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Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)

There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Liberall, and the like; and amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are so by Institution, or Custome of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The former is Naturall; the later Arbitrary Worship. Worship Commanded And Free And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For sometimes it is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such as hee requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gestures, but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are not Worship; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.

Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Private, is that which a Private person exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so. Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty. The End Of Worship The End of Worship amongst men, is Power. For where a man seeth another worshipped he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity, by those rules of Honour, that Reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good already received from them. Attributes Of Divine Honour That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of Nature, I will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him Existence: For no man can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.

Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God. Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God. Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take from him the care of Mankind; take from him his Honour: for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour. Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we can; because to Finite, it is easie to adde more. Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is Finite: Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite: Not to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes onely of things Finite: Nor to say he is this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is bounded, and Finite: Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to him Place:

Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all Finite: for there cannot be more than one Infinite: Nor to ascribe to him (unlesse Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect) Passions that partake of Griefe; as Repentance, Anger, Mercy: or of Want; as Appetite, Hope, Desire; or of any Passive faculty: For Passion, is Power limited by somewhat else. And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood, as that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which he effecteth every thing. Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense; as also Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse the organicall parts of mans body: For there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to him.

Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by naturall Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes, as Infinite, Eternall, Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High, Most Great, and the like; or Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our Fancy,) but how much wee admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much as we can: For there is but one Name to signifie our Conception of his Nature, and that is, I AM: and but one Name of his Relation to us, and that is God; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Meditations · Emperor of Rome Marcus Aurelius (121–180) · BOOK

    I. He that is unjust, is also impious. For the nature of the universe, having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good; more or less according to the several persons and occasions but in nowise hurt one another: it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the deities. For the nature of the universe, is the nature the common parent of all, and therefore piously to be observed of all things that are, and that which now is, to whatsoever first was, and gave it its being, hath relation of blood and kindred. She is also called truth and is the first cause of all truths. He therefore that willingly and wittingly doth lie, is impious in that he doth receive, and so commit injustice: but he that against his will, in that he disagreeth from the nature of the universe, and in that striving with the nature of the world he doth in his particular, violate the general order of the world. For he doth no better than strive and war against it, who contrary to his own nature applieth himself to that which is contrary to truth. For nature had before furnished him with instincts and opportunities sufficient for the attainment of it; which he having hitherto neglected, is not now able to discern that which is false from that which is true.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. V. Against the Third Meditation of God.

    Whereby it appears that we have no Idea of God; but like one born blind, who being brought to the Fire, and perceiving himself to be Warmed, knows there is something by which he is warmed and Hearing it called Fire, he Concludes that Fire Exists, but yet knows not of what shape or Colour the Fire is, neither has he any Image or Idea thereof in his Mind. So Man knowing that there must be some Cause of his Imaginations or Ideas, as also an other cause before That, and so onwards, he is brought at last to an End, or to a supposal of some Eternal Cause, Which because it never began to Be cannot have any other Cause before it, and thence he Concludes that ’tis necessary that some Eternal Thing Exist: and yet he has no Idea which He can call the Idea of this Eternal Thing, but he names this Thing, which he believes and acknowledges by the Name God. But now Des-Cartes proceeds from this Position, That we have an Idea of God in our Mind, to prove this Theoreme, That God (that if an Almighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists, whereas he ought to have explain’d this Idea of God better, and he should have thence deduced not only his Existence, but also the Creation of the World. ANSWER.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.

    Solution. For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a God; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a First and Cheif Being, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an Idea thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of Perfections, tho I do not at that time count them over, or Remark each single One; which necessity is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider Existence to be a Perfection) conclude Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a Triangle, yet whenever I please to Consider of a Right-lined Figure having only three Angles, I am then necessitated to allow it all those Requisites from which I may argue rightly, That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be inscribed within a Circle, I am not at all necessitated to think that all Quadrilateral Figures are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I clearly and distinctly Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these False suppositions, and True natural Ideas, the first and Chief; whereof is that of a God; For by many wayes I understand That not to be a Fiction depending on my Thought, but an Image of a True and Immutable Nature; As first, because I can think of no other thing but God to Whose Essence Existence belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine Two or More Gods, and supposing that he is now only One, I may plainly perceive it necessary for Him to Have been from Eternity, and will Be to Eternity; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in God, Which I cannot Change, and from which I cannot Detract.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.

    Doubt. Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident, but looks rather like a sophism; for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence, I can easily perswade my self that the Existence of God may be distinguish’d from his Essence, so that I may Imagine God not to Exist. Solution. But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the Existence of God can no more be seperated from his Essence, then the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be seperated from the Essence of a Triangle, or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley; so that ’tis no less a Repugnancy to think of a God (that is, A Being infinitely perfect) who wants Existence (that is, who wants a Perfection) then to think of a Mountain, to which there is no Valley adjoyning. Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing, or a Mountain without a Vally? yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Vally, it does not from thence follow, that there Is a Mountain in the World; so supposing me to think of a God as Existing, yet does it not follow that God Really Exists. For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things, and as I may imagine a Winged Horse, tho no Horse has Wings, so I may imagine an existing God, tho no God exist.

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  • Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 1

    *****Note—Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.) that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:—

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  • Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 3

    APPENDIX: In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.

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