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Politics: A Treatise on Government

Aristotle (-384–-322)

ACHILLES, 76 Act of the city, what, 69 Actions, their original spring, i Administration, 76; whether to be shared by the whole community, 203 AEsumnetes, 96 AEthiopia, in what manner the power of the state is there regulated, 112 Alterations in government, whence they arise, 142; what they are, 143 Ambractia, the government of, changed, 151 Andromadas Reginus, a lawgiver to the Thracian Calcidians, 65 Animals, their different provisions by nature, 14; intended by nature for the benefit of man, 14; what constitutes their different species, 113 Animals, tame, why better than wild, 8 Arbitrator and judge, their difference, 49 Architas his rattle, 248 Areopagus, senate of, 63 Argonauts refuse to take Hercules with them, 93 Aristocracies, causes of commotions in them, 157; chief cause of their alteration, 158; may degenerate into an oligarchy, 79 Aristocracy, what, 78; treated of, 120; its object, 121 Art, works of, which most excellent, 20 Artificers and slaves, their difference, 24 Assemblies, public, advantageous to a democracy, 134 Assembly, public, its proper business, 133 Athens, different dispositions of the citizens of, 149 Barter, its original, 15 Being, what the nature of every one is, 3 Beings, why some command, others obey, 2 Body by nature to be governed, 8; requires our care before the soul, 232 Calchis, the government of, changed, 151 Calcidians, 65 Carthaginian government described, 60 Census in a free state should be as extensive as possible, 131; how to be altered, 162 Charondas supposed to be the scholar of Zaleucus, 64 Child, how to be managed when first born, 235; should be taught nothing till he is five years old, 235; how then to be educated, 236 Children, the proper government of, 22; what their proper virtues, 23; what they are usually taught, 240 Cities, how governed at first, 3; what, 3; the work of nature, 3; prior in contemplation to a family, or an individual, 4 Citizen, who is one?

66, 68; should know both how to command and obey, 73 Citizens must have some things in common, 26; should be exempted from servile labour, 51; privileges different in different governments, 68; if illegally made, whether illegal, 69; who admitted to be, 75; in the best states ought not to follow merchandise, 216 City, may be too much one, 27, 35; what, 66, 82; when it continues the same, 70; for whose sake established, 76; its end, 83; of what parts made up, 113; best composed of equals, 126 City of the best form, what its establishment ought to be, 149; wherein its greatness consists, 149; may be either too large or too small, 209; what should be its situation, 211; whether proper near the sea, 211; ought to be divided by families into different sorts of men, 218 City and confederacy, their difference, 37; wherein it should be one, 27 Command amongst equals should be in rotation, 101 Common meals not well established at Lacedaemon-well at Crete, 56; the model from whence the Lacedaemonian was taken, 56; inferior to it in some respects, 56 Community, its recommendations deceitful, 34; into what people it may be divided, 194 Community of children, 29, 30; inconveniences attending it, 31 Community of goods, its inconveniences, 28; destructive of modesty and liberality, 34 Community of wives, its inconveniences, 27 Contempt a cause of sedition, 146 Courage of a man different from a woman's, 74 Courts, how many there ought to be, 140 Courts of justice should be few in a small state, 192 Cretan customs similar to the Lacedasmonian, 57; assembly open to every citizen, 58 Cretans, their power, 58; their public meals, how conducted 58 Crete, the government of, 57; description of the island of 57 Customs at Carthage, Lacedaemon, and amongst the Scythians and Iberians, concerning those who had killed an enemy, 204, 205 Dadalus's statues, 6.

Delphos, an account of a sedition there, 150 Demagogues, their influence in a democracy, 116.

Democracies, arose out of tyrannies, 100; whence they arose, 142; when changed into tyrannies, 153; their different sorts, 184, 188; general rules for their establishment, 185; should not be made too perfect, 191 Democracy, what, 79, 80; its definition, 112, 113; different sorts of, 115, 118; its object, 122; how subverted in the Isle of Cos, 152 Democracy and aristocracy, how they may be blended together, 163 Democratical state, its foundation, 184 Despotic power absurd, 205 Dion, his noble resolution, 171 Dionysius, his taxes, 175 Dissolution of kingdoms and tyrannies, 169 Domestic employments of men and women different, 74 Domestic government, its object, 77 Domestic society the first, 3 Draco, 65 Dyrrachium, government of, 101 Economy and money-getting, difference, 17 Education necessary for the happiness of the city, 90; of all things most necessary to preserve the state, 166; what it ought to be, 166; the objects of it, 228, 229; should be taken care of by the magistrate, and correspond to the nature of government, 238; should be a common care, and regulated by laws, 238 Employment, one to be allotted to one person in an extensive government, 136 Employments in the state, how to be disposed of, 88-90; whether all should be open to all, 216 Ephialtes abridges the power of the senate of Areopagus, 63 Ephori, at Sparta, their power too great, 54; improperly chosen, 54; flattered by their kings, 54; the supreme judges, 55; manner of life too indulgent, 55 Epidamnus, an account of a revolution there, 150 Equality, how twofold, 143; in a democracy, how

to be procured, 186 Euripides quoted, 72 Family government, of what it consists, 5 Father should not be too young, 232 Females and slaves, wherein they differ, 2; why upon a level amongst barbarians, 3 Forfeitures, how to be applied, 192 Fortune improper pretension for power, 91 Freemen in general, what power they ought to have, 86 Free state treated of, 121; how it arises out of a democracy and oligarchy, 122, 123 Friendship weakened by a community of children, 31 General, the office of, how to be disposed of, 98 Gods, why supposed subject to kingly government, 3 Good, relative to man, how divided, 201 Good and evil, the perception of, necessary to form a family and a city, 4 Good fortune something different from happiness, 202 Government should continue as much as possible in the same hands, 28; in what manner it should be in rotation, 28; what, 66; which best, of a good man or good laws, 98; good, to what it should owe its preservation, 124; what the best, 225 Government of the master over the slave sometimes reciprocally useful, ii Governments, how different from each other, 67; whether more than one form should be established, 76; should endeavour to prevent others from being too powerful— instances of it, 93; how compared to music, in; in general, to what they owe their preservation, 160 Governments, political, regal, family, and servile, their difference from each other, i Governors and governed, whether their virtues are the same or different, 23; whether they should be the same persons or

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Politics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER IV

    Those who have taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and make the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they could and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, if either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to this state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed. They ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the state disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious rites of private persons few, and those common; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the people together as much as possible; and that all former customs be broken through.

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  • Politics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER V

    We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by informing against men of property, they induce them to join together through self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies unite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with each other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes, prevented the people from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them, who were obliged by the number of actions they were harassed with to conspire together and destroy the popular state. The same thing was brought about at Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by the same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them, quitted the city, but afterwards joining together they returned and overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by confiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were banished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the people in a battle, and established an oligarchy.

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  • Politics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER VI

    There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which arise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till they were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the younger also: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and where this is observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free state. At Ister it was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred.

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  • Politics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER III

    The Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their sojourners to the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions: and the Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled [1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater part of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion seditions in oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not sharing the honours of the state with their equals, as I have already mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because they have not more than an equal share with others who are not equal to them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion disturbances in the state when the ground is not well adapted for one city; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and the Colophonians with the Notians.

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  • Politics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER V

    The like happened at Cume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed; and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues, to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire together, either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them on public services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason for which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues were of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers are at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances.

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  • Politics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER VI

    At Cnidus the oligarchy was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other, because the government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we have just mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not; or, if there were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people, taking advantage of their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the victory: for where there are seditions government is weak. And formerly at Erithria, during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because the people were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so few, they changed the government. Oligarchies also are subject to revolutions, from those who are in office therein, from the quarrels of the demagogues with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one who flatter the few when they are in power: for even these have their demagogues; such was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over the thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred. The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy, and flatter the people: such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who flattered the people because they were elected by them. And this will always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos.

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