Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
Neither do I say, that the understanding thing and intellection are the same, or that the understanding thing and the intellect are the same, if the intellect be taken for the Faculty, but only when ’tis taken for the thing it self that understands. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of abstracted words to signifie that thing or substance, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most concrete Words to signifie this thinking thing, such as subject, matter, Body, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from Body. Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things. It may be (sayes he) that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved. But herein he is mistaken, for I never assumed the contrary, neither have I used it as a Foundation, for the rest of my Superstructure, but left it wholly undetermin’d till the sixth Meditation, and in that ’tis proved.
Then he tells us rightly, that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject, as thought without a thinking thing, for what thinks cannot be nothing; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being. Truly the subjects of all Acts are understood under the notion of substance, or if you please under the notion of matter (that is to say of metaphysical matter) but not therefore under the notion of Bodies. But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some Spiritual, some Corporeal substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that Colour, Consistence, Shape, &c. appertain not to the Ratio Formalis of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the Ratio Formalis of the Mind, neither of Body.
Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought, for Who besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, ’Tis certain that Thought cannot be without a Thinking Thing, neither any Act or any Accident without a substance wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a substance immediately by it self, but by this alone, that ’tis the subject of several Acts, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should call by different names those substances, which we perceive are the subjects of very different Acts or Accidents, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those different names signifie different or one and the same thing. Now there are some Acts which we call corporeal, as magnitude, figure, motion, and what ever else cannot be thought on without local extension, and the substance wherein these reside we call Body; neither can it be imagin’d that ’tis one substance which is the subject of Figure, and another substance which is the subject of local motion, &c. Because all these Acts agree under one common notion of Extension. Besides there are other Acts, which we call cogitative or thinking, as understanding, will, imagination, sense, &c. All which agree under the common notion of thought, perception, or Conscience; And the substance wherein they are, we say, is a thinking thing, or mind, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with corporeal substance, because cogitative Acts have no affinity with corporeal Acts, and thought, which is the common Ratio of those is wholly different from Extension, which is the common Ratio of These. But after we have formed two distinct conceptions of these two substances, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be one and the same or different.
* Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me? Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who think am distinct from my thought, and my thought is different from me (tho’ not seperated) as dancing is distinguished from the Dancer (as before is noted.) But if Des-Cartes will prove, that he who understands is the same with his understanding, we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions, the understanding understands, the sight sees, the Will wills, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or at least the Faculty of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble Des-Cartes. ANSWER. I do not deny, that I who think am distinct from my thought, as a thing is distinguish’d from its modus or manner; But when I ask, which of them is it that is distinct from my thought? this I understand of those various modes of thought there mention’d, and not of substance; and when I subjoyn, which of them is it that can be separated from me? I only signifie that all those modes or manners of thinking reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of doubt or obscurity can be imagined.
* It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is. There is a great Difference between Imagination (that is) having an Idea of a Thing, and the Conception of the Mind (that is) a Concluding from Reasoning that a thing Is or Exists. But Des-Cartes has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides, the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver’d as a Doctrine, that substance is not perceived by sense but is Collected by Ratiocination. But what shall we now say, if perhaps Ratiocination be nothing Else but a Copulation or Concatenation of Names or Appellations by this Word Is? From whence ’twill follow that we Collect by Reasoning nothing of or concerning the Nature of Things, but of the names of Things, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we joyn the Names of Things according to the Agreements which at Pleasure we have made concerning their significations; if it be so (as so it may be) Ratiocination will depend on Words, Words on Imagination, and perhaps Imagination as also Sense on the Motion of Corporeal Parts; and so the Mind shall be nothing but Motions in some Parts of an Organical Body. ANSWER.
Passages expressing a similar idea
A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.
First, I observe, that the word, action, according to this explication of it, can never justly be applied to any perception, as derived from a mind or thinking substance. Our perceptions are all really different, and separable, and distinguishable from each other, and from everything else, which we can imagine: and therefore it is impossible to conceive, how they can be the action or abstract mode of any substance. The instance of motion, which is commonly made use of to shew after what manner perception depends, as an action, upon its substance, rather confounds than instructs us. Motion to all appearance induces no real nor essential change on the body, but only varies its relation to other objects. But betwixt a person in the morning walking a garden with company, agreeable to him; and a person in the afternoon inclosed in a dungeon, and full of terror, despair, and resentment, there seems to be a radical difference, and of quite another kind, than what is produced on a body by the change of its situation. As we conclude from the distinction and separability of their ideas, that external objects have a separate existence from each other; so when we make these ideas themselves our objects, we must draw the same conclusion concerning them, according to the precedent reasoning. At least it must be confest, that having idea of the substance of the soul, it is impossible for us to tell how it can admit of such differences, and even contrarieties of perception without any fundamental change; and consequently can never tell in what sense perceptions are actions of that substance. The use, therefore, of the word, action, unaccompanyed with any meaning, instead of that of modification, makes no addition to our knowledge, nor is of any advantage to the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXVII. OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY.
But next, as to the first part of the question, Whether, if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person? I answer, that cannot be resolved but by those who know there can what kind of substances they are that do think; and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant were the same consciousness the same individual action it could not: but it being a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the mind to have been which really never was, will remain to be shown. And therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what IT never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent—why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true—will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God; who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that, if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
The same happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c., which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other SUBSTANCE, which we call SPIRIT; whereby yet it is evident that, having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist; by supposing a substance wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c., do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the SUBSTRATUM to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the SUBSTRATUM to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain then, that the idea of CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE, or spirit: and therefore, from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
Besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances, of which I have last spoken,—by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c., co-existing in some substance, we are able to frame the COMPLEX IDEA OF AN IMMATERIAL SPIRIT. And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all, in both: it is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.
I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of SUBSTANCE; which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves; but we see, on the contrary, that since, by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all; and therefore signify nothing by the word SUBSTANCE but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i. e. of something whereof we have no idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know. 20. No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but some few superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies; we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity, than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent one from another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, i.e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, i.e. matter, to exist; especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection and dive further into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficulties, and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection: and so is it of all our other ideas of substances, even of God himself.
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