Pascal's Pensées
Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)
[173] P. 128, l. 7. Wretched is, etc.—M. Faugère thinks this thought is taken from St. Augustine's Commentary on Ps. cxxxvii, Super flumina Babylonis. [174] P. 129, l. 6. Qui gloriatur, etc.—1 Cor. i, 31. [175] P. 130, l. 13. Via, veritas.—John xiv, 6. [176] P. 130, l. 14. Zeno.—The original founder of Stoicism. [177] P. 130, l. 15. Epictetus.—Diss., iv, 6, 7. [178] P. 131, l. 32. A body full of thinking members.—See I Cor. xii. [179] P. 133, l. 5. Book of Wisdom.—ii, 6. [180] P. 134, l. 28. Qui adhæret, etc.—1 Cor. vi, 17. [181] P. 134, l. 36. Two laws.—Matthew xxii, 35-40; Mark xii, 28-31. [182] P. 135, l. 6. The kingdom of God is within us.—Luke xvii, 29. [183] P. 137, l. 1. Et non, etc.—Ps. cxliii, 2. [184] P. 137, l. 3. The goodness of God leadeth to repentance.—Romans ii, 4. [185] P. 137, l. 5. Let us do penance, etc.—See Jonah iii, 8, 9. [186] P. 137, l. 27. I came to send war.—Matthew x, 34. [187] P. 137, l. 28. I came to bring fire and the sword.—Luke xii, 49. [188] P. 138, l. 2. Pharisee and the Publican.—Parable in Luke xviii, 9-14. [189] P. 138, l. 13. Abraham.—Genesis xiv, 22-24. [190] P. 138, l. 17. Sub te erit appetitus tuus.—Genesis iv, 7. [191] P. 140, l. 1. It is, etc.—A discussion on the Eucharist. [192] P. 140, l. 34. Non sum dignus.—Luke vii, 6. [193] P. 140, l. 35. Qui manducat indignus.—I Cor. xi, 29.
[194] P. 140, l. 36. Dignus est accipere.—Apoc. iv, II. [195] P. 141. In the French edition on which this translation is based there was inserted the following fragment after No. 513: "Work out your own salvation with fear." Proofs of prayer. Petenti dabitur. Therefore it is in our power to ask. On the other hand, there is God. So it is not in our power, since the obtaining of (the grace) to pray to Him is not in our power. For since salvation is not in us, and the obtaining of such grace is from Him, prayer is not in our power. The righteous man should then hope no more in God, for he ought not to hope, but to strive to obtain what he wants. Let us conclude then that, since man is now unrighteous since the first sin, and God is unwilling that he should thereby not be estranged from Him, it is only by a first effect that he is not estranged. Therefore, those who depart from God have not this first effect without which they are not estranged from God, and those who do not depart from God have this first effect. Therefore, those whom we have seen possessed for some time of grace by this first effect, cease to pray, for want of this first effect. Then God abandons the first in this sense.
It is doubtful, however that this fragment should be included in the Pensées, and it has seemed best to separate it from the text. It has only once before appeared—in the edition of Michaut (1896). The first half of it has been freely translated in order to give an interpretation in accordance with a suggestion from M. Emile Boutroux, the eminent authority on Pascal. The meaning seems to be this. In one sense it is in our power to ask from God, who promises to give us what we ask. But, in another sense, it is not in our power to ask; for it is not in our power to obtain the grace which is necessary in asking. We know that salvation is not in our power. Therefore some condition of salvation is not in our power. Now the conditions of salvation are two: (1) The asking for it, and (2) the obtaining it. But God promises to give us what we ask. Hence the obtaining is in our power. Therefore the condition which is not in our power must be the first, namely, the asking. Prayer presupposes a grace which it is not within our power to obtain. After giving the utmost consideration to the second half of this obscure fragment, and seeking assistance from some eminent scholars, the translator has been compelled to give a strictly literal translation of it, without attempting to make sense. [196] P. 141, l. 14. Lord, when saw we, etc.—Matthew xxv, 37.
[197] P. 143, l. 19. Qui justus est, justificetur adhuc.—Apoc. xxii, II. [198] P. 144, l. 2. Corneille.—See his Horace, II, iii. [199] P. 144, l. 15. Corrumpunt mores, etc.—I Cor. xv, 33. [200] P. 145. l. 25. Quod curiositate, etc.—St. Augustine, Sermon CXLI. [201] P. 146, l. 34. Quia ... facere.—I Cor. i, 21. [202] P. 148, l. 7. Turbare semetipsum.—John xi, 33. The text is turbavit seipsum. [203] P. 148, l. 25. My soul is sorrowful even unto death.—Mark xiv, 34. [204] P. 149, l. 3. Eamus. Processit.—John xviii, 4. But eamus does not occur. See, however, Matthew xxvi, 46. [205] P. 150, l. 36. Eritis sicut, etc.—Genesis iv, 5. [206] P. 151, l. 2. Noli me tangere.—John xx, 17. [207] P. 156, l. 14. Vere discipuli, etc.—Allusions to John viii, 31, i, 47; viii, 36; vi, 32. [208] P. 158, l. 41. Signa legem in electis meis.—Is. viii, 16. The text of the Vulgate is in discipulis meis. [209] P. 159, l. 2. Hosea.—xiv, 9. [210] P. 159, l. 13. Saint John.—xii, 39. [211] P. 160, l. 17. Tamar.—Genesis xxxviii, 24-30. [212] P. 160, l. 17. Ruth.—Ruth iv, 17-22. [213] P. 163, l. 13. History of China.—A History of China in Latin had been published in 1658. [214] P. 164, l. I. The five suns, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 6. [215] P. 164, l. 9. Jesus Christ.—John v, 31. [216] P. 164, l. 17. The Koran says, etc.—There is no mention of Saint Matthew in the Koran; but it speaks of the Apostles generally.
[217] P. 165, l. 35. Moses.—Deut. xxxi, 11. [218] P. 166, l. 23. Carnal Christians.—Jesuits and Molinists. [219] P. 170, l. 14. Whom he welcomed from afar.—John viii, 56. [220] P. 170, l. 19. Salutare, etc.—Genesis xdix, 18. [221] P. 173, l. 33. The Twelve Tables at Athens.—There were no such tables. About 450 B.C. a commission is said to have been appointed in Rome to visit Greece and collect information to frame a code of law. This is now doubted, if not entirely discredited. [222] P. 173, l. 35. Josephus.—Reply to Apion, ii, 16. Josephus, the Jewish historian, gained the favour of Titus, and accompanied him to the siege of Jerusalem. He defended the Jews against a contemporary grammarian, named Apion, who had written a violent satire on the Jews. [223] P. 174, l. 27. Against Apion.—ii, 39. See preceding note. [224] P. 174, l. 28. Philo.—A Jewish philosopher, who lived in the first century of the Christian era. He was one of the founders of the Alexandrian school of thought. He sought to reconcile Jewish tradition with Greek thought. [225] P. 175, l. 20. Prefers the younger.—See No. 710.
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK V
[14] I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he put them where they made the best sense. [15] This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend to be able to get it out of the words. [16] This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and another against the office. [17] χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.
Read in contextEthics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 3
I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop. xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection or change.
Read in contextFundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: "Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?" Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: "How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?" Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
Read in contextEmile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · OF TRAVEL
Again, we shall inquire whether we are bound by our conscience to give our purse to a highwayman when we might conceal it from him, for the pistol in his hand is also a power. Does this word power in this context mean something different from a power which is lawful and therefore subject to the laws to which it owes its being? Suppose we reject this theory that might is right and admit the right of nature, or the authority of the father, as the foundation of society; we shall inquire into the extent of this authority; what is its foundation in nature? Has it any other grounds but that of its usefulness to the child, his weakness, and the natural love which his father feels towards him? When the child is no longer feeble, when he is grown-up in mind as well as in body, does not he become the sole judge of what is necessary for his preservation? Is he not therefore his own master, independent of all men, even of his father himself? For is it not still more certain that the son loves himself, than that the father loves the son?
Read in contextEthics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 2
We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point. Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · What Each Of Them Contributes Thereunto
Seeing then it is Necessary that Faith, and Obedience (implyed in the word Repentance) do both concurre to our Salvation; the question by which of the two we are Justified, is impertinently disputed. Neverthelesse, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be Justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by Righteousnesse be understood the Justice of the Works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the Law of God. And therefore when wee are said to be Justified by Works, it is to be understood of the Will, which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it selfe, as well in good, as in evill men. And in this sense onely it is, that a man is called Just, or Unjust; and that his Justice Justifies him, that is, gives him the title, in Gods acceptation, of Just; and renders him capable of Living By His Faith, which before he was not. So that Justice Justifies in that that sense, in which to Justifie, is the same that to Denominate A Man Just; and not in the signification of discharging the Law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust.
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