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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

Neither was it without Reason that I Judged, That Body (which by a peculiar right I call my Own) to be more nighly appertaining to Me then any other Body. For from It, as from other Bodies, I can never be seperated, I was sensible of all Appetites and Affections in It and for It, and lastly I perceived pleasure and Pain in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the sense of Pain a certain Grief, and from the sense of pleasure a certain Joy of the Mind should arise, or Why that Gnawing of the stomach, Which I call Hunger, should put me in mind of Eating, or the driness of my Throat of Drinking, I can give no other Reason but that I am taught so by Nature. For to my thinking there is no Affinity or Likeness between that Gnawing of the Stomach, and the desire of Eating, or between the sense of Pain, and the sorrowful thought from thence arising. But in this as in all other judgments that I made of sensible objects, I seem’d to be taught by Nature, for I first perswaded my self that things were so or so, before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it. The Reasons why I doubted my senses. Medit. I.

But afterwards I discover’d many experiments, wherein my senses so grosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers which seem’d Round a far off, nigh at hand appear’d square, and large Statues on their tops seem’d small to those that stood on the ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the judgements of my outward senses were deceived: and not of my outward only, but of my inward senses also; for what is more intimate or inward than Pain? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have felt pain in that part which they wanted, and therefore I am not absolutely certain that any part of me is affected with pain, tho I feel pain therein. To these I have lately added two very general Reasons of doubt; The first was, that while I was awake, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I were a sleep; And seeing I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my sleep proceeds from outward Objects, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am awake? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing I know not the Author of my Being (or at least I then supposed my self not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by Nature as to be deceived even in those things which appear’d to me most true. And as to the Reasons, which induced me to give credit to sensible Things, ’twas easie to return an answer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled by Nature to many Things, which Reason disswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by Nature. And tho the perceptions of my senses depended not on my Will, I thought I should not therefore conclude, that they proceeded from Objects different from my self; for perhaps there may be some other Faculty in me (tho as yet unknown to me) which might frame those perceptions.

How far the senses are now to be trusted.

But now that I begin better to know my self and the Author of my Original, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my senses are rashly to be admitted, neither are all things so had, to be doubted. And first because I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive, may be so made by God as I perceive them; the Power of understanding clearly and distinctly one Thing without the other is sufficient to make Me certain that One Thing is different from the Other; because it may at least be placed apart by God, and that it may be esteem’d different, it matters not by what Power it may be so sever’d. And therefore from the knowledge I have, that I my self exist, and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my Nature or Essence, but that I am a thinking Being, I rightly conclude, that my Essence consists in this alone, that I am a thinking Thing. And tho perhaps (or, as I shall shew presently, ’tis certain) I have a Body which is very nighly conjoyned to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and distinct Idea of my self, as I am only a thinking Thing, not extended; and on the other side because I have a distinct Idea of my Body, as it is onely an extended thing, not thinking, ’tis from hence certain, that I am really distinct from my Body, and that I can exist without it.

Moreover I find in my self some Faculties endow’d with certain peculiar waies of thinking, such as the Faculty of Imagination, the Faculty of Perception or sense; without which I can conceive my whole self clearly and distinctly, but (changing the phrase) I cannot conceive those Faculties without conceiving My self, that is, an understanding substance in which they are; for none of them in their formal Conception includes understanding; from whence I perceive they are as different from me, as the modus or manner of a Thing is different from the Thing it self. I acknowledge also, that I have several other Faculties, such as changing of place, putting on various shapes, &c. Which can no more be understood without a substance in which they are, then the foremention’d Faculties, and consequently they can no more be understood to Exist without that substance: But yet ’tis Manifest, that this sort of Faculties, to the End they may exist, ought to be in a Corporeal, Extended, and not in an Understanding substance, because Extension, and not Intellection or Understanding is included in the Clear and Distinct conception of them.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XII. — APOLOGY FOR RAIMOND SEBOND.

    The first consideration I have upon the subject of the senses is that I make a doubt whether or no man be furnished with all natural senses. I see several animals who live an entire and perfect life, some without sight, others without hearing; who knows whether to us also one, two, three, or many other senses may not be wanting? For if any one be wanting, our examination cannot discover the defect. ‘Tis the privilege of the senses to be the utmost limit of our discovery; there is nothing beyond them that can assist us in exploration, not so much as one sense in the discovery of another:— An poterunt oculos aures reprehendere? an aures Tactus an hunc porro tactum sapor argnet oris? An confutabunt nares, oculive revincent? “Can ears the eyes, the touch the ears, correct? Or is that touch by tasting to be check’d? Or th’ other senses, shall the nose or eyes Confute in their peculiar faculties?” They all make the extremest limits of our ability:— Seorsum cuique potestas Divisa est, sua vis cuique est, “Each has its power distinctly and alone, And every sense’s power is its own.”

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  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE FOX AND THE CROW / A FABLE

    As we have made a comparison between sight and touch, it will be as well to do the same for hearing, and to find out which of the two impressions starting simultaneously from a given body first reaches the sense-organ. When you see the flash of a cannon, you have still time to take cover; but when you hear the sound it is too late, the ball is close to you. One can reckon the distance of a thunderstorm by the interval between the lightning and the thunder. Let the child learn all these facts, let him learn those that are within his reach by experiment, and discover the rest by induction; but I would far rather he knew nothing at all about them, than that you should tell him. In the voice we have an organ answering to hearing; we have no such organ answering to sight, and we do not repeat colours as we repeat sounds. This supplies an additional means of cultivating the ear by practising the active and passive organs one with the other.

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  • An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING. / BOOK I NEITHER PRINCIPLES NOR IDEAS ARE INNATE / CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

    If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state. 5. Our Capacity suited to our State and Concerns.

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  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE FOX AND THE CROW / A FABLE

    Of all the senses, sight is that which we can least distinguish from the judgments of the mind; as it takes a long time to learn to see. It takes a long time to compare sight and touch, and to train the former sense to give a true report of shape and distance. Without touch, without progressive motion, the sharpest eyes in the world could give us no idea of space. To the oyster the whole world must seem a point, and it would seem nothing more to it even if it had a human mind. It is only by walking, feeling, counting, measuring the dimensions of things, that we learn to judge them rightly; but, on the other hand, if we were always measuring, our senses would trust to the instrument and would never gain confidence. Nor must the child pass abruptly from measurement to judgment; he must continue to compare the parts when he could not compare the whole; he must substitute his estimated aliquot parts for exact aliquot parts, and instead of always applying the measure by hand he must get used to applying it by eye alone. I would, however, have his first estimates tested by measurement, so that he may correct his errors, and if there is a false impression left upon the senses he may correct it by a better judgment. The same natural standards of measurement are in use almost everywhere, the man’s foot, the extent of his outstretched arms, his height. When the child wants to measure the height of a room, his tutor may serve as a measuring rod; if he is estimating the height of a steeple let him measure it by the house; if he wants to know how many leagues of road there are, let him count the hours spent in walking along it. Above all, do not do this for him; let him do it himself.

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  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE FOX AND THE CROW / A FABLE

    As touch confines its operations to the man’s immediate surroundings, so sight extends its range beyond them; it is this which makes it misleading; man sees half his horizon at a glance. In the midst of this host of simultaneous impressions and the thoughts excited by them, how can he fail now and then to make mistakes? Thus sight is the least reliable of our senses, just because it has the widest range; it functions long before our other senses, and its work is too hasty and on too large a scale to be corrected by the rest. Moreover, the very illusions of perspective are necessary if we are to arrive at a knowledge of space and compare one part of space with another. Without false appearances we should never see anything at a distance; without the gradations of size and tone we could not judge of distance, or rather distance would have no existence for us. If two trees, one of which was a hundred paces from us and the other ten, looked equally large and distinct, we should think they were side by side. If we perceived the real dimensions of things, we should know nothing of space; everything would seem close to our eyes.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY

    [7] Book I. Part III. Sect. 15. The second principle I shall take notice of is that of our adherence to general rules; which has such a mighty influence on the actions and understanding, and is able to impose on the very senses. When an object is found by experience to be always accompanyed with another; whenever the first object appears, though changed in very material circumstances; we naturally fly to the conception of the second, and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner, as if we had infered its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding. Nothing can undeceive us, not even our senses, which, instead of correcting this false judgment, are often perverted by it, and seem to authorize its errors.

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