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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

And certainly I might well have expected the same chance, had this been the Translation of an History, Play or Romance; wherein there is requisite not onely a bare version but a conformation of Idiom and language, manner and customary expression; But the nature of this present Work will not admit of the like liberty, and therefore, I hope, amongst Judicious Readers it may be exempt from the common Fate of Translations; for if we look upon it as a Philosophical or Metaphysical Tract, or rather as (really it is) a Physico-Mathematical Argumentation, we shall find that a great strictness of Expression is requisite to be observed therein. So that had a Translator taken upon him to use his own liberty of Phrase, he would thereby have endanger’d the sense and force of the Arguments; for Politeness of language might as well be expected in a Translation of Euclide as in this. And all that are acquainted with this famous Authors design, do very well know, that it was his intention in these Meditations Mathematically to demonstrate, that there is a God, and that mans mind is incorporeal. And it was his opinion, that metaphysicks may as clearly be demonstrated as mathematicks, as witness his expression in the Dedicatory Epistle of this Work to the Sorbone Doctors, Eas (Rationes scilicet) quibus hic utor certitudine & evidentiâ Geometricas æquare, vel etiam superare existimem; That he reputed his Arguments used in these Meditations, to equal if not excell Geometrical certainty.

And this, I suppose, is sufficient to make the Reader, not expect herein any smoothness of phrase or quaintness of Expression; what is here delivered in English is immediately taken, as it is naturally in the Original. The words, we hope, may be apposite enough, and fit to express what is here designed, and I think it a derogation from the Authors skill to draw the Picture of his mind in any other Colours, than what his own Copy expresses. Thus far in vindication of the Philosophical plain stile and rough Language of the following Translation. I shall add a line or two, first relating to the Readers, secondly of the Author, and lastly of the Meditations themselves, together with the Motives which excited me to this Work.

As to the Readers, ’tis, I suppose, so evident that candour of mind, and freedome from prejudice is requisite to all that desire to advantage themselves by reading other mens notions, that it need not be here insisted on with much earnestness; yet considering the Antiquity of this subject, and the novelty of the Arguments here produced, it seems to be more than ordinarily requisite for an impartial perusal of the ensuing Tract. Neither are the following Meditations to be slightly passed over, but with diligence and attention to be read; for as in mathematical demonstration, the careless missing of any one single Position may render the Conclusion obscure and sometimes inconsequent, so in these metaphysical Demonstrations, which (as, before has been noted from the illustrious Author thereof) for certainty do equal, if not excel Geometrical Propositions, the slight attention to any one particular Argument may frustrate the design of the whole discourse. The Reasoning therefore here being close and solid, and (as in Mathematicks) the knowledge of the latter depending on the knowledge of what went before, ’tis the duty of every Reader seriously to attend the Particulars, as also the connexion of the whole. Let him weigh the Arguments and perpend the Conclusions, and after a clear and distinct Knowledge, lett him pass his judgement.

And to this end I shall make it my request to every Reader, that he would not be content with a single perusal of the following Discourses, but that he would often repeat his reading them over; for by this means the force of those Arguments, which at first may by chance escape the most diligent and attentive Peruser, by a second or third Essay may offer themselves more fully to his Consideration. This was the desire of our Author in an other of his pieces, I mean his Principles of Philosophy, which I am sure do not require so strict an attention of mind, as these abstracted speculations; and therefore if it were his Request in that case, we may Reasonably think that ’twas no less his desire in this. When we come to speak of the Incomparable Author of these Meditations, we have reason to lament our own Ignorance, and to blame the Ingratitude of the Age wherein he lived, for not transmitting to Posterity more certain and ample Records of the Life and Conversation of this Excellent Philosopher, all that has been Written in this kind gives us only so much light into the Life of this Prodigious Man, as may make us wish for more; imparting which, I shall recommend the Readers to a further enquiry into the inward Thoughts, (largly discover’d in the Writings) of our Famous Author, of whose outward actions and condition we have so small knowledge.

Renatus Des-Cartes was born on the last day of March in the year 1596. at Tours, or at Castrum Eraldum a Town near Tours in France; He came of an Antient and Noble Family, being by Descent Lord of Perron, His Father was a Senator of his Country, and a Man of no mean estate, leaving to this his only Son by a second Wife between six and seven thousand pounds a year. He was Educated in his younger years according to the manner of his Country (and as he himself recommends in one of his Epistles, viz. Epist. 90. partis secundæ to One for the Instruction of his Son) in the Aristotelian principles of Philosophy, a whole course whereof he had run through at the Age of seventeen in the Schools of Flexia, or La Flesche a Town in the Province of Anjou, famous for the Colledge of Jesuites there establish’d by Henry the 4th. But to this he did not Continue long devoted, giving early testimonies of his dislike to the unsatisfactory Notions, and verbose emptiness of the Peripatetick Philosophy; He used therefore his utmost endeavours (as he himself testifies in his Dissertatio de Methodo) to get loose from those Chains and Fetters of Mind to which the weakness of his tender years had subjected him.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART II

    The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another. And I had little difficulty in determining the objects with which it was necessary to commence, for I was already persuaded that it must be with the simplest and easiest to know, and, considering that of all those who have hitherto sought truth in the sciences, the mathematicians alone have been able to find any demonstrations, that is, any certain and evident reasons, I did not doubt but that such must have been the rule of their investigations. I resolved to commence, therefore, with the examination of the simplest objects, not anticipating, however, from this any other advantage than that to be found in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth, and to a distaste for all such reasonings as were unsound.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART IV

    I am in doubt as to the propriety of making my first meditations in the place above mentioned matter of discourse; for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be acceptable to every one. And yet, that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them. I had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · THE TRANSLATORS Preface. TO THE READERS.

    And certainly I might well have expected the same chance, had this been the Translation of an History, Play or Romance; wherein there is requisite not onely a bare version but a conformation of Idiom and language, manner and customary expression; But the nature of this present Work will not admit of the like liberty, and therefore, I hope, amongst Judicious Readers it may be exempt from the common Fate of Translations; for if we look upon it as a Philosophical or Metaphysical Tract, or rather as (really it is) a Physico-Mathematical Argumentation, we shall find that a great strictness of Expression is requisite to be observed therein. So that had a Translator taken upon him to use his own liberty of Phrase, he would thereby have endanger’d the sense and force of the Arguments; for Politeness of language might as well be expected in a Translation of Euclide as in this. And all that are acquainted with this famous Authors design, do very well know, that it was his intention in these Meditations Mathematically to demonstrate, that there is a God, and that mans mind is incorporeal. And it was his opinion, that metaphysicks may as clearly be demonstrated as mathematicks, as witness his expression in the Dedicatory Epistle of this Work to the Sorbone Doctors, Eas (Rationes scilicet) quibus hic utor certitudine & evidentiâ Geometricas æquare, vel etiam superare existimem; That he reputed his Arguments used in these Meditations, to equal if not excell Geometrical certainty.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART V

    I would here willingly have proceeded to exhibit the whole chain of truths which I deduced from these primary but as with a view to this it would have been necessary now to treat of many questions in dispute among the earned, with whom I do not wish to be embroiled, I believe that it will be better for me to refrain from this exposition, and only mention in general what these truths are, that the more judicious may be able to determine whether a more special account of them would conduce to the public advantage. I have ever remained firm in my original resolution to suppose no other principle than that of which I have recently availed myself in demonstrating the existence of God and of the soul, and to accept as true nothing that did not appear to me more clear and certain than the demonstrations of the geometers had formerly appeared; and yet I venture to state that not only have I found means to satisfy myself in a short time on all the principal difficulties which are usually treated of in philosophy, but I have also observed certain laws established in nature by God in such a manner, and of which he has impressed on our minds such notions, that after we have reflected sufficiently upon these, we cannot doubt that they are accurately observed in all that exists or takes place in the world and farther, by considering the concatenation of these laws, it appears to me that I have discovered many truths more useful and more important than all I had before learned, or even had expected to learn.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART II

    Among the branches of philosophy, I had, at an earlier period, given some attention to logic, and among those of the mathematics to geometrical analysis and algebra,--three arts or sciences which ought, as I conceived, to contribute something to my design. But, on examination, I found that, as for logic, its syllogisms and the majority of its other precepts are of avail--rather in the communication of what we already know, or even as the art of Lully, in speaking without judgment of things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation of the unknown; and although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very excellent precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many others, and these either injurious or superfluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost quite as difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble. Then as to the analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns, besides that they embrace only matters highly abstract, and, to appearance, of no use, the former is so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures, that it can exercise the understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the imagination; and, in the latter, there is so complete a subjection to certain rules and formulas, that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity calculated to embarrass, instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind. By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which would comprise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects. And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice, so that a state is best governed when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; in like manner, instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me, provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART VI

    If some of the matters of which I have spoken in the beginning of the “Dioptrics” and “Meteorics” should offend at first sight, because I call them hypotheses and seem indifferent about giving proof of them, I request a patient and attentive reading of the whole, from which I hope those hesitating will derive satisfaction; for it appears to me that the reasonings are so mutually connected in these treatises, that, as the last are demonstrated by the first which are their causes, the first are in their turn demonstrated by the last which are their effects. Nor must it be imagined that I here commit the fallacy which the logicians call a circle; for since experience renders the majority of these effects most certain, the causes from which I deduce them do not serve so much to establish their reality as to explain their existence; but on the contrary, the reality of the causes is established by the reality of the effects. Nor have I called them hypotheses with any other end in view except that it may be known that I think I am able to deduce them from those first truths which I have already expounded; and yet that I have expressly determined not to do so, to prevent a certain class of minds from thence taking occasion to build some extravagant philosophy upon what they may take to be my principles, and my being blamed for it. I refer to those who imagine that they can master in a day all that another has taken twenty years to think out, as soon as he has spoken two or three words to them on the subject; or who are the more liable to error and the less capable of perceiving truth in very proportion as they are more subtle and lively. As to the opinions which are truly and wholly mine, I offer no apology for them as new,--persuaded as I am that if their reasons be well considered they will be found to be so simple and so conformed, to common sense as to appear less extraordinary and less paradoxical than any others which can be held on the same subjects; nor do I even boast of being the earliest discoverer of any of them, but only of having adopted them, neither because they had nor because they had not been held by others, but solely because reason has convinced me of their truth.

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