The Art of War
active 6th century B.C. Sunzi
26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. [Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up.] 27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. [That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."]
28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. [Cf. III. § 13 (1).] 29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. [The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes."] 31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete. [Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] [1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. [2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. [3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.
1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. [So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."] 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground. [Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."] 4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.]
5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. [There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which intercommunication is easy."] 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, [Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, [The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies.] is ground of intersecting highways. 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. [Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious."] 8. Mountain forests, [Or simply "forests."] rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Art of War · active 6th century B.C. Sunzi · Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. [But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to attack. In the Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu, when the King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: "The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. [Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off.] On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. [Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
Read in contextThe Art of War · active 6th century B.C. Sunzi · Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. One’s first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch’en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine Situations.] When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. 45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose. [This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, § 11.]
Read in contextThe Art of War · active 6th century B.C. Sunzi · Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; [Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground."] the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. [Cf. supra, § 20.] 43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground.
Read in contextThe Art of War · active 6th century B.C. Sunzi · Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. [There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which intercommunication is easy."] 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, [Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, [The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies.] is ground of intersecting highways. 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. [Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious."] 8. Mountain forests, [Or simply "forests."] rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
Read in contextThe Art of War · active 6th century B.C. Sunzi · Chapter X. TERRAIN
[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with "terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six calamities" are discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.] 1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground; [Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of communications."] (2) entangling ground; [The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you become entangled."] (3) temporising ground; [Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy. [It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.] 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies.
Read in contextThe Art of War · active 6th century B.C. Sunzi · Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.]
Read in context