Pascal's Pensées
Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)
[349] P. 252, l. 10. An angel from heaven.—See previous note. [350] P. 252, l. 14. Father Lingende.—Claude de Lingendes, an eloquent Jesuit preacher, who died in 1660. [351] P. 252, l. 33. Ubi est Deus tuus?—Ps. xiii, 3. [352] P. 252, l. 34. Exortum est, etc.—Ps. cxii, 4. [353] P. 253, l. 6. Saint Xavier.—Saint François Xavier, the friend of Ignatius Loyola, became a Jesuit. [354] P. 253, l. 9. Væ qui, etc.—Is. x, I. [355] P. 253, l. 24. The five propositions.—See Preface. [356] P. 253, l. 36. To seduce, etc.—Mark xiii, 22. [357] P. 254, l. 6. Si non fecissem.—John xv, 24. [358] P. 255, l. 11. Believe in the Church.—Matthew xviii, 17-20. [359] P. 257, l. 14. They.—The Jansenists, who believed in the system of evangelical doctrine deduced from Augustine by Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), the Bishop of Ypres. They held that interior grace is irresistible, and that Christ died for all, in reaction against the ordinary Catholic dogma of the freedom of the will, and merely sufficient grace. [360] P. 258, l. 4. A time to laugh, etc.—Eccles. iii, 4. [361] P. 258, l. 4. Responde. Ne respondeas.—Prov. xxvi, 4, 5. [362] P. 260, l. 3. Saint Athanasius.—Patriarch of Alexandria, accused of rape, of murder, and of sacrilege. He was condemned by the Councils of Tyre, Aries, and Milan. Pope Liberius is said to have finally ratified the condemnation in A.D. 357. Athanasius here stands for Jansenius, Saint Thersea for Mother Angélique, and Liberius for Clement IX.
[363] P. 261, l. 17. Vos autem non sic.—Luke xxii, 26. [364] P. 261, l. 23. Duo aut tres in unum.—John x, 30; First Epistle of St. John, V, 8. [365] P. 262, l. 18. The Fronde.—The party which rose against Mazarin and the Court during the minority of Louis XIV. They led to civil war. [366] P. 262, l. 25. Pasce oves meas.—John xxi, 17. [367] P. 263, l. 14. Jeroboam.—I Kings xii, 31. [368] P. 265, l. 21. The servant, etc.—John xv, 15. [369] P. 266, l. 4. He that is not, etc.—Matthew xii, 30. [370] P. 266, l. 5. He that is not, etc.—Mark ix, 40. [371] P. 266, l. 11. Humilibus dot gratiam.—James iv, 6. [372] P. 266, l. 12. Sui eum non, etc.—John i, 11, 12. [373] P. 266, l. 33. We will be as the other nations.—I Sam. viii, 20. [374] P. 268, l. 19. Vince in bono malum.—Romans xii, 21. [375] P. 268, l. 26. Montalte.—See note on page 6, line 30, above. [376] P. 269, l. 11. Probability.—The doctrine in casuistry that of two probable views, both reasonable, one may follow his own inclinations, as a doubtful law cannot impose a certain obligation. It was held by the Jesuits, the famous religious order founded in 1534 by Ignatius Loyola. This section of the Pensées is directed chiefly against them. [377] P. 269, l. 22. Coacervabunt sibi magistros.—2 Tim. iv, 3. [378] P. 270, l. 3. These.—The writers of Port-Royal. [379] P. 270, l. 15. The Society.—The Society of Jesus. [380] P. 271, l. 15. Digna necessitas.—Book of Wisdom xix, 4.
The figures refer to the numbers of the Pensées, and not to the pages.
Abraham, took nothing for himself, 502; from stones can come children unto, 777; and Gideon, 821 Absolutions, without signs of regret, 903, 904 Act, the last, is tragic, 210 Adam, compared with Christ, 551; his glorious state, 559; forma futuri, 655 Advent, the time of the first, foretold, 756 Age, influences judgment, 381; the six ages, 654 Alexander, the example of his chastity, 103 Amusements, dangerous to the Christian life, 11 Animals, intelligence and instinct of, 340, 342 Antichrist, miracles of, foretold by Christ, 825; will speak openly against God, 842; miracles of, cannot lead into error, 845 Apocalyptics, extravagances of the, 650 Apostles, hypothesis that they were deceivers, 571; foresaw heresies, 578; supposition that they were either deceived or deceivers, 801 Aquinas, Thomas, 61, 338 Arcesilaus, the sceptic, became a dogmatist, 375 Archimedes, greatness of, 792 Arians, where they go wrong, 861 Aristotle, and Plato, 331 Arius, miracles in his time, 831 Athanasius, St., 867 Atheism, shows a certain strength of mind, 225 Atheists, who seek, to be pitied, 190; ought to say what is perfectly evident, 221; objections of, against the Resurrection and the Virgin Birth, 222, 223; objection of, 228 Augustine, St., saw that we work for an uncertainty, 234; on the submission of reason, 270; on miracles, 811; his authority, 868 Augustus, his saying about Herod's son, 179 Authority, in belief, 260 Authors, vanity of certain, 43 Automatism, human, 252 Babylon, rivers of, 459 Beauty, a certain standard of, 32; poetical, 33 Belief, three sources of, 245; rule of, 260; of simple people, 284; without reading
the Testaments, 286; the Cross creates, 587; reasons why there is no, in the miracles, 825 Bias, leads to error, 98 Birth, noble, an advantage, 322; persons of high, honoured and despised, 337 Blame, and praise, 501 Blood, example of the circulation of, 96 Body, nourishment of the, 356; the, and its members, 475, 476; infinite distance between mind and, 792 Brutes, no mutual admiration among the, 401 Cæsar, compared with Alexander and Augustus, 132 Calling, chance decides the choice of a, 97 Calvinism, error of, 776 Canonical, the heretical books prove the, 568 Carthusian monk, difference between a soldier and a, 538 Casuists, true believers have no pretext for following their laxity, 888; submit the decision to a corrupted reason, 906; cannot give assurance to a conscience in error, 908; allow lust to act, 913 Causes, seen by the intellect and not by the senses, 234 Catholic, the, doctrine, of the Holy Sacrament, 861 Ceremonies, ordained in the Old Testament, are types, 679 Certain, nothing is, 234 Chance, according to the doctrine of chance, one should believe in God, 233; and work for an uncertainty, 234; and seek the truth, 236; gives rise to thoughts, 370 Chancellor, the position of the, uneral, 307 Character, the Christian, the human, and the inhuman, 532 Charity, nothing so like it as covetousness, 662; not a figurative precept, 664; the sole aim of the Scripture, 669 Charron, the divisions of, 62 Children, frightened at the face they have blackened, 88; of Port-Royal, 151; illustration of usurpation from, 295 China, History of, 592, 593
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Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE
No one passes in the world as skilled in verse unless he has put up the sign of a poet, a mathematician, etc. But educated people do not want a sign, and draw little distinction between the trade of a poet and that of an embroiderer. People of education are not called poets or mathematicians, etc.; but they are all these, and judges of all these. No one guesses what they are. When they come into society, they talk on matters about which the rest are talking. We do not observe in them one quality rather than another, save when they have to make use of it. But then we remember it, for it is characteristic of such persons that we do not say of them that they are fine speakers, when it is not a question of oratory, and that we say of them that they are fine speakers, when it is such a question. It is therefore false praise to give a man when we say of him, on his entry, that he is a very clever poet; and it is a bad sign when a man is not asked to give his judgment on some verses. 35
Read in contextPascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · INTRODUCTION
We must regard the Pensées as merely the first notes for a work which he left far from completion; we have, in Sainte-Beuve's words, a tower of which the stones have been laid on each other, but not cemented, and the structure unfinished. In early years his memory had been amazingly retentive of anything that he wished to remember; and had it not been impaired by increasing illness and pain, he probably would not have been obliged to set down these notes at all. But taking the book as it is left to us, we still find that it occupies a unique place in the history of French literature and in the history of religious meditation.
Read in contextPascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE
The reason, therefore, that some intuitive minds are not mathematical is that they cannot at all turn their attention to the principles of mathematics. But the reason that mathematicians are not intuitive is that they do not see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the exact and plain principles of mathematics, and not reasoning till they have well inspected and arranged their principles, they are lost in matters of intuition where the principles do not allow of such arrangement. They are scarcely seen; they are felt rather than seen; there is the greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do not of themselves perceive them. These principles are so fine and so numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is needed to perceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are perceived, without for the most part being able to demonstrate them in order as in mathematics; because the principles are not known to us in the same way, and because it would be an endless matter to undertake it. We must see the matter at once, at one glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least to a certain degree. And thus it is rare that mathematicians are intuitive, and that men of intuition are mathematicians, because mathematicians wish to treat matters of intuition mathematically, and make themselves ridiculous, wishing to begin with definitions and then with axioms, which is not the way to proceed in this kind of reasoning. Not that the mind does not do so, but it does it tacitly, naturally, and without technical rules; for the expression of it is beyond all men, and only a few can feel it.
Read in contextPascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE
Intuitive minds, on the contrary, being thus accustomed to judge at a single glance, are so astonished when they are presented with propositions of which they understand nothing, and the way to which is through definitions and axioms so sterile, and which they are not accustomed to see thus in detail, that they are repelled and disheartened. But dull minds are never either intuitive or mathematical. Mathematicians who are only mathematicians have exact minds, provided all things are explained to them by means of definitions and axioms; otherwise they are inaccurate and insufferable, for they are only right when the principles are quite clear. And men of intuition who are only intuitive cannot have the patience to reach to first principles of things speculative and conceptual, which they have never seen in the world, and which are altogether out of the common. 2 There are different kinds of right understanding;[2] some have right understanding in a certain order of things, and not in others, where they go astray. Some draw conclusions well from a few premises, and this displays an acute judgment. Others draw conclusions well where there are many premises. For example, the former easily learn hydrostatics, where the premises are few, but the conclusions are so fine that only the greatest acuteness can reach them.
Read in contextPascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION I / THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE
THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE 1 The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.[1]—In the one the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use; so that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and one must have a quite inaccurate mind who reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it is almost impossible they should escape notice. But in the intuitive mind the principles are found in common use, and are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous, that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice. Now the omission of one principle leads to error; thus one must have very clear sight to see all the principles, and in the next place an accurate mind not to draw false deductions from known principles. All mathematicians would then be intuitive if they had clear sight, for they do not reason incorrectly from principles known to them; and intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could turn their eyes to the principles of mathematics to which they are unused.
Read in contextPascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · INDEX
776 Penitence, 660, 922 People, ordinary, have the power of not thinking of that about which they do not want to think, 259; sound opinions of the people, 313, 316, 324 Perpetuity, 612, 615, 616 Perseus, 410 Persons, only three kinds of, 257; two kinds of, know God, 288 Peter, St., 671, 743 Philosophers, the, have confused ideas of things, 72; influence of imagination upon, 82; disquiet inquirers, 184; made their ethics independent of the immortality of the soul, 219, 220; have mastered their passions, 349; believe in God without Christ, 463; their motto, 464; have consecrated vices, 503; what they advise, 509; did not prescribe suitable feelings, 524 Piety, different from superstition, 255 Pilate, the false justice of, 790 Plato, 219, 331 Poets, 34, 38, 39 Pope, the, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 879, 881 Port-Royal, 151, 838, 919 Prayer, why established, 513 Predictions of particular things, 710; of Cyrus, 712; of events in the fourth monarchy, 723; of the Messiah, 728, 730 Present, we do not rest satisfied with the, 172 Presumption of men, 148 Pride, 152, 153, 406 Probability, the Jesuitical doctrine of, 901, 907, 909, 912, 915, 916, 917, 919, 921 Proofs, of religion, 289, 290; metaphysical, of God, 542 Prophecies, the, entrusted to the Jews, 570; the strongest proof of Christ, 705; necessarily distributed, 706; about Christ, 709, 726, 730, 732, 735; proofs of divinity, 712; in Egypt, 725 Prophets, the, prophesied by symbols, 652; their discourses obscure, 658; their meaning veiled, 677; zeal after the, 702; did not speak to flatter the people, 718; foretold, 738 Propositions, the five, 830, 849 Purgatory, 518 Provincial Letters, the, 52, 919 Pyrrhus, advice given to, 139 Rabbinism, chronology of, 634 Reason and the imagination, 82; and the senses, 83; recognises an infinity of things beyond it, 267; submission of, 268, 269, 270, 272; the heart and, 277, 278, 282; and instinct, 344, 395; commands us imperiously, 345; and the passions, 412, 413; corruption of, 440 Reasoning, reduces itself to yielding to feeling, 274 Redemption, the Red Sea an image of the, 642; the completeness of the, 780 Religion, its true nature and the necessity of studying it, 194; sinfulness of indifference to it, 195; whether certain, 234; suited to all kinds of minds, 285; true, 470, 494; test of the falsity of a, 487; two ways of proving its truths, 560; the Christian, has something astonishing in it, 614; the Christian, founded upon a preceding, 618; reasons for preferring the Christian, 736; three marks of, 843; and natural reason, 902 Republic, the Christian, 482, 610 Rivers, moving roads, 17 Roannez, M.
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