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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

I have often noted before, That that very Thing which is evidenc’d by Reason, as also whatever else is perceived by any other Means, is Called by Me an Idea. And I have sufficiently explain’d How Reality may be Encreas’d or Diminish’d, in the same manner (to wit) as Substance is More a Thing, then A Mode; and if there be any such things as Real Qualities, or Incomplete Substances, these are More Things then Modes, and Less Things then Complete Substances: and Lastly if there be an Infinite Independent Substance this is More a Thing, then a Finite, Dependent Substance. And all this is self-evident.

* Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider whether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self and every thing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All which attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively I consider them, the Less I Conceive my self alone possible to be the Author of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must Conclude there is a God.

Considering the Attributes of God, that from thence we may gather an Idea of God, and that we may enquire whether there be not something in that Idea which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover (if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the Venerable name of God proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that they should have any other Original then from Outward Objects. For by the Name of God I understand a Substance, that is, I understand that God Exists (not by an Idea, but by Reasoning) Infinite (that is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an Idea of Gods Infinity but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the Word Infinite. Independent, That is, I do not conceive any Cause from which God may proceed; from whence ’tis evident that I have no other Idea at the word Independent, but the memory of my own Ideas which at Different Times have Different Beginnings, and Consequently they must be Dependent.

Wherefore, to say that God is Independent, is only to say That God is in the Number of those things, the Original whereof I do not Imagine: and so to say that God is Infinite, is the same as if we say That He is in the Number of Those Things whose Bounds we do not Conceive: And thus any Idea of God is Exploded, for What Idea can we have without Beginning or Ending? Omniscient or Understanding all things, Here I desire to know, by what Idea, Des-Cartes understands Gods Understanding? Almighty, I desire also to know by What Idea Gods Power is understood? For Power is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For my Part, I understand Power from the Image or Memory of past Actions, arguing with my self thus, He did so, therefore he was able (or had Power) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have Power to do so. But now all these are Ideas that may arise from external Objects.

Creatour of all things, I can frame an Image of Creation from what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that shape and size he now bears; an other Idea then this no man can have at the word Creatour; But the Possibility of Imagining a Creation is not sufficient to prove that the world was created. And therefore tho it were Demonstrated that some Infinite Independent Almighty Being did exist, yet it will not from thence follow that a Creatour exists; unless one can think this to be a right inference, we believe that there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the world was Created thereby. Moreover when he says, that the Idea of God, and of our Soul is Innate or born in us, I would fain know, whether the Souls of those that sleep soundly do think unless they dream; If not, then at that time they have no Ideas, and consequently no Idea is Innate, for what is Innate to us is never Absent from us. ANSWER. None of Gods Attributes can proceed from outward objects as from a Pattern, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in External, that is, Corporeal things; Now ’tis manifest that whatever we think of in him differing or unlike what we find in them proceeds not from them, but from a cause of that very diversity in our Thought.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. X.

    * Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider whether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self and every thing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All which attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively I consider them, the Less I Conceive my self alone possible to be the Author of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must Conclude there is a God.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    As to those other things, of which the Idea of a body is made up, as extension, figure, place and motion, they are not formally in me, seeing I am only a thinking thing; yet seeing they are only certain modes of substance, and I my self also am a substance, they may seem to be in me eminently. * Wherefore there only Remains the Idea of a God, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its original from me. By the word God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created. All which Attributes are of such an high nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the Author of these notions.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    Neither can it be objected, that I cannot comprehend an Infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God, which I can neither conceive, nor in the least think upon; for it is of the very nature of an Infinite not to be apprehendable by me who am finite. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my Idea of God to be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct Idea of all those Ideas I have, upon this account, that I understand that God is not to be understood, and that I judge that whatever I clearly perceive and know Implys any perfection, as also perhaps other innumerable perfections, which I am ignorant of, are in God either formally or eminently. Doubt. But perhaps I am something more then I take my self to be, and perhaps all these perfections which I attribute to God, are potentially in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my Knowledge may be encreased, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not encrease by degrees in Infinitum, nor why by my knowledge so encreased I may not attain to the other perfections of God; nor lastly, why the power or aptitude of having these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the Idea of them in me.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a God; for tho the Idea of substance may arise in me, because that I my self am a substance, yet I could not have the Idea of an Infinite substance (seeing I my self am finite) unless it proceeded from a substance which is really Infinite. Neither ought I to think that I have no true Idea of Infinity, or that I perceive it only by the negation of what is finite, as I conceive rest and darkness by the negation or absence of motion or light. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is more reality in an Infinite substance, then in a Finite; and that therefore the perception of an Infinite (as God) is antecedent to the notion I have of a finite (as my self). For how should I know that I doubt or desire, that is to say, that I want something, and that I am not altogether perfect, unless I had the Idea of a being more perfect then my self, by comparing my self to which I may discover my own Imperfections.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.

    Solution. For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a God; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a First and Cheif Being, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an Idea thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of Perfections, tho I do not at that time count them over, or Remark each single One; which necessity is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider Existence to be a Perfection) conclude Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a Triangle, yet whenever I please to Consider of a Right-lined Figure having only three Angles, I am then necessitated to allow it all those Requisites from which I may argue rightly, That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be inscribed within a Circle, I am not at all necessitated to think that all Quadrilateral Figures are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I clearly and distinctly Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these False suppositions, and True natural Ideas, the first and Chief; whereof is that of a God; For by many wayes I understand That not to be a Fiction depending on my Thought, but an Image of a True and Immutable Nature; As first, because I can think of no other thing but God to Whose Essence Existence belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine Two or More Gods, and supposing that he is now only One, I may plainly perceive it necessary for Him to Have been from Eternity, and will Be to Eternity; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in God, Which I cannot Change, and from which I cannot Detract.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose Ideas I have within Me) are Really Existent without Me; And that is Thus: As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking, I acknowledge no Inequality between them, and they all proceed from me in the same Manner. But as one Represents one thing, an other, an other Thing, ’tis Evident there is a Great difference between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reallity in them, then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reallity, then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited. But Now, it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause, as there is in the Effect of that Cause; For from Whence can the effect have its Reallity, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause give it that Reallity, unless it self have it? And from hence it follows, that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing, Neither a Thing which is more Perfect (that is, Which has in it self more Reallity) proceed from That Which is Less Perfect.

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