Politics: A Treatise on Government
Aristotle (-384–-322)
Delphos, an account of a sedition there, 150 Demagogues, their influence in a democracy, 116.
Democracies, arose out of tyrannies, 100; whence they arose, 142; when changed into tyrannies, 153; their different sorts, 184, 188; general rules for their establishment, 185; should not be made too perfect, 191 Democracy, what, 79, 80; its definition, 112, 113; different sorts of, 115, 118; its object, 122; how subverted in the Isle of Cos, 152 Democracy and aristocracy, how they may be blended together, 163 Democratical state, its foundation, 184 Despotic power absurd, 205 Dion, his noble resolution, 171 Dionysius, his taxes, 175 Dissolution of kingdoms and tyrannies, 169 Domestic employments of men and women different, 74 Domestic government, its object, 77 Domestic society the first, 3 Draco, 65 Dyrrachium, government of, 101 Economy and money-getting, difference, 17 Education necessary for the happiness of the city, 90; of all things most necessary to preserve the state, 166; what it ought to be, 166; the objects of it, 228, 229; should be taken care of by the magistrate, and correspond to the nature of government, 238; should be a common care, and regulated by laws, 238 Employment, one to be allotted to one person in an extensive government, 136 Employments in the state, how to be disposed of, 88-90; whether all should be open to all, 216 Ephialtes abridges the power of the senate of Areopagus, 63 Ephori, at Sparta, their power too great, 54; improperly chosen, 54; flattered by their kings, 54; the supreme judges, 55; manner of life too indulgent, 55 Epidamnus, an account of a revolution there, 150 Equality, how twofold, 143; in a democracy, how
to be procured, 186 Euripides quoted, 72 Family government, of what it consists, 5 Father should not be too young, 232 Females and slaves, wherein they differ, 2; why upon a level amongst barbarians, 3 Forfeitures, how to be applied, 192 Fortune improper pretension for power, 91 Freemen in general, what power they ought to have, 86 Free state treated of, 121; how it arises out of a democracy and oligarchy, 122, 123 Friendship weakened by a community of children, 31 General, the office of, how to be disposed of, 98 Gods, why supposed subject to kingly government, 3 Good, relative to man, how divided, 201 Good and evil, the perception of, necessary to form a family and a city, 4 Good fortune something different from happiness, 202 Government should continue as much as possible in the same hands, 28; in what manner it should be in rotation, 28; what, 66; which best, of a good man or good laws, 98; good, to what it should owe its preservation, 124; what the best, 225 Government of the master over the slave sometimes reciprocally useful, ii Governments, how different from each other, 67; whether more than one form should be established, 76; should endeavour to prevent others from being too powerful— instances of it, 93; how compared to music, in; in general, to what they owe their preservation, 160 Governments, political, regal, family, and servile, their difference from each other, i Governors and governed, whether their virtues are the same or different, 23; whether they should be the same persons or
different, 227 Grecians, their superiority over other people, 213 Guards of a king natives, 96,168; of a tyrant foreigners, 96, 168 Gymnastic exercises, when to be performed, 223; how far they should be made a part of education, 242, 243 Happiness, wherein it consists, 207 Happy life, where most likely to be found, 202 Harmony, whether all kinds of it are to be used in education, 251 Helots troublesome to the Lacedaemonians, 87 Herdsmen compose the second-best democracy, 189 Hippodamus, an account of, 46; his plan of government, 46, 47: objected to, 47, 48 Homer quoted, 95, 116 Honours, an inequality of, occasions seditions, 44 Horse most suitable to an oligarchy, 195 Houses, private, their best form, 221 Human flesh devoured by some nations, 242 Husbandmen compose the best democracy, 189; will choose to govern according to law, 118 Husbandry, art of, whether part of money-getting, 13 Instruments, their difference from each other, 6; wherein they differ from possessions, 6 Italy, its ancient boundary, 218 Jason's declaration, 72 Judge should not act as an arbitrator, 48, 49; which is best for an individual, or the people in general, 98, 99 Judges, many better than one, 102; of whom to consist, 102; how many different sorts are necessary, 141 Judicial part of government, how to be divided, 140 Jurymen, particular powers sometimes appointed to that office, 68 Justice, what, 88; the course of, impeded in Crete, 59; different in different situations, 74 King, from whom to be chosen 60; the guardian of his people 168 King's children, what to be done
with, 100 King's power, what it should be 100; when unequal, 143 Kingdom, what, 78 Kingdoms, their object, 167; how bestowed, 168; causes of their dissolution, 173; how preserved, 173 Kingly government in the heroic times, what, 96 Kingly power regulated by the laws at Sparta in peace, 95; absolute in war, 95 Kings formerly in Crete, 58; their power afterwards devolved to the kosmoi, 58; method of electing them at Carthage, 60 Knowledge of the master and slave different from each other, ii Kosmoi, the power of, 58; their number, 58; wherein inferior to the ephori, 58; allowed to resign their office before their time is elapsed, 59 Lacedamonian customs similar to the Cretan, 57 Lacedaemonian government much esteemed, 41; the faults of it, 53-56; calculated only for war, 56; how composed of a democracy and oligarchy, 124 Lacedaemonian revenue badly raised, 56, 57 Lacedaemonians, wherein they admit things to be common, 33 Land should be divided into two parts, 219 Law makes one man a slave, another free, 6; whether just or not, 9; at Thebes respecting tradesmen, 75; nothing should be done contrary to it, 160 Law and government, their difference, 107, 108 Laws, when advantageous to alter them, 49,50, 52; of every state will be like the state, 88; whom they should be calculated for, 92; decide better than men, 101; moral preferable to written, 102; must sometimes bend to ancient customs, 117; should be framed to the state, 107; the same suit not all governments, 108 Legislator ought to know not only what is best,
Passages expressing a similar idea
The social contract & discourses · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
But how could the government of the State be like that of the family, when the basis on which they rest is so different? The father being physically stronger than his children, his paternal authority, as long as they need his protection, may be reasonably said to be established by nature. But in the great family, all the members of which are naturally equal, the political authority, being purely arbitrary as far as its institution is concerned, can be founded only on conventions, and the Magistrate can have no authority over the rest, except by virtue of the laws. The duties of a father are dictated to him by natural feelings, and in a manner that seldom allows him to neglect them. For rulers there is no such principle, and they are really obliged to the people only by what they themselves have promised to do, and the people have therefore a right to require of them. Another more important difference is that since the children have nothing but what they receive from their father, it is plain that all the rights of property belong to him, or emanate from him; but quite the opposite is the case in the great family, where the general administration is established only to secure individual property, which is antecedent to it. The principal object of the work of the whole house is to preserve and increase the patrimony of the father, in order that he may be able some day to distribute it among his children without impoverishing them; whereas the wealth of the exchequer is only a means, often ill understood, of keeping the individuals in peace and plenty. In a word, the little family is destined to be extinguished, and to resolve itself some day into several families of a similar nature; but the great family, being constituted to endure for ever in the same condition, need not, like the small one, increase for the purpose of multiplying, but need only maintain itself; and it can easily be proved that any increase does it more harm than good.
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.
Read in contextSecond Treatise of Government · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER. VIII. / OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.
Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father’s government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in different hands.
Read in contextSecond Treatise of Government · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER. VII. / OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.
Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political society itself consists.
Read in contextSecond Treatise of Government · John Locke (1632–1704) · Book II / CHAPTER. I. / AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us. Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.
Read in contextSecond Treatise of Government · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER. VIII. / OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.
Sect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were naturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families to make a government, should generally put the rule into one man’s hands, and chuse to be under the conduct of a single person, without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people. I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of governments. The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the way I have mentioned, is this, viz. Sect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it is impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government.
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