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The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle

Aristotle (-384–-322)

[46] The consequentia is this: There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and therefore, etc. [47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10, { [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai] { [Greek: to de phylaktikon], { [Greek: to de sæmantikon]. Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon]. [48] Healthiness is the formal cause of health. Medicine is the efficient cause of health. See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein]. [49] [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom. [50] This is another case of an observation being thrown in obiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand. [51] See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii. [52] The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism. [53] See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30. [54] And for the Minor, of course, “This particular action is———.”

We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.) [55] “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici. [56] The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues. [57] Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs]. [58] It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it.

[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men may be than what they are. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development. [2] This illustrates the expression, “Deceits of the Flesh.” [3] Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.” [4] Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——] [5] Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not. [6] As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”

[7] That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise, it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that “this is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the major i.e. the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:——] tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided,” and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But [Greek:——], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in place of the minor premise “This is excess,” its own premise “This is sweet,” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle (‘[Greek:——]), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.” The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:——] is this that [Greek:——], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the suggestions of Right Reason. On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:——] i.e. [Greek:——] easily defeats [Greek:——]. The [Greek:——], an hour before he is in temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The [Greek:——] would.

Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2): Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo Discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentes Verum hic impransi mecum disquirite Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it is red,” etc. [8] As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes Metaphysics. [9] [Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word (Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it. [10] The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas]. [11] Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I chap v sect. iv. [12] That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue. [13] See the letter of Sabina Rentfree. Spectator, 431. [14] Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. [15] The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined. Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure, Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*] Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust, Actions of Lust are more unjust

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · MY LORD, / JOHN LOCKE / THE EPISTLE TO THE READER / READER,

    If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said, Bk. I. ch. ii. sect. 18, and Bk. II. ch. xxviii. sect. 13, 14, 15 and 20, he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice. And if he had observed that in the place he quotes I only report as a matter of fact what OTHERS call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For I think I am not much out in saying that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation is—that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men, according to which they are there called virtues or vices. And whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his Old English Dictionary, I daresay it nowhere tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue, in one place, which, being in disrepute, passes for and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men bestow the names of ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ according to this rule of Reputation is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making vice virtue or virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in such points, and to take the alarm even at expressions, which, standing alone by themselves, might sound ill and be suspected.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II OF GREATNESS OF MIND

    It may now be proper to illustrate this general system of morals, by applying it to particular instances of virtue and vice, and shewing how their merit or demerit arises from the four sources here explained. We shall begin with examining the passions of pride and humility, and shall consider the vice or virtue that lies in their excesses or just proportion. An excessive pride or overweaning conceit of ourselves is always esteemed vicious, and is universally hated; as modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is esteemed virtuous, and procures the good-will of every-one. Of the four sources of moral distinctions, this is to be ascribed to the third; viz, the immediate agreeableness and disagreeableness of a quality to others, without any reflections on the tendency of that quality.

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  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · SOPHY, OR WOMAN

    One of my opponents has very truly asserted that virtue is one; you cannot disintegrate it and choose this and reject the other. If you love virtue, you love it in its entirety, and you close your heart when you can, and you always close your lips to the feelings which you ought not to allow. Moral truth is not only what is, but what is good; what is bad ought not to be, and ought not to be confessed, especially when that confession produces results which might have been avoided. If I were tempted to steal, and in confessing it I tempted another to become my accomplice, the very confession of my temptation would amount to a yielding to that temptation. Why do you say that modesty makes women false? Are those who lose their modesty more sincere than the rest? Not so, they are a thousandfold more deceitful. This degree of depravity is due to many vices, none of which is rejected, vices which owe their power to intrigue and falsehood. [Footnote: I know that women who have openly decided on a certain course of conduct profess that their lack of concealment is a virtue in itself, and swear that, with one exception, they are possessed of all the virtues; but I am sure they never persuaded any but fools to believe them. When the natural curb is removed from their sex, what is there left to restrain them? What honour will they prize when they have rejected the honour of their sex? Having once given the rein to passion they have no longer any reason for self-control. “Nec femina, amissa pudicitia, alia abnuerit.” No author ever understood more thoroughly the heart of both sexes than Tacitus when he wrote those words.]

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  • Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER II——OF REPENTANCE

    The true condemnation, and which touches the common practice of men, is that their very retirement itself is full of filth and corruption; the idea of their reformation composed, their repentance sick and faulty, very nearly as much as their sin. Some, either from having been linked to vice by a natural propension or long practice, cannot see its deformity. Others (of which constitution I am) do indeed feel the weight of vice, but they counterbalance it with pleasure, or some other occasion; and suffer and lend themselves to it for a certain price, but viciously and basely. Yet there might, haply, be imagined so vast a disproportion of measure, where with justice the pleasure might excuse the sin, as we say of utility; not only if accidental and out of sin, as in thefts, but in the very exercise of sin, or in the enjoyment of women, where the temptation is violent, and, ‘tis said, sometimes not to be overcome.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. VI SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

    (2) In the second place we may observe, that all kinds of vice and virtue run insensibly into each other, and may approach by such imperceptible degrees as will make it very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to determine when the one ends, and the other begins; and from this observation we may derive a new argument for the foregoing principle. For whatever may be the case, with regard to all kinds of vice and virtue, it is certain, that rights, and obligations, and property, admit of no such insensible gradation, but that a man either has a full and perfect property, or none at all; and is either entirely obliged to perform any action, or lies under no manner of obligation. However civil laws may talk of a perfect dominion, and of an imperfect, it is easy to observe, that this arises from a fiction, which has no foundation in reason, and can never enter into our notions of natural justice and equity. A man that hires a horse, though but for a day, has as full a right to make use of it for that time, as he whom we call its proprietor has to make use of it any other day; and it was evident, that however the use may be bounded in time or degree, the right itself is not susceptible of any such gradation, but is absolute and entire, so far as it extends.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II MORAL DISTINCTIONS DERIVED FROM A MORAL SENSE

    Thus the course of the argument leads us to conclude, that since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them. Our decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity are evidently perceptions; and as all perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the exclusion of the one is a convincing argument for the other. Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of; though this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other.

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