Beyond Good and Evil
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900)
111. Our vanity is most difficult to wound just when our pride has been wounded. 112. To him who feels himself preordained to contemplation and not to belief, all believers are too noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them. 113. "You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be embarrassed before him." 114. The immense expectation with regard to sexual love, and the coyness in this expectation, spoils all the perspectives of women at the outset. 115. Where there is neither love nor hatred in the game, woman's play is mediocre. 116. The great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage to rebaptize our badness as the best in us. 117. The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately only the will of another, or of several other, emotions. 118. There is an innocence of admiration: it is possessed by him to whom it has not yet occurred that he himself may be admired some day. 119. Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning ourselves—"justifying" ourselves. 120. Sensuality often forces the growth of love too much, so that its root remains weak, and is easily torn up. 121. It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author—and that he did not learn it better. 122. To rejoice on account of praise is in many cases merely politeness of heart—and the very opposite of vanity of spirit. 123. Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage.
124. He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable. 125. When we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us. 126. A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get round them. 127. In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it—or worse still! under their dress and finery. 128. The more abstract the truth you wish to teach, the more must you allure the senses to it. 129. The devil has the most extensive perspectives for God; on that account he keeps so far away from him:—the devil, in effect, as the oldest friend of knowledge. 130. What a person IS begins to betray itself when his talent decreases,—when he ceases to show what he CAN do. Talent is also an adornment; an adornment is also a concealment. 131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is ESSENTIALLY unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanour. 132. One is punished best for one's virtues.
133. He who cannot find the way to HIS ideal, lives more frivolously and shamelessly than the man without an ideal. 134. From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good conscience, all evidence of truth. 135. Pharisaism is not a deterioration of the good man; a considerable part of it is rather an essential condition of being good. 136. The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the other seeks some one whom he can assist: a good conversation thus originates. 137. In intercourse with scholars and artists one readily makes mistakes of opposite kinds: in a remarkable scholar one not infrequently finds a mediocre man; and often, even in a mediocre artist, one finds a very remarkable man. 138. We do the same when awake as when dreaming: we only invent and imagine him with whom we have intercourse—and forget it immediately. 139. In revenge and in love woman is more barbarous than man. 140. ADVICE AS A RIDDLE.—"If the band is not to break, bite it first—secure to make!" 141. The belly is the reason why man does not so readily take himself for a God. 142. The chastest utterance I ever heard: "Dans le veritable amour c'est l'ame qui enveloppe le corps." 143. Our vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is most difficult to us.—Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.
144. When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste; man, indeed, if I may say so, is "the barren animal." 145. Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the SECONDARY role. 146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee. 147. From old Florentine novels—moreover, from life: Buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone.—Sacchetti, Nov. 86. 148. To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion of their neighbour—who can do this conjuring trick so well as women? 149. That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of what was formerly considered good—the atavism of an old ideal. 150. Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes—what? perhaps a "world"? 151. It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have your permission to possess it;—eh, my friends? 152. "Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always Paradise": so say the most ancient and the most modern serpents. 153. What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. 154. Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology.
155. The sense of the tragic increases and declines with sensuousness. 156. Insanity in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule. 157. The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night. 158. Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to our strongest impulse—the tyrant in us. 159. One MUST repay good and ill; but why just to the person who did us good or ill? 160. One no longer loves one's knowledge sufficiently after one has communicated it. 161. Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences: they exploit them. 162. "Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our neighbour's neighbour":—so thinks every nation. 163. Love brings to light the noble and hidden qualities of a lover—his rare and exceptional traits: it is thus liable to be deceptive as to his normal character. 164. Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants;—love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!" 165. IN SIGHT OF EVERY PARTY.—A shepherd has always need of a bell-wether—or he has himself to be a wether occasionally. 166. One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with the accompanying grimace one nevertheless tells the truth. 167. To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame—and something precious. 168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice.
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter II.
Again, if the having strong and bad lusts is necessary to the idea of the man of Self-Control, this character cannot be identical with the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, because the having strong desires or bad ones does not enter into the idea of this latter character: and yet the man of Self-Control must have such: for suppose them good; then the moral state which should hinder a man from following their suggestions must be bad, and so Self-Control would not be in all cases good: suppose them on the other hand to be weak and not wrong, it would be nothing grand; nor anything great, supposing them to be wrong and weak. Again, if Self-Control makes a man apt to abide by all opinions without exception, it may be bad, as suppose the case of a false opinion: and if Imperfect Self-Control makes a man apt to depart from all without exception, we shall have cases where it will be good; take that of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance: he is to be praised for not abiding by what he was persuaded to by Ulysses, because he was pained at being guilty of falsehood.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter VIII.
Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to fear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is disgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in fact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their own proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the contrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they have not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted of it. Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter by words what has been of old taken into men’s very dispositions: and, it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and appliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES / SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND VICES
If we examine the panegyrics that are commonly made of great men, we shall find, that most of the qualities, which are attributed to them, may be divided into two kinds, viz. such as make them perform their part in society; and such as render them serviceable to themselves, and enable them to promote their own interest. Their prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, enterprize, dexterity, are celebrated, as well as their generosity and humanity. If we ever give an indulgence to any quality, that disables a man from making a figure in life, it is to that of indolence, which is not supposed to deprive one of his parts and capacity, but only suspends their exercise; and that without any inconvenience to the person himself, since it is, in some measure, from his own choice. Yet indolence is always allowed to be a fault, and a very great one, if extreme: Nor do a man's friends ever acknowledge him to be subject to it, but in order to save his character in more material articles. He could make a figure, say they, if he pleased to give application: His understanding is sound, his conception quick, and his memory tenacious; but he hates business, and is indifferent about his fortune. And this a man sometimes may make even a subject of vanity; though with the air of confessing a fault: Because he may think, that his incapacity for business implies much more noble qualities; such as a philosophical spirit, a fine taste, a delicate wit, or a relish for pleasure and society. But take any other case: Suppose a quality, that without being an indication of any other good qualities, incapacitates a man always for business, and is destructive to his interest; such as a blundering understanding, and a wrong judgment of every thing in life; inconstancy and irresolution; or a want of address in the management of men and business: These are all allowed to be imperfections in a character; and many men would rather acknowledge the greatest crimes, than have it suspected, that they are, in any degree, subject to them.
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · APOLOGY:
trouble adapt himself to entire abstinence Man must approach his wife with prudence and temperance Man must have a care not to do his master so great service Man must learn that he is nothing but a fool Man runs a very great hazard in their hands (of physicians) Mark of singular good nature to preserve old age Marriage Marriage rejects the company and conditions of love Melancholy: Are there not some constitutions that feed upon it? Memories are full enough, but the judgment totally void Men approve of things for their being rare and new Men are not always to rely upon the personal confessions Men as often commend as undervalue me beyond reason Men make them (the rules) without their (women’s) help Men must embark, and not deliberate, upon high enterprises Men should furnish themselves with such things as would float Mercenaries who would receive any (pay) Merciful to the man, but not to his wickedness—Aristotle Methinks I am no more than half of myself Methinks I promise it, if I but say it Miracle: everything our reason cannot comprehend Miracles and strange events have concealed themselves from me Miracles appear to be so, according to our ignorance of nature Miserable kind of remedy, to owe one’s health to one’s disease!
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter IV.
The Small-minded man is deficient, both as regards himself, and also as regards the estimation of the Great-minded: while the Vain man is in excess as regards himself, but does not get beyond the Great-minded man. Now the Great-minded man, being by the hypothesis worthy of the greatest things, must be of the highest excellence, since the better a man is the more is he worth, and he who is best is worth the most: it follows then, that to be truly Great-minded a man must be good, and whatever is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the Great-minded. It would no way correspond with the character of the Great-minded to flee spreading his hands all abroad; nor to injure any one; for with what object in view will he do what is base, in whose eyes nothing is great? in short, if one were to go into particulars, the Great-minded man would show quite ludicrously unless he were a good man: he would not be in fact deserving of honour if he were a bad man, honour being the prize of virtue and given to the good. This virtue, then, of Great-mindedness seems to be a kind of ornament of all the other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be without them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be really and truly Great-minded; for it cannot be without thorough goodness and nobleness of character.
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion
And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination. And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.
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