Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. rest quiet. So when I feel pain in my Foot, the consideration of Physicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of Nerves dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being continued like Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are drawn in the Foot, they also draw the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certain motion, which is ordain’d by Nature to affect the mind with a sense of Pain, as being in the Foot. But because these Nerves must pass through the Shin, the Thighs, the Loins, the Back, the Neck, before they can reach the Brain from the Foot, it may so happen, that tho that part of them, which is in the Foot were not touch’d, but only some of their intermediate parts, yet the same motion, would be caused in the Brain, as when the Foot it self is ill affected, from whence ’twill necessarily follow, that the mind should perceive the same Pain. And thus may we think of any other Sense.
I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that part of the Brain, which immediately affects the mind, excites therein only one sort of sense, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all those Senses which it can cause, it should cause that which cheifly, and most frequently conduces to the conservation of an healthful Man; And experience witnesses, that to this very end all our senses are given us by Nature; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testifie the Power and Goodness of God. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the Nature of Man might have been so order’d by God, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing, viz. either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body. In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health. So of the Rest.
From all which ’tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the infinite Goodness of God) ’tis impossible but the Nature of Man as he consists of a mind and body should be deceivable. For if any cause should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, that self same motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled, the Pain would be felt as in the Foot, and the sense would be naturally deceived; for ’tis consonant to Reason (seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause hurtful to the Foot, than from any other) I say ’tis reasonable, that it should make known to the mind the Pain of the Foot, rather than of any other part. And so if a dryness of Throat arises (not as ’tis used from the necessity of drink for the conservation of the Body, but) from an unusual Cause, as it happens in a Dropsie, ’tis far better that it should then deceive us; then that it should alwayes deceive us when the Body is in Health, and so of the Rest.
And this consideration helps me very much, not only to understand the Errors to which my Nature is subject, but also to correct and avoid them. For seeing I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me falsly than truely in those things which conduce to the Bodies advantage; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one to Examine the same thing, as also I can use memory, which joyns present and past things together, and my understanding also, which hath already discovered to me all the causes of my Errors, I ought no longer to fear, that what my Senses daily represent to me should be false. But especially those extravagant Doubts of my First Meditation are to be turn’d off as ridiculous; and perticularly the chief of them, viz. That * of not distinguishing Sleep from Waking, for now I plainly discover a great difference, between them, for my Dreams are never conjoyned by my memory with the other actions of my life, as whatever happens to me awake is; and certainly if (while I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently disappear (as in Dreams) so that I could not tell from whence he came or where he went, I should rather esteem it a Spectre or Apparition feign’d in my Brain, then a true Man; but when such things occur, as I distinctly know from whence, where, and when they come, and I conjoyn the perception of them by my memory with the other Accidents of my life, I am certain they are represented to me waking and not asleep, neither ought I in the least to doubt of their Truth, if after I have called up all my senses, memory, and understanding to their Examination I find nothing in any of them, that clashes with other truths; For God not being a Deceiver, it follows, that In such things I am not deceived. But because the urgency of Action in the common occurrences of Affairs will not alwayes allow time for such an accurate examination, I must confess that Mans life is subject to many Errors about perticulars, so that the infirmity of our Nature must be acknowledged by Us. FINIS.
Among seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy, as being Penn’d by Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury, a Man famously known to the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and therefore ’tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance, so fares it with these Meditations which stand unshaken by the Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess’d that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. Hobbs’s Philosophy, especially His Book De Corpore and De Homine, The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore not Impertinently refer’d to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And this is the Reason that makes the Great Des-Cartes pass over many of these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the Hobbian Philosophy had he but known upon What Foundations it was Built.
Passages expressing a similar idea
A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.
Add to this, that every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, sensations, pains and pleasures, are originally on the same footing; and that whatever other differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true colours, as impressions or perceptions. And indeed, if we consider the matter aright, it is scarce possible it should be otherwise, nor is it conceivable that our senses should be more capable of deceiving us in the situation and relations, than in the nature of our impressions. For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality a perception, it is impossible any thing should to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken. But not to lose time in examining, whether it is possible for our senses to deceive us, and represent our perceptions as distinct from ourselves, that is as external to and independent of us; let us consider whether they really do so, and whether this error proceeds from an immediate sensation, or from some other causes.
Read in contextThe Genealogy of Morals The Complete Works, Volume Thirteen, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy. · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
I am proceeding, as you see, in this essay, from an hypothesis which, as far as such readers as I want are concerned, does not require to be proved; the hypothesis that "sinfulness" in man is not an actual fact, but rather merely the interpretation of a fact, of a physiological discomfort,—a discomfort seen through a moral religious perspective which is no longer binding upon us. The fact, therefore, that any one feels "guilty," "sinful," is certainly not yet any proof that he is right in feeling so, any more than any one is healthy simply because he feels healthy. Remember the celebrated witch-ordeals: in those days the most acute and humane judges had no doubt but that in these cases they were confronted with guilt,—the "witches" themselves had no doubt on the point,—and yet the guilt was lacking. Let me elaborate this hypothesis: I do not for a minute accept the very "pain in the soul" as a real fact, but only as an explanation (a casual explanation) of facts that could not hitherto be precisely formulated; I regard it therefore as something as yet absolutely in the air and devoid of scientific cogency—just a nice fat word in the place of a lean note of interrogation. When any one fails to get rid of his "pain in the soul," the cause is, speaking crudely, to be found not in his "soul" but more probably in his stomach (speaking crudely, I repeat, but by no means wishing thereby that you should listen to me or understand me in a crude spirit). A strong and well-constituted man digests his experiences (deeds and misdeeds all included) just as he digests his meats, even when he has some tough morsels to swallow. If he fails to "relieve himself" of an experience, this kind of indigestion is quite as much physiological as the other indigestion—and indeed, in more ways than one, simply one of the results of the other. You can adopt such a theory, and yet entre nous be nevertheless the strongest opponent of all materialism.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.
But though this be the only reasonable account we can give of necessity, the contrary notion if; so riveted in the mind from the principles above-mentioned, that I doubt not but my sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. What! the efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind! As if causes did not operate entirely independent of the mind, and would not continue their operation, even though there was no mind existent to contemplate them, or reason concerning them. Thought may well depend on causes for its operation, but not causes on thought. This is to reverse the order of nature, and make that secondary, which is really primary, To every operation there is a power proportioned; and this power must be placed on the body, that operates. If we remove the power from one cause, we must ascribe it to another: But to remove it from all causes, and bestow it on a being, that is no ways related to the cause or effect, but by perceiving them, is a gross absurdity, and contrary to the most certain principles of human reason.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. V. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
I answer this objection, by pleading guilty, and by confessing that my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations. For besides that this belongs not to my present purpose, I am afraid, that such an enterprise is beyond the reach of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses. As to those who attempt any thing farther, I cannot approve of their ambition, till I see, in some one instance at least, that they have met with success. But at present I content myself with knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses, and their connections with each other, as far as experience informs me of them. This suffices for the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions, or impressions and ideas.[6]
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.
But, secondly, supposing, that the deity were the great and efficacious principle, which supplies the deficiency of all causes, this leads us into the grossest impieties and absurdities. For upon the same account, that we have recourse to him in natural operations, and assert that matter cannot of itself communicate motion, or produce thought, viz. because there is no apparent connexion betwixt these objects; I say, upon the very same account, we must acknowledge that the deity is the author of all our volitions and perceptions; since they have no more apparent connexion either with one another, or with the supposed but unknown substance of the soul. This agency of the supreme Being we know to have been asserted by[14] several philosophers with relation to all the actions of the mind, except volition, or rather an inconsiderable part of volition; though it is easy to perceive, that this exception is a mere pretext, to avoid the dangerous consequences of that doctrine. If nothing be active but what has an apparent power, thought is in no case any more active than matter; and if this inactivity must make us have recourse to a deity, the supreme being is the real cause of all our actions, bad as well as good, vicious as well as virtuous. [14] As father Malebranche and other Cartesians.
Read in contextAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECTION VII. / OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.
The same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by external objects, produce sensations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such a sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members: It is God himself, who is pleased to second our will, in itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself, in its internal operations. Our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and renders it present to us.
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