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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

Neither do I say, that the understanding thing and intellection are the same, or that the understanding thing and the intellect are the same, if the intellect be taken for the Faculty, but only when ’tis taken for the thing it self that understands. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of abstracted words to signifie that thing or substance, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most concrete Words to signifie this thinking thing, such as subject, matter, Body, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from Body. Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things. It may be (sayes he) that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved. But herein he is mistaken, for I never assumed the contrary, neither have I used it as a Foundation, for the rest of my Superstructure, but left it wholly undetermin’d till the sixth Meditation, and in that ’tis proved.

Then he tells us rightly, that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject, as thought without a thinking thing, for what thinks cannot be nothing; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being. Truly the subjects of all Acts are understood under the notion of substance, or if you please under the notion of matter (that is to say of metaphysical matter) but not therefore under the notion of Bodies. But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some Spiritual, some Corporeal substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that Colour, Consistence, Shape, &c. appertain not to the Ratio Formalis of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the Ratio Formalis of the Mind, neither of Body.

Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought, for Who besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, ’Tis certain that Thought cannot be without a Thinking Thing, neither any Act or any Accident without a substance wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a substance immediately by it self, but by this alone, that ’tis the subject of several Acts, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should call by different names those substances, which we perceive are the subjects of very different Acts or Accidents, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those different names signifie different or one and the same thing. Now there are some Acts which we call corporeal, as magnitude, figure, motion, and what ever else cannot be thought on without local extension, and the substance wherein these reside we call Body; neither can it be imagin’d that ’tis one substance which is the subject of Figure, and another substance which is the subject of local motion, &c. Because all these Acts agree under one common notion of Extension. Besides there are other Acts, which we call cogitative or thinking, as understanding, will, imagination, sense, &c. All which agree under the common notion of thought, perception, or Conscience; And the substance wherein they are, we say, is a thinking thing, or mind, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with corporeal substance, because cogitative Acts have no affinity with corporeal Acts, and thought, which is the common Ratio of those is wholly different from Extension, which is the common Ratio of These. But after we have formed two distinct conceptions of these two substances, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be one and the same or different.

* Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me? Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who think am distinct from my thought, and my thought is different from me (tho’ not seperated) as dancing is distinguished from the Dancer (as before is noted.) But if Des-Cartes will prove, that he who understands is the same with his understanding, we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions, the understanding understands, the sight sees, the Will wills, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or at least the Faculty of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble Des-Cartes. ANSWER. I do not deny, that I who think am distinct from my thought, as a thing is distinguish’d from its modus or manner; But when I ask, which of them is it that is distinct from my thought? this I understand of those various modes of thought there mention’d, and not of substance; and when I subjoyn, which of them is it that can be separated from me? I only signifie that all those modes or manners of thinking reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of doubt or obscurity can be imagined.

* It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is. There is a great Difference between Imagination (that is) having an Idea of a Thing, and the Conception of the Mind (that is) a Concluding from Reasoning that a thing Is or Exists. But Des-Cartes has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides, the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver’d as a Doctrine, that substance is not perceived by sense but is Collected by Ratiocination. But what shall we now say, if perhaps Ratiocination be nothing Else but a Copulation or Concatenation of Names or Appellations by this Word Is? From whence ’twill follow that we Collect by Reasoning nothing of or concerning the Nature of Things, but of the names of Things, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we joyn the Names of Things according to the Agreements which at Pleasure we have made concerning their significations; if it be so (as so it may be) Ratiocination will depend on Words, Words on Imagination, and perhaps Imagination as also Sense on the Motion of Corporeal Parts; and so the Mind shall be nothing but Motions in some Parts of an Organical Body. ANSWER.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. II. Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind.

    Then he tells us rightly, that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject, as thought without a thinking thing, for what thinks cannot be nothing; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being. Truly the subjects of all Acts are understood under the notion of substance, or if you please under the notion of matter (that is to say of metaphysical matter) but not therefore under the notion of Bodies. But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some Spiritual, some Corporeal substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that Colour, Consistence, Shape, &c. appertain not to the Ratio Formalis of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the Ratio Formalis of the Mind, neither of Body.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. II. Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind.

    Neither do I say, that the understanding thing and intellection are the same, or that the understanding thing and the intellect are the same, if the intellect be taken for the Faculty, but only when ’tis taken for the thing it self that understands. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of abstracted words to signifie that thing or substance, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most concrete Words to signifie this thinking thing, such as subject, matter, Body, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from Body. Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things. It may be (sayes he) that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved. But herein he is mistaken, for I never assumed the contrary, neither have I used it as a Foundation, for the rest of my Superstructure, but left it wholly undetermin’d till the sixth Meditation, and in that ’tis proved.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · OBJECT. II. Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind.

    I am a Thinking Thing. ’Tis True; for because I think or have a Phantasme (whether I am awake or asleep) it follows that I am Thinking, for I Think and I am Thinking signifie the same Thing. Because I Think, it follows That I am, for whatever Thinks cannot be Nothing. But when he Adds, That is, a Mind, a Soul, an Understanding, Reason, I question his Argumentation; for it does not seem a Right Consequence to say, I am a Thinking Thing, therefore I am a Thought, neither, I am an Understanding Thing, therefore I am the Understanding. For in the same manner I may Conclude, I am a Walking Thing, therefore I am the Walking it self. Wherefore D.Cartes Concludes that an Understanding Thing and Intellection (which is the Act of an Understanding Thing) are the same; or at least that an Understanding Thing and the Intellect (which is the Power of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet all Philosophers distinguish the subject from its Faculties and Acts, that is, from its Properties and Essence, for the Thing it self is one thing, and its Essence is an other. It may be therefore that a Thinking Thing is the Subject of a Mind, Reason, or Understanding, and therefor it may be a Corporeal Thing, the Contrary Whereof is here Assumed and not Proved; and yet this Inference is the Foundation of that Conclusion which D.Cartes would Establish. * Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the foregoing Meditations here Objected against.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose Ideas I have within Me) are Really Existent without Me; And that is Thus: As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking, I acknowledge no Inequality between them, and they all proceed from me in the same Manner. But as one Represents one thing, an other, an other Thing, ’tis Evident there is a Great difference between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reallity in them, then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reallity, then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited. But Now, it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause, as there is in the Effect of that Cause; For from Whence can the effect have its Reallity, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause give it that Reallity, unless it self have it? And from hence it follows, that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing, Neither a Thing which is more Perfect (that is, Which has in it self more Reallity) proceed from That Which is Less Perfect.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.

    Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these Ideas of Qualities, which offer’d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone I properly and Immediately perceived) that I thought my self to Perceive some Things Different from my Thought, viz. The Bodies or Objects from whence these Ideas might Proceed; for I often found these Ideas come upon me without my Consent or Will; so that I can neither perceive an Object (tho I had a mind to it) unless it were before the Organs of my Sense; Neither can I Hinder my self from perceiving it, when it is Present. And seeing that those Ideas which I take in by sense are much more Lively, Apparent and in their kind more distinct, than any of those which I knowingly and Willingly frame by Meditation, or stir up in my Memory; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from my self. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other Things Without Me. Of Which Things seeing I have no other Knowledge but from these Ideas, I cannot Think but that these Ideas are like the Things.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other Author of these Ideas but my self; for if they are false, that is, represent things that are not, I know by the light of nature that they proceed from nothing; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my nature is deficient in something, and imperfect. But if they are true, yet seeing I discover so little reality in them, that that very reality scarce seems to be realy, I see no reason why I my self should not be the Author of them. But also some of those very Ideas of Corporeal things which are clear and distinct, I may seem to have borrow’d from the Idea I have of my self, viz. Substance, duration, number, and the like; For when I conceive a stone to be a substance (that is, a thing apt of it self to exist) and also that I my self am a substance, tho I conceive my self a thinking substance and not extended, and the stone an extended substance and not thinking, by which there is a great diversity between both the conceptions, yet they agree in this, that they are both substances. So when I conceive my self as now in being, and also remember, that heretofore I have been; and since I have divers thoughts, which I can number or count; from hence it is that I come by the notions of duration and number; which afterwards I apply to other things.

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