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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

Here I take Nature more strictly, then for the Complication of all those Things which are Given me by God; For in this Complication there are many things contain’d which relate to the Mind alone, as, That I perceive What is done cannot be not Done, and all Other things which are known by the Light of Nature, but of these I speak not at present. There are also many Other Things which belong only to the Body, as, That it tends Downwards and such like, of these also I treat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only which God hath bestowed upon me as I am Compounded of a Mind and Body together, and not differently Consider’d. ’Tis Nature therefore thus taken that teaches me to avoid troublesome Objects, and seek after pleasing Ones; but it appears not that this Nature teaches us to conclude any thing of these Perceptions of our senses, before that we make by our Understanding a diligent examination of outward Objects; for to Enquire into the Truth of Things belongs not to the Whole Compositum of a Man as he Consists of Mind and Body, but to the Mind alone.

So that tho a star affect my eye no more then a small spark of Fire, yet there is in my Eye no Real or Positive Inclination to believe One no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been used to Judge from my Childhood without any Reason: and tho coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to perswade me, That in the Fire there is any thing like either that Heat or that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be, that excites in us those sensations of Heat or Pain: and so tho in some space there may be nothing that Works on my senses, it does not from thence follow, that there is no Body there; for I see that in these and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because I use these perceptions of sense (which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what is advantagious or hurtful to the Compositum, whereof the mind is part, and so far only they are Clear and Distinct enough) as certain Rules immediately to discover the Essence of External Bodies, of Which they make known nothing but very Obscurely and Confusedly. Medit. 4.

I have * formerly shewn how my Judgement happens to be false notwithstanding Gods Goodness. But now there arises a new Difficulty concerning those very things which Nature tells me I am to prosecute or avoid, concerning my Internal senses, Wherein I find many Errors, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the Poyson, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire the Meat only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, That Mans-Nature is not All-knowing; which is no Wonder seeing Man is a Finite Being, and therefore nothing but Finite Perfections belong to him.

But We often err even in those things to Which we are Impelled by Nature, as when sick men desire that Meat or Drink, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply’d, That they Err in this because their Nature is Corrupt. But this Answers not the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less Gods Creature then a Man in Health, and therefore ’tis as Absurd to Imagine a Deceitful Nature imposed by God on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the Laws of its Nature, when it is ill contrived, and tells the hours falsly, as when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if I consider the body of a Man as a meer Machine or Movement, made up and compounded of Bones, Nerves, Muscles, Veins, Blood, and Skin; so that, tho there were no mind in It, yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from the Will, and consequently from the Mind) I do easily acknowledge, that it would be as natural for him (if for example sake he were sick of a Dropsie) to suffer that Driness of his Throat which uses to bring into his mind the sense of Thirst, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his disease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to Drink, when ’tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that it Errs from its Nature, when it tells the Hours wrong, and so considering the Movement of a Mans Body as contrived for such Motions as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That also to Err from its Nature, if its Throat is Dry, when it has no want of Drink for its Preservation. Yet I Plainly discover, that this last Acceptation of Nature differs much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While, for this is only a Denomination extrinsick to the Things whereof ’tis spoken, and depending on my Thought, while it Compares a sick man, and a disorderly Clock with the Idea of an healthy man and a Rectified Clock. But by Nature in its former Acceptation I Understand something that is Really in the Things themselves, which therefore has something of Truth in it.

But tho Respecting only a Body sick of a Dropsie it be an Extrinsick Denomination to say, that its Nature is Corrupt, because it has a Dry Throat, and stands in no need of Drink; yet respecting the Whole Compound or Mind joyn’d to such a Body, ’tis not a meer Denomination, but a real Error of Nature for it to thirst when drink is hurtful to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how the Goodness of God suffers Nature so taken to be deceivable.

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