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Beyond Good and Evil

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900)

87. FETTERED HEART, FREE SPIRIT—When one firmly fetters one's heart and keeps it prisoner, one can allow one's spirit many liberties: I said this once before But people do not believe it when I say so, unless they know it already. 88. One begins to distrust very clever persons when they become embarrassed. 89. Dreadful experiences raise the question whether he who experiences them is not something dreadful also. 90. Heavy, melancholy men turn lighter, and come temporarily to their surface, precisely by that which makes others heavy—by hatred and love. 91. So cold, so icy, that one burns one's finger at the touch of him! Every hand that lays hold of him shrinks back!—And for that very reason many think him red-hot. 92. Who has not, at one time or another—sacrificed himself for the sake of his good name? 93. In affability there is no hatred of men, but precisely on that account a great deal too much contempt of men. 94. The maturity of man—that means, to have reacquired the seriousness that one had as a child at play. 95. To be ashamed of one's immorality is a step on the ladder at the end of which one is ashamed also of one's morality. 96. One should part from life as Ulysses parted from Nausicaa—blessing it rather than in love with it. 97. What? A great man? I always see merely the play-actor of his own ideal. 98. When one trains one's conscience, it kisses one while it bites.

99. THE DISAPPOINTED ONE SPEAKS—"I listened for the echo and I heard only praise." 100. We all feign to ourselves that we are simpler than we are, we thus relax ourselves away from our fellows. 101. A discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the animalization of God. 102. Discovering reciprocal love should really disenchant the lover with regard to the beloved. "What! She is modest enough to love even you? Or stupid enough? Or—or—-" 103. THE DANGER IN HAPPINESS.—"Everything now turns out best for me, I now love every fate:—who would like to be my fate?" 104. Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents the Christians of today—burning us. 105. The pia fraus is still more repugnant to the taste (the "piety") of the free spirit (the "pious man of knowledge") than the impia fraus. Hence the profound lack of judgment, in comparison with the Church, characteristic of the type "free spirit"—as ITS non-freedom. 106. By means of music the very passions enjoy themselves. 107. A sign of strong character, when once the resolution has been taken, to shut the ear even to the best counter-arguments. Occasionally, therefore, a will to stupidity. 108. There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. 109. The criminal is often enough not equal to his deed: he extenuates and maligns it. 110. The advocates of a criminal are seldom artists enough to turn the beautiful terribleness of the deed to the advantage of the doer.

111. Our vanity is most difficult to wound just when our pride has been wounded. 112. To him who feels himself preordained to contemplation and not to belief, all believers are too noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them. 113. "You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be embarrassed before him." 114. The immense expectation with regard to sexual love, and the coyness in this expectation, spoils all the perspectives of women at the outset. 115. Where there is neither love nor hatred in the game, woman's play is mediocre. 116. The great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage to rebaptize our badness as the best in us. 117. The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately only the will of another, or of several other, emotions. 118. There is an innocence of admiration: it is possessed by him to whom it has not yet occurred that he himself may be admired some day. 119. Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning ourselves—"justifying" ourselves. 120. Sensuality often forces the growth of love too much, so that its root remains weak, and is easily torn up. 121. It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author—and that he did not learn it better. 122. To rejoice on account of praise is in many cases merely politeness of heart—and the very opposite of vanity of spirit. 123. Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage.

124. He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable. 125. When we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us. 126. A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get round them. 127. In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it—or worse still! under their dress and finery. 128. The more abstract the truth you wish to teach, the more must you allure the senses to it. 129. The devil has the most extensive perspectives for God; on that account he keeps so far away from him:—the devil, in effect, as the oldest friend of knowledge. 130. What a person IS begins to betray itself when his talent decreases,—when he ceases to show what he CAN do. Talent is also an adornment; an adornment is also a concealment. 131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is ESSENTIALLY unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanour. 132. One is punished best for one's virtues.

133. He who cannot find the way to HIS ideal, lives more frivolously and shamelessly than the man without an ideal. 134. From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good conscience, all evidence of truth. 135. Pharisaism is not a deterioration of the good man; a considerable part of it is rather an essential condition of being good. 136. The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the other seeks some one whom he can assist: a good conversation thus originates. 137. In intercourse with scholars and artists one readily makes mistakes of opposite kinds: in a remarkable scholar one not infrequently finds a mediocre man; and often, even in a mediocre artist, one finds a very remarkable man. 138. We do the same when awake as when dreaming: we only invent and imagine him with whom we have intercourse—and forget it immediately. 139. In revenge and in love woman is more barbarous than man. 140. ADVICE AS A RIDDLE.—"If the band is not to break, bite it first—secure to make!" 141. The belly is the reason why man does not so readily take himself for a God. 142. The chastest utterance I ever heard: "Dans le veritable amour c'est l'ame qui enveloppe le corps." 143. Our vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is most difficult to us.—Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IV. APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES

    169. To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing oneself. 170. In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in blame. 171. Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of knowledge, like tender hands on a Cyclops. 172. One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one must never confess to the individual. 173. One does not hate as long as one disesteems, but only when one esteems equal or superior. 174. Ye Utilitarians—ye, too, love the UTILE only as a VEHICLE for your inclinations,—ye, too, really find the noise of its wheels insupportable! 175. One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired. 176. The vanity of others is only counter to our taste when it is counter to our vanity. 177. With regard to what "truthfulness" is, perhaps nobody has ever been sufficiently truthful. 178. One does not believe in the follies of clever men: what a forfeiture of the rights of man! 179. The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile "reformed." 180. There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a cause. 181. It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed. 182. The familiarity of superiors embitters one, because it may not be returned. 183. "I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but because I can no longer believe in you." 184. There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the appearance of wickedness. 185. "I dislike him."—Why?—"I am not a match for him."—Did any one ever answer so?

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IX. WHAT IS NOBLE?

    261. Vanity is one of the things which are perhaps most difficult for a noble man to understand: he will be tempted to deny it, where another kind of man thinks he sees it self-evidently. The problem for him is to represent to his mind beings who seek to arouse a good opinion of themselves which they themselves do not possess—and consequently also do not "deserve,"—and who yet BELIEVE in this good opinion afterwards. This seems to him on the one hand such bad taste and so self-disrespectful, and on the other hand so grotesquely unreasonable, that he would like to consider vanity an exception, and is doubtful about it in most cases when it is spoken of. He will say, for instance: "I may be mistaken about my value, and on the other hand may nevertheless demand that my value should be acknowledged by others precisely as I rate it:—that, however, is not vanity (but self-conceit, or, in most cases, that which is called 'humility,' and also 'modesty')." Or he will even say: "For many reasons I can delight in the good opinion of others, perhaps because I love and honour them, and rejoice in all their joys, perhaps also because their good opinion endorses and strengthens my belief in my own good opinion, perhaps because the good opinion of others, even in cases where I do not share it, is useful to me, or gives promise of usefulness:—all this, however, is not vanity."

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IV. APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES

    99. THE DISAPPOINTED ONE SPEAKS—"I listened for the echo and I heard only praise." 100. We all feign to ourselves that we are simpler than we are, we thus relax ourselves away from our fellows. 101. A discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the animalization of God. 102. Discovering reciprocal love should really disenchant the lover with regard to the beloved. "What! She is modest enough to love even you? Or stupid enough? Or—or—-" 103. THE DANGER IN HAPPINESS.—"Everything now turns out best for me, I now love every fate:—who would like to be my fate?" 104. Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents the Christians of today—burning us. 105. The pia fraus is still more repugnant to the taste (the "piety") of the free spirit (the "pious man of knowledge") than the impia fraus. Hence the profound lack of judgment, in comparison with the Church, characteristic of the type "free spirit"—as ITS non-freedom. 106. By means of music the very passions enjoy themselves. 107. A sign of strong character, when once the resolution has been taken, to shut the ear even to the best counter-arguments. Occasionally, therefore, a will to stupidity. 108. There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. 109. The criminal is often enough not equal to his deed: he extenuates and maligns it. 110. The advocates of a criminal are seldom artists enough to turn the beautiful terribleness of the deed to the advantage of the doer.

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IV. APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES

    124. He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable. 125. When we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us. 126. A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get round them. 127. In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it—or worse still! under their dress and finery. 128. The more abstract the truth you wish to teach, the more must you allure the senses to it. 129. The devil has the most extensive perspectives for God; on that account he keeps so far away from him:—the devil, in effect, as the oldest friend of knowledge. 130. What a person IS begins to betray itself when his talent decreases,—when he ceases to show what he CAN do. Talent is also an adornment; an adornment is also a concealment. 131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is ESSENTIALLY unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanour. 132. One is punished best for one's virtues.

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  • Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · XLIII. MANLY PRUDENCE.

    And thus spake I often to myself for consolation: “Courage! Cheer up! old heart! An unhappiness hath failed to befall thee: enjoy that as thy—happiness!” This, however, is mine other manly prudence: I am more forbearing to the VAIN than to the proud. Is not wounded vanity the mother of all tragedies? Where, however, pride is wounded, there groweth up something better than pride. That life may be fair to behold, its game must be well played; for that purpose, however, it needeth good actors. Good actors have I found all the vain ones: they play, and wish people to be fond of beholding them—all their spirit is in this wish. They represent themselves, they invent themselves; in their neighbourhood I like to look upon life—it cureth of melancholy. Therefore am I forbearing to the vain, because they are the physicians of my melancholy, and keep me attached to man as to a drama. And further, who conceiveth the full depth of the modesty of the vain man! I am favourable to him, and sympathetic on account of his modesty. From you would he learn his belief in himself; he feedeth upon your glances, he eateth praise out of your hands. Your lies doth he even believe when you lie favourably about him: for in its depths sigheth his heart: “What am I?” And if that be the true virtue which is unconscious of itself—well, the vain man is unconscious of his modesty!—

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  • The Antichrist · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · 23.

    (Precisely because of this power that hope has of making the suffering hold out, the Greeks regarded it as the evil of evils, as the most malign of evils; it remained behind at the source of all evil.)[3]—In order that love may be possible, God must become a person; in order that the lower instincts may take a hand in the matter God must be young. To satisfy the ardor of the woman a beautiful saint must appear on the scene, and to satisfy that of the men there must be a virgin. These things are necessary if Christianity is to assume lordship over a soil on which some aphrodisiacal or Adonis cult has already established a notion as to what a cult ought to be. To insist upon chastity greatly strengthens the vehemence and subjectivity of the religious instinct—it makes the cult warmer, more enthusiastic, more soulful.—Love is the state in which man sees things most decidedly as they are not. The force of illusion reaches its highest here, and so does the capacity for sweetening, for transfiguring. When a man is in love he endures more than at any other time; he submits to anything.

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