells us that all our ideas or notions contain in them some truth; for otherwise it could not be that God, who is wholly perfect and veracious, should have placed them in us. And because our reasonings are never so clear or so complete during sleep as when we are awake, although sometimes the acts of our imagination are then as lively and distinct, if not more so than in our waking moments, reason further dictates that, since all our thoughts cannot be true because of our partial imperfection, those possessing truth must infallibly be found in the experience of our waking moments rather than in that of our dreams.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there Be a God, And if there be One, Whether he can be a Deceiver, For whilst I am Ignorant of this, I cannot possibly be fully Certain of any Other thing. But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them Truth or Falshood properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the Images of Things, and to these alone the Name of an Idea properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or God. But there are others of them, that have superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the subject or object of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something more which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and Others of them Judgments.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.

    I have * formerly shewn how my Judgement happens to be false notwithstanding Gods Goodness. But now there arises a new Difficulty concerning those very things which Nature tells me I am to prosecute or avoid, concerning my Internal senses, Wherein I find many Errors, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the Poyson, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire the Meat only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, That Mans-Nature is not All-knowing; which is no Wonder seeing Man is a Finite Being, and therefore nothing but Finite Perfections belong to him.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.

    But afterwards I discover’d many experiments, wherein my senses so grosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers which seem’d Round a far off, nigh at hand appear’d square, and large Statues on their tops seem’d small to those that stood on the ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the judgements of my outward senses were deceived: and not of my outward only, but of my inward senses also; for what is more intimate or inward than Pain? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have felt pain in that part which they wanted, and therefore I am not absolutely certain that any part of me is affected with pain, tho I feel pain therein. To these I have lately added two very general Reasons of doubt; The first was, that while I was awake, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I were a sleep; And seeing I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my sleep proceeds from outward Objects, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am awake? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing I know not the Author of my Being (or at least I then supposed my self not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by Nature as to be deceived even in those things which appear’d to me most true. And as to the Reasons, which induced me to give credit to sensible Things, ’twas easie to return an answer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled by Nature to many Things, which Reason disswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by Nature. And tho the perceptions of my senses depended not on my Will, I thought I should not therefore conclude, that they proceeded from Objects different from my self; for perhaps there may be some other Faculty in me (tho as yet unknown to me) which might frame those perceptions.

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