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The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle

Aristotle (-384–-322)

[39] The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos]. [40] We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae]. [41] Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. [Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it). The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom. Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]? [42] See note, on p. 140.

[43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous], i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each. [44] i.e. of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton]. [45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e. by [Greek: ethismos]). All that is pleasant is to be done, This is pleasant, This is to be done By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, i.e. on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.

[46] The consequentia is this: There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and therefore, etc. [47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10, { [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai] { [Greek: to de phylaktikon], { [Greek: to de sæmantikon]. Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon]. [48] Healthiness is the formal cause of health. Medicine is the efficient cause of health. See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein]. [49] [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom. [50] This is another case of an observation being thrown in obiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand. [51] See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii. [52] The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism. [53] See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30. [54] And for the Minor, of course, “This particular action is———.”

We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.) [55] “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici. [56] The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues. [57] Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs]. [58] It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it.

[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men may be than what they are. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development. [2] This illustrates the expression, “Deceits of the Flesh.” [3] Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.” [4] Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——] [5] Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not. [6] As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · NOTES / BOOK I

    [5] The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima aplos] I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as denoting respectively what is and what may be known. All truth is [Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek: gnorima aemin] which we have received as true. From this appears immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he should ask. But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect. 10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin] Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage, which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition” The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai] occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI

    [23] [Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ——] might exist independent of [Greek:——], but not this without that. Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being [Greek:——]. There are three branches of [Greek:——] according to Greek Philosophy, [Greek:——], [Greek:——], [Greek:——]. Science is perhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent. [24] [Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:——] would be its chief Instrument. [25] The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——]. [26] In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not. Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom. [27] [Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI

    [13] The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes of it.” (See the appendix to this Book.) [14] This is the test of correct logical division, that the membra dividentia shall be opposed, i.e. not included the one by the other. [15] The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, 1. vi. [16] See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter V.

    As for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to what kind of persons we in common language ascribe it.[16] It is thought then to be the property of the Practically Wise man to be able to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for himself, not in any definite line,[17] as what is conducive to health or strength, but what to living well. A proof of this is that we call men Wise in this or that, when they calculate well with a view to some good end in a case where there is no definite rule. And so, in a general way of speaking, the man who is good at deliberation will be Practically Wise. Now no man deliberates respecting things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor such as lie not within the range of his own action: and so, since Knowledge requires strict demonstrative reasoning, of which Contingent matter does not admit (I say Contingent matter, because all matters of deliberation must be Contingent and deliberation cannot take place with respect to things which are Necessarily), Practical Wisdom cannot be Knowledge nor Art; nor the former, because what falls under the province of Doing must be Contingent; not the latter, because Doing and Making are different in kind.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI

    [43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous], i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each. [44] i.e. of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton]. [45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e. by [Greek: ethismos]). All that is pleasant is to be done, This is pleasant, This is to be done By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, i.e. on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI

    [39] The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos]. [40] We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae]. [41] Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. [Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it). The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom. Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]? [42] See note, on p. 140.

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