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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

Let me ask therefore What I am, A Thinking Thing, but What is That? That is a thing, doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, nilling, imagining also, and sensitive. These truely are not a few Properties, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not belong to me? For am not I the very same who at present doubt almost of All things; yet understand something, which thing onely I affirm to be true, I deny all other things, I am willing to know more, I would not be deceived, I imagine many things unwillingly, and consider many things as coming to me by my senses. Which of all these faculties is it, which is not as true as that I Exist, tho I should sleep, or my Creatour should as much as in him lay, strive to deceive Me? which of them is it that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be seperated from me? For that I am the same that doubt, understand, and will is so evident, that I know not how to explain it more manifestly, and that I also am the same that imagine, for tho perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be imagined is true, yet the imaginative Power it self is really existent, and makes up a part of my Thought; and last of all that I am the same that am sensitive, or perceive corporeal things as by my senses, yet that I now see light, hear a noise, feel heat, these things are false, for I suppose my self asleep, but I know that I see, hear, and am heated, that cannot be false; and this it is that in me is properly called Sense, and this strictly taken is the same with thought.

By these Considerations I begin a little better to understand My self what I am; But yet it seems, and I cannot but think that Corporeal Things (whose Images are formed in my thought, and which by my senses, I perceive) are much more distinctly known, then that confused Notion of My Self which imagination cannot afford me. And yet ’tis strange that things doubtful, unknown, distinct from Me, should be apprehended more clearly by Me, then a Thing that is True, then a thing that is known, or then I my self; But the Reason is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded within the strict limits of Truth. Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins, that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be more easily Govern’d. Let me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived most evident, that is to say, Bodies which we touch, which we see, not bodies in General (for those General Conceptions are usually Confused) but some one Body in particular.

Let us chuse for example this piece of Bees-wax, it was lately taken from the Comb, it has not yet lost all the tast of the Honey, it retains something of the smell of the Flowers from whence ’twas gather’d, its colour, shape, and bigness are manifest, ’tis hard, ’tis cold, ’tis easily felt, and if you will knock it with your finger, ’twill make a noise: In fine, it hath all things requisite to the most perfect notion of a Body.

But behold whilst I am speaking, ’tis put to the Fire, its tast is purged away, the smell is vanish’d, the colour is changed, the shape is alter’d, its bulk is increased, its become soft, ’tis hot, it can scarce be felt, and now (though you strike it) it makes no noise. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things which I perceived by my senses; for what I smelt, tasted, have seen, felt, or heard, are all vanish’d, and yet the Wax remains. Perhaps ’twas this only that I now think on, viz. that the Wax it self was not that tast of Honey, that smell of Flowers, that whiteness, that shape, or that sound, but it was a Body which awhile before appear’d to me so and so modified, but now otherwise. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me see what will remain, viz. this only, a thing extended, flexible, and mutable. But what is this flexible, and mutable? is it that I imagine that this Wax from being round may be made square, or from being square can be made triangular? No, this is not it; for I conceive it capable of innumerable such changes, and yet I cannot by my imagination run over these Innumerables; Wherefore this notion of its mutability proceeds not from my imagination. What then is extended? is not its Extension also unknown? For when it melts ’tis greater, when it boils ’tis greater, and yet greater when the heat is increas’d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I not think it capable of more various Extensions than I can imagine. It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot imagine what this Wax is, but that I perceive with my Mind what it is. I speak of this particular Wax, for of Wax in general the notion is more clear.

But what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? ’Tis the same which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the perception thereof is not sight, the touch, or the imagination thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem’d so. But the perception thereof is the inspection or beholding of the Mind only, which may be either imperfect and confused, as formerly it was; or clear and distinct, as now it is; the more or the less I consider the Composition of the Wax.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. II. Of the nature of Mans mind, and that ’tis easier proved to be then our body.

    But behold whilst I am speaking, ’tis put to the Fire, its tast is purged away, the smell is vanish’d, the colour is changed, the shape is alter’d, its bulk is increased, its become soft, ’tis hot, it can scarce be felt, and now (though you strike it) it makes no noise. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things which I perceived by my senses; for what I smelt, tasted, have seen, felt, or heard, are all vanish’d, and yet the Wax remains. Perhaps ’twas this only that I now think on, viz. that the Wax it self was not that tast of Honey, that smell of Flowers, that whiteness, that shape, or that sound, but it was a Body which awhile before appear’d to me so and so modified, but now otherwise. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me see what will remain, viz. this only, a thing extended, flexible, and mutable. But what is this flexible, and mutable? is it that I imagine that this Wax from being round may be made square, or from being square can be made triangular? No, this is not it; for I conceive it capable of innumerable such changes, and yet I cannot by my imagination run over these Innumerables; Wherefore this notion of its mutability proceeds not from my imagination. What then is extended? is not its Extension also unknown? For when it melts ’tis greater, when it boils ’tis greater, and yet greater when the heat is increas’d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I not think it capable of more various Extensions than I can imagine. It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot imagine what this Wax is, but that I perceive with my Mind what it is. I speak of this particular Wax, for of Wax in general the notion is more clear.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. II. Of the nature of Mans mind, and that ’tis easier proved to be then our body.

    Moreover, if the notion of Wax seems more distinct after it is made known to me, not only by my sight or touch, but by more and other causes; How much the more distinctly must I confess my self known unto my self, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in the perception of Wax, or any other Body, does also encrease the proofs of the nature of my Mind. But there are so many more things in the very Mind it self, by which the notion of it may be made more distinct, that those things which drawn from Body conduce to its knowledge are scarce to be mention’d. And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in; for seeing I have now discover’d that Bodies themselves are not properly perceived by our senses or imagination, but only by our understanding, and are not therefore perceived, because they are felt or seen, but because they are understood; it plainly appears to me, that nothing can possibly be perceived by me easier, or more evidently, than my Mind. But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. II. Of the nature of Mans mind, and that ’tis easier proved to be then our body.

    But what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? ’Tis the same which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the perception thereof is not sight, the touch, or the imagination thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem’d so. But the perception thereof is the inspection or beholding of the Mind only, which may be either imperfect and confused, as formerly it was; or clear and distinct, as now it is; the more or the less I consider the Composition of the Wax.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.

    I am taught also by Nature, that there are many other Bodies Without and About my Body, some whereof are to be desired, others are to be Avoided. And because that I Perceive very Different Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tasts, Heat, Hardness, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are Correspondent Differences in Bodies, from which these different perceptions of sense proceed, tho perhaps not Alike. And because that some of these perceptions are Pleasant, others Unpleasant, ’tis evidently certain, that my Body, or rather my Whole self (as I am compounded of a Mind and Body) am liable to be Affected by these Bodies which encompass me about.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. III. Of GOD, and that there is a God.

    And as to the Ideas of Corporeal things, I find nothing in them of that perfection, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (in the second Medit.) I did the Idea of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them, viz. Magnitude or extension in Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, the Figure or shape which arises from the termination of that Extension, the Position or place which divers Figured Bodies have in respect of each other, their motion or change of place; to which may be added, their substance, continuance, and number; as to the other, such as are, Light, Colours, Sounds, Smels, Tasts, Heat, and Cold, with the other tactile qualities, I have but very obscure and confused thoughts of them, so that I know not, whether they are true or false, that is to say, whether the Ideas I have of them are the Ideas of things which really are, or are not. For altho falshood formally and properly so called, consists only in the judgement (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of material falshood in Ideas, when they represent a thing as really existent, tho it does not exist; so, for example, the Ideas I have of heat and cold are so obscure and confused, that I cannot collect from them, whether cold be a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether either of them be a real quality, or whether neither of them be real. And since every Idea must be like the thing it represents, if it be true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, that Idea which represents it to me as a thing real and positive may deservedly be called false. The same may be apply’d to other Ideas.

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  • Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. II. Of the nature of Mans mind, and that ’tis easier proved to be then our body.

    Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more perfectly and evidently what the Wax was, when I first look’d on’t, and believed that I knew it by my outward senses, or at least by my common sense (as they call it) that is to say, by my imagination; or whether at present I better understand it, after I have more diligently enquired both what it is, and how it may be known. Surely it would be a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts are true; What was there in my first perception that was distinct? What was there that seem’d not incident to every other Animal? But now when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it as if it were naked, with it’s coverings pull’d off, then I cannot but really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.

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