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Pascal's Pensées

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)

You say that I am a heretic. Is that lawful? And if you do not fear that men do justice, do you not fear that God does justice? You will feel the force of the truth, and you will yield to it ... There is something supernatural in such a blindness. Digna necessitas.[380] Mentiris impudentissime ... Doctrina sua noscitur vir ... False piety, a double sin. I am alone against thirty thousand. No. Protect, you, the court; protect, you, deception; let me protect the truth. It is all my strength. If I lose it, I am undone. I shall not lack accusations, and persecutions. But I possess the truth, and we shall see who will take it away. I do not need to defend religion, but you do not need to defend error and injustice. Let God, out of His compassion, having no regard to the evil which is in me, and having regard to the good which is in you, grant us all grace that truth may not be overcome in my hands, and that falsehood ... 921 Probable.—Let us see if we seek God sincerely, by comparison of the things which we love. It is probable that this food will not poison me. It is probable that I shall not lose my action by not prosecuting it ... 922 It is not absolution only which remits sins by the sacrament of penance, but contrition, which is not real if it does not seek the sacrament. 923

People who do not keep their word, without faith, without honour, without truth, deceitful in heart, deceitful in speech; for which that amphibious animal in fable was once reproached, which held itself in a doubtful position between the fish and the birds ... It is important to kings and princes to be considered pious; and therefore they must confess themselves to you.

The following brief notes are mainly based on those of M. Brunschvicg. But those of MM. Faugère, Molinier, and Havet have also been consulted. The biblical references are to the Authorised English Version. Those in the text are to the Vulgate, except where it has seemed advisable to alter the reference to the English Version. [1] P. 1, l. 1. The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.—Pascal is here distinguishing the logical or discursive type of mind, a good example of which is found in mathematical reasoning, and what we should call the intuitive type of mind, which sees everything at a glance. A practical man of sound judgment exemplifies the latter; for he is in fact guided by impressions of past experience, and does not consciously reason from general principles. [2] P. 2, l. 34. There are different kinds, etc.—This is probably a subdivision of the discursive type of mind. [3] P. 3, l. 31. By rule.—This is an emendation by M. Brunschvicg. The MS. has sans règle. [4] P. 4, l. 3. I judge by my watch.—Pascal is said to have always carried a watch attached to his left wrist-band. [5] P. 5, l. 21. Scaramouch.—A traditional character in Italian comedy. [6] P. 5, l. 22. The doctor.—Also a traditional character in Italian comedy.

[7] P. 5, l. 24. Cleobuline.—Princess, and afterwards Queen of Corinth, figures in the romance of Mademoiselle de Scudéry, entitled Artamène ou le Grand Cyrus. She is enamoured of one of her subjects, Myrinthe. But she "loved him without thinking of love; and remained so long in that error, that this affection was no longer in a state to be overcome, when she became aware of it." The character is supposed to have been drawn from Christina of Sweden. [8] P. 6, l. 21. Rivers are, etc.—Apparently suggested by a chapter in Rabelais: How we descended in the isle of Odes, in which the roads walk. [9] P. 6, l. 30. Salomon de Tultie.—A pseudonym adopted by Pascal as the author of the Provincial Letters. [10] P. 7, l. 7. Abstine et sustine.—A maxim of the Stoics. [11] P. 7, l. 8. Follow nature.—The maxim in which the Stoics summed up their positive ethical teaching. [12] P. 7, l. 9. As Plato.—Compare Montaigne, Essais, iii, 9. [13] P. 9, l. 29. We call this jargon poetical beauty.—According to M. Havet, Pascal refers here to Malherbe and his school. [14] P. 10, l. 23. Ne quid nimis.—Nothing in excess, a celebrated maxim in ancient Greek philosophy. [15] P. 11, l. 26. That epigram about two one-eyed people.—M. Havet points out that this is not Martial's, but is to be found in Epigrammatum Delectus, published by Port-Royal in 1659.

Lumine Æon dextro, capta est Leonilla sinistro, Et potis est forma vincere uterque deos. Blande puer, lumen quod habes concede parenti, Sic tu cæcus Amor, sic erit ilia Venus. [16] P. 11, l. 29. Ambitiosa recidet ornamenta.—Horace, De Arte Poetica, 447. [17] P. 13, l. 2. Cartesian.—One who follows the philosophy of Descartes (1596-1650), "the father of modern philosophy." [18] P. 13, l. 8. Le Maître.—A famous French advocate in Pascal's time. His Plaidoyers el Harangues appeared in 1657. Plaidoyer VI is entitled Pour un fils mis en religion par force, and on the first page occurs the word répandre: "Dieu qui répand des aveuglements et des ténèbres sur les passions illégitimes." Pascal's reference is probably to this passage. [19] P. 13, l. 12. The Cardinal.—Mazarin. He was one of those statesmen who do not like condolences. [20] P. 14, l. 12. Saint Thomas.—Thomas Aquinas (1223-74), one of the greatest scholastic philosophers. [21] P. 14, l. 16. Charron.—A friend of Montaigne. His Traité de la Sagesse (1601), which is not a large book, contains 117 chapters, each of which is subdivided. [22] P. 14, l. 17. Of the confusion of Montaigne.—The Essays of Montaigne follow each other without any kind of order. [23] P. 14, l. 27. Mademoiselle de Gournay.—The adopted daughter of Montaigne. She published in 1595 an edition of his Essais, and, in a Preface (added later), she defends him on this point. [24] P. 15, l. 1. People without eyes.—Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [25] P. 15, l. 1. Squaring the circle.—Ibid., ii, 14.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter XI.

    Now all these mental states[41] tend to the same object, as indeed common language leads us to expect: I mean, we speak of γνώμη, Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing the possession of γνώμη and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals whom we denominate Practically-Wise and Judicious: because all these faculties are employed upon the extremes,[42] i.e. on particular details; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which come within the province of the Practically-Wise, a man is Judicious and possessed of good γνώμη; i.e. he is disposed to make allowance, for considerations of equity are entertained by all good men alike in transactions with their fellows. And all matters of Moral Action belong to the class of particulars, otherwise called extremes: for the man of Practical Wisdom must know them, and Judiciousness and γνώμη are concerned with matters of Moral Actions, which are extremes. Intuition, moreover, takes in the extremes at both ends:[43] I mean, the first and last terms must be taken in not by reasoning but by Intuition [so that Intuition comes to be of two kinds], and that which belongs to strict demonstrative reasonings takes in immutable, i.e. Necessary, first terms; while that which is employed in practical matters takes in the extreme, the Contingent, and the minor Premiss:[44] for the minor Premisses are the source of the Final Cause, Universals being made up out of Particulars.[45] To take in these, of course, we must have Sense, i.e. in other words Practical Intuition.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. / SECT. I. OF KNOWLEDGE.

    I shall here take occasion to propose a second observation concerning our demonstrative reasonings, which is suggested by the same subject of the mathematics. It is usual with mathematicians, to pretend, that those ideas, which are their objects, are of so refined and spiritual a nature, that they fall not under the conception of the fancy, but must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual view, of which the superior faculties of the soul are alone capable. The same notion runs through most parts of philosophy, and is principally made use of to explain oar abstract ideas, and to shew how we can form an idea of a triangle, for instance, which shall neither be an isoceles nor scalenum, nor be confined to any particular length and proportion of sides. It is easy to see, why philosophers are so fond of this notion of some spiritual and refined perceptions; since by that means they cover many of their absurdities, and may refuse to submit to the decisions of clear ideas, by appealing to such as are obscure and uncertain. But to destroy this artifice, we need but reflect on that principle so oft insisted on, that all our ideas are copyed from our impressions. For from thence we may immediately conclude, that since all impressions are clear and precise, the ideas, which are copyed from them, must be of the same nature, and can never, but from our fault, contain any thing so dark and intricate. An idea is by its very nature weaker and fainter than an impression; but being in every other respect the same, cannot imply any very great mystery. If its weakness render it obscure, it is our business to remedy that defect, as much as possible, by keeping the idea steady and precise; and till we have done so, it is in vain to pretend to reasoning and philosophy.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic.

    It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this respect agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius), consequently not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to given objects). This latter remark, however, must be taken only as an illustration, and not as any proof of the truth of our æsthetical theory.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 1787

    It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present condition by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects à priori, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of objects à priori, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do just what COPERNICUS did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects.

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  • An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.

    Besides what I have already said, there is another reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other principles are innate. I that am fully persuaded that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern SPECULATION, are of no great use; and those that concern PRACTICE, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not allowed to be innate. For, to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us WHICH THEY ARE; and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no. Since if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already: of their usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter. 23. Difference of Men’s Discoveries depends upon the different Application of their Faculties.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason

    I shall not repeat here the common and clear refutations of this absurdity, which are to be found everywhere in numbers: every one knows that it is impossible to undermine the evidence of mathematics by mere discursive conceptions; I shall only remark that, if in this case philosophy endeavours to gain an advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices, it is because it forgets that the discussion relates solely to Phenomena and their conditions. It is not sufficient to find the conception of the simple for the pure conception of the composite, but we must discover for the intuition of the composite (matter), the intuition of the simple. Now this, according to the laws of sensibility, and consequently in the case of objects of sense, is utterly impossible. In the case of a whole composed of substances, which is cogitated solely by the pure understanding, it may be necessary to be in possession of the simple before composition is possible. But this does not hold good of the Totum substantiale phaenomenon, which, as an empirical intuition in space, possesses the necessary property of containing no simple part, for the very reason that no part of space is simple. Meanwhile, the Monadists have been subtle enough to escape from this difficulty, by presupposing intuition and the dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility of space, instead of regarding space as the condition of the possibility of the objects of external intuition, that is, of bodies.

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