The Enchiridion
Epictetus (55–135)
Whatever rules you have adopted, abide by them as laws, and as if you would be impious to transgress them; and do not regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then, will you delay to demand of yourself the noblest improvements, and in no instance to transgress the judgments of reason? You have received the philosophic principles with which you ought to be conversant; and you have been conversant with them. For what other master, then, do you wait as an excuse for this delay in self-reformation? You are no longer a boy but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue to accomplish nothing and, living and dying, remain of vulgar mind. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, glory or disgrace, be set before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off; and that by one failure and defeat honor may be lost or—won. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything, following reason alone. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one seeking to be a Socrates.
The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is the practical application of principles, as, We ought not to lie; the second is that of demonstrations as, Why it is that we ought not to lie; the third, that which gives strength and logical connection to the other two, as, Why this is a demonstration. For what is demonstration? What is a consequence? What a contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third point is then necessary on account of the second; and the second on account of the first. But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we do just the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third point and employ all our diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are very ready to show how it is demonstrated that lying is wrong. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand: Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny, Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot. I follow cheerfully; and, did I not, Wicked and wretched, I must follow still.[8] Who’er yields properly to Fate is deemed Wise among men, and knows the laws of Heaven.[9] And this third: “O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be.”[10] “Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed; but hurt me they cannot.”[11]
[1] Happiness, the effect of virtue, is the mark which God has set up for us to aim at. Our missing it is no work of His; nor so properly anything real, as a mere negative and failure of our own. [2] Chapter XV of the third book of the Discourses, which, with the exception of some very trifling differences, is the same as chapter XXIX of the Enchiridion.—Ed. [3] Euphrates was a philosopher of Syria, whose character is described, with the highest encomiums, by Pliny the Younger, Letters I. 10. [4] The two inimical sons of Oedipus, who killed each other in battle.—Ed. [5] This refers to an anecdote given in full by Simplicius, in his commentary on this passage, of a man assaulted and killed on his way to consult the oracle, while his companion, deserting him, took refuge in the temple till cast out by the Deity.—Tr. [6] Reference is to Zeno of Cyprus (335-263 B.C.), the founder of the Stoic school.—Ed. [7] Chrysippus (c. 280-207 B.C.) was a Stoic philosopher who became head of the Stoa after Cleanthes. His works, which are lost, were most influential and were generally accepted as the authoritative interpretation of orthodox Stoic philosophy.—Ed. [8] Cleanthes, in Diogenes Laertius, quoted also by Seneca, Epistle 107. [9] Euripides, Fragments. [10] Plato, Crito, Chap. XVII. [11] Plato, Apology, Chap. XVIII.
Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound. Tr. E. B. Browning. (LLA 24) .40 *Alembert, d’: Introduction to the Encyclopédie of 1751. Tr. T. D. Lockwood. (LLA 88) .80 *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Tr. M. Ostwald. (LLA 75) .80 ——: On the Art of Poetry. Tr. S. H. Butcher. (LLA 6) .50 *——: On Poetry and Style. Tr. G. M. A. Grube. (LLA 68) .75 Augustine: On Christian Doctrine. Tr. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (LLA 80) .95 *Bacon: The New Organon. (LLA 97) 1.00 *Beccaria: Of Crimes and Punishments. Tr. H. Paolucci & V. Caporale. (LLA 107) .60 Bergson: An Introduction to Metaphysics. Tr. T. E. Hulme. (LLA 10) .40 *Berkeley: An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision & The Theory of Vision Vindicated. (LLA 83) .80 ——: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. (LLA 53) .75 ——: Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. (LLA 39) .75 Boccaccio on Poetry. Tr. C. G. Osgood. (LLA 82) cl. $3.50 1.25 *Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy. Tr. R. H. Green. (LLA 86) .95 Bonaventura: The Mind’s Road to God. Tr. G. Boas. (LLA 32) .50 Bowman: The Absurdity of Christianity and Other Essays. (LLA 56) .75 Bradley: Ethical Studies (Selected Essays). (LLA 28) cl. $2.00 .85 *Burke: On the Sublime and Beautiful. (LLA 99) .90 ——: Reflections on the Revolution in France. (LLA 46) cl. $3.50 1.25 Butler: Five Sermons. (LLA 21) .60 Calvin: On the Christian Faith. (LLA 93) .95 ——: On God and Political Duty. (LLA 23) .60 *The Cid. Tr. J. G. Markley. (LLA 77) .75
Cornford: Plato and Parmenides. (LLA 102) 1.60 ——: Plato’s Cosmology. (LLA 101) 1.75 ——: Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. (LLA 100) 1.75 *Dante: De vulgari eloquentia. Tr. W. T. H. Jackson. (LLA 85) .60 ——: On World-Government (De Monarchia). Tr. H. W. Schneider. (LLA 15) .60 Descartes: Discourse on Method. Tr. L. J. Lafleur. (LLA 19) .50 *——: Discourse on Method and Meditations. Tr. L. J. Lafleur. (LLA 89) .90 ——: Meditations. Tr. L. J. Lafleur. (LLA 29) .60 Dostoevski: The Grand Inquisitor on the Nature of Man. Tr. C. Garnett. (LLA 63) .40 *Dryden: An Essay of Dramatic Poesy. (LLA 104) .60 Emerson: Nature. (LLA 2) .40 Epictetus: The Enchiridion. Tr. T. W. Higginson. (LLA 8) .40 Erasmus: Ten Colloquies of Erasmus. Tr. C. R. Thompson. (LLA 48) cl. $3.00 .90 Euripides: Electra. Tr. M. Hadas. (LLA 26) .40 Fichte: The Vocation of Man. Tr. W. Smith. (LLA 50) .75 Goethe: Faust I. Tr. B. Q. Morgan. (LLA 33) cl. $2.50 .75 Grotius: Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace. Tr. F. W. Kelsey. (LLA 65) .50 Hanslick: The Beautiful in Music. (LLA 45) cl. $2.50 .80 Harrington: The Political Writings of James Harrington. (LLA 38) cl. $3.00 .90 Hegel: Reason in History. Tr. R. S. Hartman. (LLA 35) cl. $2.75 .75 Hesiod: Theogony. Tr. N. O. Brown. (LLA 36) .50 Hobbes: Leviathan I-II. (LLA 69) 1.00 *Hume.: David Hume’s Literary Essays. (LLA 84) .90 ——: David Hume’s Political Essays. (LLA 34) cl. $3.00 .90 ——: An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (LLA 49) .80
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Enchiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · INTRODUCTION
While it is interesting to observe how varied were the effects produced by this small volume, this epitome of the Stoic system of moral philosophy, these effects seem still more remarkable when we consider that it was not intended to be a philosophical treatise on Stoicism for students. It was, rather, to be a guide for the advanced student of Stoicism to show him the best roads toward the goal of becoming a true philosopher. Thus Epictetus and his Enchiridion have a unique position in Roman Stoicism. Seneca and Marcus Aurelius had selected Stoic philosophy as the most adequate system for expressing their existential problems of independence, solitude, and history. In this enterprise, Seneca made tremendous strides toward the insights of social psychology as a by-product of his consciousness of decadence (in this he was close to Nietzsche), but he was not primarily concerned with the unity of the Stoic system. Marcus Aurelius changed the philosophical doctrine into the regimen of the lonesome ruler. In contrast to both, Epictetus was teaching Stoic philosophy as a doctrine and as a way of life. The Enchiridion is a summary of theoretical and applied Stoicism.
Read in contextThe Enchiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · XXXI
Be assured that the essence of piety toward the gods lies in this—to form right opinions concerning them, as existing and as governing the universe justly and well. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them amidst all events, as being ruled by the most perfect wisdom. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be affected in any other way than by withdrawing yourself from things which are not within our own power, and by making good or evil to consist only in those which are. For if you suppose any other things to be either good or evil, it is inevitable that, when you are disappointed of what you wish or incur what you would avoid, you should reproach and blame their authors. For every creature is naturally formed to flee and abhor things that appear hurtful and that which causes them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial and that which causes them. It is impracticable, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should rejoice in the person who, as he thinks, hurts him, just as it is impossible to rejoice in the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by his son when he does not impart the things which seem to be good; and this made Polynices and Eteocles[4] mutually enemies—that empire seemed good to both. On this account the husbandman reviles the gods; [and so do] the sailor, the merchant, or those who have lost wife or child. For where our interest is, there, too, is piety directed. So that whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought is thus made careful of piety likewise. But it also becomes incumbent on everyone to offer libations and sacrifices and first fruits, according to the customs of his country, purely, and not heedlessly nor negligently; not avariciously, nor yet extravagantly.
Read in contextThe Enchiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · INTRODUCTION
Thus the Enchiridion was liberating for all intellectuals who learned from it that there are philosophical ways of self-redemption. From its time, the secular thinker could feel jubilant because he was not in need of a divine grace. Epictetus had taught him that philosophical reason could make him free and that he was capable of redeeming himself by sound reasoning. In the Stoic distinctions of personality and world, of I and mine, of subjective consciousness and the world of objects, of freedom and dependence, we find implicit the basic elements of modern philosophies of rationalism and of objective idealism or pantheism. For this reason there is a continuous renascence of Stoicism from Descartes, Grotius, and Bishop Butler, to Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Kant. In this long development in modern times, the tiny Enchiridion of Epictetus played a remarkable part.
Read in contextThe Enchiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · INTRODUCTION
The translations of Epictetus and of all other Stoics had the widest effect on philosophers, theologians, and lay thinkers. They were studied by the clergy of the various Christian denominations, by the scientists who were striving for a natural religion, and by the independent philosophers who were eager to separate philosophy from religion. There were many outstanding bishops in the Catholic and Anglican Churches who were eager to transform the traditions of Roman Stoicism into Christian Stoicism. Among the Calvinistic denominations were many thinkers who were in sympathy with Stoic moral principles because of their praise of the austerity of life and of the control of passions. Likewise the adherents of natural religion were propagating Stoicism as the ideal pattern of universally valid and intelligible religion. Renascent Stoicism had three functions in the rise of the modern world. First, it reconciled Christian traditions to modern rationalistic philosophies; secondly, it established an ideal pattern of natural religion; and, thirdly, it opened the way for the autonomy of morals. ALBERT SALOMON The New School for Social Research July, 1948
Read in contextThe Enchiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · INTRODUCTION
Nothing like this is revealed in the Enchiridion. Gone is the Stoic philosopher as living spirit. What remains is the living spirit of Stoicism. The Enchiridion is a manual for the combat officer. This analogy should be taken seriously. The Roman Stoics coined the formula: Vivere militare! (Life is being a soldier.) The student of philosophy is a private, the advancing Stoic is a non-commissioned officer, and the philosopher is the combat officer. For this reason all Roman Stoics apply metaphors and images derived from military life. Apprentice students of Stoicism are described as messengers, as scouts of God, as representatives of divine nature. The advancing student who is close to the goal of being a philosopher has the rank of an officer. He is already able to establish inner freedom and independence. He understands the basic Stoic truth of subjective consciousness, which is to distinguish what is in our power from what is not in our power. Not in our power are all the elements which constitute our environment, such as wealth, health, reputation, social prestige, power, the lives of those we love, and death. In our power are our thinking, our intentions, our desires, our decisions. These make it possible for us to control ourselves and to make of ourselves elements and parts of the universe of nature. This knowledge of ourselves makes us free in a world of dependencies. This superiority of our powers enables us to live in conformity with nature. The rational philosophy of control of Self and of adjustment to the Whole implies an asceticism of the emotional and the sensitive life. The philosopher must examine and control his passions, his love, his tenderness at all times in order always to be ready for the inevitable moment of farewell. The Stoics practiced a Jesuitism avant la lettre. They were able to live in the world as if they did not live in it. To the Stoic, life is a military camp, a play on the stage, a banquet to which we are invited. The Enchiridion briefly indicated the techniques which the philosopher should apply in acting well the diverse roles which God might assign to those whom he loves, the Stoic philosophers. From the rules of social conduct to the recommendations of sexual asceticism before marriage, and the method of true thinking, the advanced Stoic will find all principles of perfection and all precepts for realizing philosophical principles in his conduct in this tiny volume.
Read in contextThe Enchiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · V / VI / VII
Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things. Thus death is nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death, that it is terrible. When, therefore, we are hindered or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others, but to ourselves—that is, to our own views. It is the action of an uninstructed person to reproach others for his own misfortunes; of one entering upon instruction, to reproach himself; and one perfectly instructed, to reproach neither others nor himself. VI Be not elated at any excellence not your own. If a horse should be elated, and say, “I am handsome,” it might be endurable. But when you are elated and say, “I have a handsome horse,” know that you are elated only on the merit of the horse. What then is your own? The use of the phenomena of existence. So that when you are in harmony with nature in this respect, you will be elated with some reason; for you will be elated at some good of your own. VII
Read in context