Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
Creatour of all things, I can frame an Image of Creation from what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that shape and size he now bears; an other Idea then this no man can have at the word Creatour; But the Possibility of Imagining a Creation is not sufficient to prove that the world was created. And therefore tho it were Demonstrated that some Infinite Independent Almighty Being did exist, yet it will not from thence follow that a Creatour exists; unless one can think this to be a right inference, we believe that there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the world was Created thereby. Moreover when he says, that the Idea of God, and of our Soul is Innate or born in us, I would fain know, whether the Souls of those that sleep soundly do think unless they dream; If not, then at that time they have no Ideas, and consequently no Idea is Innate, for what is Innate to us is never Absent from us. ANSWER. None of Gods Attributes can proceed from outward objects as from a Pattern, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in External, that is, Corporeal things; Now ’tis manifest that whatever we think of in him differing or unlike what we find in them proceeds not from them, but from a cause of that very diversity in our Thought.
And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces Gods Understanding from outward Things, and yet I can easily explain what Idea I have thereof, by saying, that by the Idea of Gods Understanding I conceive whatever is the Form of any Perception; For who is there that does not perceive that he understands something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an Idea of understanding, and by enlarging it Indefinitely he forms the Idea of Gods Understanding. And so of his other Attributes. And seeing we have made use of that Idea of God which is in us to demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain’d in this Idea such an Immense Power, that we conceive it a contradiction for God to Exist, and yet that any thing should Be besides Him, which was not Created by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from God, were Created by God. Lastly when we assert, that some Ideas are Innate or natural to us, we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no Idea would be Innate) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of producing them.
* The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, viz, having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my mind. Wherefore seeing ’tis not demonstrated that we have an Idea of God, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that God is Inconceivable, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an Idea of Him, it follows, that the Existence of God is not demonstrated, much less the Creation. ANSWER. When God is said to be Inconceiveable ’tis understood of an Adequate full conception. But I am ’een tired with often repeating, how notwithstanding we may have an Idea of God. So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my demonstration.
* By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being, Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God. ’Tis Certain that Ignorance is only a Defect, and that there is no Occasion of any Positive Faculty to make us Ignorant. But this position is not so clear in Relation to Error, for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot Err, for this Reason only, because they have not the Faculties of Reasoning or Imagination; from whence ’tis Natural for us to Conclude, That to Err there is requisite a Faculty of Judging, or at least of Imagining, both which Faculties are Positive, and given to all Creatures subject to Error, and to Them only. Moreover Des-Cartes says thus, I find (my Errors) to Depend on two concurring Causes, viz. on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of Choosing, or Freedom of my Will. Which seems Contradictious to what he said before; And here also we may note, that Freedom of Will is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists. ANSWER.
Tho to make us Err there is requisite a Faculty of Reasoning (or rather of Judging, that is, of Affirming and Denying) because Error is the Defect thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that this Defect is any thing Real, for neither is Blindness a Real Thing, tho stones cannot be said to be Blind, for this Reason only, That they are incapable of sight. And I much wonder that in all these Objections I have not found one Right Inference. I have not here assumed any thing concerning the Freedom of Mans Will, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position. Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting Gods predisposal of Things cannot Comprehend, How their Freedom of Will Consists there-with, but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by Experience, That ’tis one and the same Thing to be Willing, and to be Free. But ’tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter.
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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.
Doubt. Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident, but looks rather like a sophism; for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence, I can easily perswade my self that the Existence of God may be distinguish’d from his Essence, so that I may Imagine God not to Exist. Solution. But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the Existence of God can no more be seperated from his Essence, then the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be seperated from the Essence of a Triangle, or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley; so that ’tis no less a Repugnancy to think of a God (that is, A Being infinitely perfect) who wants Existence (that is, who wants a Perfection) then to think of a Mountain, to which there is no Valley adjoyning. Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing, or a Mountain without a Vally? yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Vally, it does not from thence follow, that there Is a Mountain in the World; so supposing me to think of a God as Existing, yet does it not follow that God Really Exists. For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things, and as I may imagine a Winged Horse, tho no Horse has Wings, so I may imagine an existing God, tho no God exist.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.
And truly ’tis not to be Admired that God in Creating me should Imprint this Idea in me, that it may there remain as a stamp impressed by the Workman God on me his Work, neither is it requisite that this stamp should be a Thing different from the Work it self, but ’tis very Credible (from hence only that God Created me) that I am made as it were according to his likeness and Image, and that the same likeness, in which the Idea of God is contain’d, is perceived by Me with the same faculty, with which I perceive my Self; That is to say, whilst I reflect upon my self, I do not only perceive that I am an Imperfect thing, having my dependance upon some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires more and better things Indefinitely; But also at the same time I understand, that He on whom I depend contains in him all those wish’d for things (not only Indefinitely and Potentially, but) Really, Indefinitely; and that therefore he is God. The whole stress of which * Argument lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am, Viz. Having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, a God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my Mind (that is, Having all those perfections, which I cannot comprehend, but can as it were think upon them) and who is not subject to any Defects.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. X.
Considering the Attributes of God, that from thence we may gather an Idea of God, and that we may enquire whether there be not something in that Idea which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover (if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the Venerable name of God proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that they should have any other Original then from Outward Objects. For by the Name of God I understand a Substance, that is, I understand that God Exists (not by an Idea, but by Reasoning) Infinite (that is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an Idea of Gods Infinity but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the Word Infinite. Independent, That is, I do not conceive any Cause from which God may proceed; from whence ’tis evident that I have no other Idea at the word Independent, but the memory of my own Ideas which at Different Times have Different Beginnings, and Consequently they must be Dependent.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.
Solution. But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that my Knowledge is capable of being increased, and that many things are in me potentially, which actually are not, yet none of these go to the making an Idea of God, in which I conceive nothing potentially, for tis a certain argument of imperfection that a thing may be encreased Gradually. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be more and more encreased, yet I know that it can never be actually Infinite, for it can never arrive to that height of perfection, which admits not of an higher degree. But I conceive God to be actually so Infinite, that nothing can be added to his perfections. And lastly, I perceive that the objective being of an Idea cannot be produced only by the potential being of a thing (which in proper speech is nothing) but requires an actual or formal being to its production.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.
But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the objective reallity of any of my Ideas be such, that it cannot be in me either formally or eminently, and that therefore I cannot be the cause of that Idea, from hence it necessarily Follows, that I alone do not only exist, but that some other thing, which is cause of that Idea, does exist also. But if I can find no such Idea in me, I have no argument to perswade me of the existence of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other perswasive. Some of these Ideas there are (besides that which represents my self to my self, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a God, others of them Corporeal and Inanimate things, some of them Angels, others Animals, and lastly some of them which exhibite to me men like my self. As touching those that represent Men or Angels or Animals, I easily understand that they may be made up of those Ideas which I have of my self, of Corporeal things, and of God, tho there were neither man (but my self) nor Angel, nor Animal in being.
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.
Neither can it be objected, that I cannot comprehend an Infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God, which I can neither conceive, nor in the least think upon; for it is of the very nature of an Infinite not to be apprehendable by me who am finite. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my Idea of God to be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct Idea of all those Ideas I have, upon this account, that I understand that God is not to be understood, and that I judge that whatever I clearly perceive and know Implys any perfection, as also perhaps other innumerable perfections, which I am ignorant of, are in God either formally or eminently. Doubt. But perhaps I am something more then I take my self to be, and perhaps all these perfections which I attribute to God, are potentially in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my Knowledge may be encreased, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not encrease by degrees in Infinitum, nor why by my knowledge so encreased I may not attain to the other perfections of God; nor lastly, why the power or aptitude of having these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the Idea of them in me.
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