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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

* It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is. There is a great Difference between Imagination (that is) having an Idea of a Thing, and the Conception of the Mind (that is) a Concluding from Reasoning that a thing Is or Exists. But Des-Cartes has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides, the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver’d as a Doctrine, that substance is not perceived by sense but is Collected by Ratiocination. But what shall we now say, if perhaps Ratiocination be nothing Else but a Copulation or Concatenation of Names or Appellations by this Word Is? From whence ’twill follow that we Collect by Reasoning nothing of or concerning the Nature of Things, but of the names of Things, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we joyn the Names of Things according to the Agreements which at Pleasure we have made concerning their significations; if it be so (as so it may be) Ratiocination will depend on Words, Words on Imagination, and perhaps Imagination as also Sense on the Motion of Corporeal Parts; and so the Mind shall be nothing but Motions in some Parts of an Organical Body. ANSWER.

I have here Explain’d the Difference between Imagination, and the Meer Conception of the Mind, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax, what it is therein which we Imagine, and what it is that we conceive in our Mind only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place How we understand one way, and Imagine an other way One and the same Thing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure. There is in Ratiocination a Conjunction not of Words, but of Things signified by Words; And I much admire that the Contrary could Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that a Frenchman and a German may argue about the same Things, tho they use very Differing Words? and does not the Philosopher Disprove himself when he speaks of the Agreements which at pleasure we have made about the significations of Words? for if he grants that something is Signified by Words, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are rather about this something, then about Words only? and by the same Right that he concludes the Mind to be a Motion, he may Conclude Also that the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases.

* Some of These (viz. Humane Thoughts) are as it were the Images of Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when I Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God. When I Think on a Man I perceive an Idea made up of Figure and Colour, whereof I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of a Man or not; and so when I think on Heaven. But when I think on a Chimera, I perceive an Image or Idea, of which I may doubt whether it be the Likeness of any Animal not only at present Existing, but possible to Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not. But thinking on an Angel, there is offer’d to my Mind sometimes the Image of a Flame, sometimes the Image of a Pretty Little Boy with Wings, which I am certain has no Likeness to an Angel, and therefore that it is not the Idea of an Angel; But beleiving that there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the Thing Believed or supposed we Impose the Name of Angel; Whereas the Idea, under which I Imagine an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things. In the like manner at the Venerable Name of God, we have no Image or Idea of God, and therefore we are forbidden to Worship God under any Image, least we should seem to Conceive Him that is inconceivable.

Whereby it appears that we have no Idea of God; but like one born blind, who being brought to the Fire, and perceiving himself to be Warmed, knows there is something by which he is warmed and Hearing it called Fire, he Concludes that Fire Exists, but yet knows not of what shape or Colour the Fire is, neither has he any Image or Idea thereof in his Mind. So Man knowing that there must be some Cause of his Imaginations or Ideas, as also an other cause before That, and so onwards, he is brought at last to an End, or to a supposal of some Eternal Cause, Which because it never began to Be cannot have any other Cause before it, and thence he Concludes that ’tis necessary that some Eternal Thing Exist: and yet he has no Idea which He can call the Idea of this Eternal Thing, but he names this Thing, which he believes and acknowledges by the Name God. But now Des-Cartes proceeds from this Position, That we have an Idea of God in our Mind, to prove this Theoreme, That God (that if an Almighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists, whereas he ought to have explain’d this Idea of God better, and he should have thence deduced not only his Existence, but also the Creation of the World. ANSWER.

Here the Philosopher will have the Word Idea be only Understood for the Images of Material Things represented in a Corporeal Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper Idea of an Angel or God. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name Idea for whatever is immediately perceived by the Mind, so that when I Will, or Fear, because at the same time I perceive that I Will or Fear, this very Will or Fear are reckon’d by me among the number of Ideas; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of Perceptions in the Divine Mind, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in God: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by. And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the Idea of God for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them. Lastly, what is here added concerning the Creation of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there Be a God, And if there be One, Whether he can be a Deceiver, For whilst I am Ignorant of this, I cannot possibly be fully Certain of any Other thing. But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them Truth or Falshood properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the Images of Things, and to these alone the Name of an Idea properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or God. But there are others of them, that have superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the subject or object of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something more which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and Others of them Judgments.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. V. Against the Third Meditation of God.

    Here the Philosopher will have the Word Idea be only Understood for the Images of Material Things represented in a Corporeal Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper Idea of an Angel or God. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name Idea for whatever is immediately perceived by the Mind, so that when I Will, or Fear, because at the same time I perceive that I Will or Fear, this very Will or Fear are reckon’d by me among the number of Ideas; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of Perceptions in the Divine Mind, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in God: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by. And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the Idea of God for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them. Lastly, what is here added concerning the Creation of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    Now as touching Ideas, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without Respect to any other Things, they cannot Properly be false; for Whether I Imagine a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as Certain that I Imagine one as t’other. Also in the Will and Affections I need not Fear any Falshood, For tho I should Wish for evil Things, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore Not true that I Wish for them. Wherefore there onely Remains my Judgments of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not deceived. Now the Chief and most usual Error that I discover in them is, That I Judge Those Ideas that are within me to be Conformable and like to certain things that are without Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain Modes of my Thought, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of Erring.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. IV. Of Truth and Falshood.

    Of late it has been so common with me to withdraw my Mind from my sences, and I have so throughly consider’d how few things there are appertaining to Bodies that are truly perceived, and that there are more Things touching Mans mind, and yet more concerning God, which are well known; that now without any difficulty I can turn my Thoughts from things sensible, to those which are only Intelligible, and Abstracted from Matter. And truely I have a much more distinct Idea of a Mans mind (as it is a Thinking Thing, having no Corporeal Dimensions of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, nor having any other Corporeal Quality) then the Idea of any Corporeal Thing can be. And when I reflect upon my self, and consider how that I doubt, that is, am an imperfect dependent Being, I from hence Collect such a clear and distinct Idea of an Independent perfect Being, which is God, and from hence only that I have such an Idea, that is, because I that have this Idea do my self Exist; I do so clearly conclude that God also Exists, and that on him my Being depends each Minute; That I am Confident nothing can be known more Evidently and Certainly by Humane Understanding. And now I seem to perceive a Method by which, (from this Contemplation of the true God, in whom the Treasures of Knowledge and Wisdome are Hidden) I may attain the Knowledge of other Things.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. V. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And that he does Exist.

    Solution. For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a God; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a First and Cheif Being, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an Idea thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of Perfections, tho I do not at that time count them over, or Remark each single One; which necessity is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider Existence to be a Perfection) conclude Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a Triangle, yet whenever I please to Consider of a Right-lined Figure having only three Angles, I am then necessitated to allow it all those Requisites from which I may argue rightly, That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be inscribed within a Circle, I am not at all necessitated to think that all Quadrilateral Figures are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I clearly and distinctly Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these False suppositions, and True natural Ideas, the first and Chief; whereof is that of a God; For by many wayes I understand That not to be a Fiction depending on my Thought, but an Image of a True and Immutable Nature; As first, because I can think of no other thing but God to Whose Essence Existence belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine Two or More Gods, and supposing that he is now only One, I may plainly perceive it necessary for Him to Have been from Eternity, and will Be to Eternity; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in God, Which I cannot Change, and from which I cannot Detract.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    As to those other things, of which the Idea of a body is made up, as extension, figure, place and motion, they are not formally in me, seeing I am only a thinking thing; yet seeing they are only certain modes of substance, and I my self also am a substance, they may seem to be in me eminently. * Wherefore there only Remains the Idea of a God, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its original from me. By the word God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created. All which Attributes are of such an high nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the Author of these notions.

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