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Pascal's Pensées

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)

[149] P. 100, l. 25. They win battles.—Montaigne, in his Essais, ii, 12, relates that the Portuguese were compelled to raise the siege of Tamly on account of the number of flies. [150] P. 100, l. 27. When it is said, etc.—By Descartes. [151] P. 102, l. 20. Arcesilaus.—A follower of Pyrrho, the sceptic. He lived in the third century before Christ. [152] P. 105, l. 20. Ecclesiastes.—Eccles. viii, 17. [153] P. 106, l. 16. The academicians.—Dogmatic sceptics, as opposed to sceptics who doubt their own doubt. [154] P. 107, l. 10. Ego vir videns.—Lamentations iii, I. [155] P. 108, l. 26. Evil is easy, etc.—The Pythagoreans considered the good as certain and finite, and evil as uncertain and infinite. Montaigne, Essais, i, 9. [156] P. 109, l. 7. Paulus Æmilius.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 19. Cicero, Tusc., v, 40. [157] P. 109, l. 30. Des Barreaux.—Author of a licentious love song. He was born in 1602, and died in 1673. Balzac call him "the new Bacchus." [158] P. 110, l. 16. For Port-Royal.—The letters, A. P. R., occur in several places, and are generally thought to indicate what will be afterwards treated in lectures or conferences at Port-Royal, the famous Cistercian abbey, situated about eighteen miles from Paris. Founded early in the thirteenth century, it acquired its greatest fame in its closing years. Louis XIV was induced to believe it heretical; and the monastery was finally demolished in 1711. Its downfall was no doubt brought about by the Jesuits.

[159] P. 113, l. 4. They all tend to this end.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 19. [160] P. 119, l. 15. Quod ergo, etc.—Acts xvii, 23. [161] P. 119, l. 26. Wicked demon.—Descartes had suggested the possibility of the existence of an evil genius to justify his method of universal doubt. See his First Meditation. The argument is quite Cartesian. [162] P. 122, l. 18. Deliciæ meæ, etc.—Proverbs viii, 31. [163] P. 122, l. 18. Effundam spiritum, etc.—Is. xliv, 3; Joel ii, 28. [164] P. 122, l. 19. Dii estis.—Ps. lxxxii, 6. [165] P. 122, l. 20. Omnis caro fænum.—Is. xl, 6. [166] P. 122, l. 20. Homo assimilatus, etc.—Ps. xlix, 20. [167] P. 124, l. 24. Sapientius est hominibus.—1 Cor. i, 25. [168] P. 125, l. 1. Of original sin.—The citations from the Rabbis in this fragment are borrowed from a work of the Middle Ages, entitled Pugio christianorum ad impiorum perfidiam jugulandam et maxime judæorum. It was written in the thirteenth century by Raymond Martin, a Catalonian monk. An edition of it appeared in 1651, edited by Bosquet, Bishop of Lodève. [169] P. 125, l. 24. Better is a poor and wise child, etc.—Eccles. iv, 13. [170] P. 126, l. 17. Nemo ante, etc.—See Ovid, Met., iii, 137, and Montaigne, Essais, i, 18. [171] P. 127, l. 10. Figmentum.—Borrowed from the Vulgate, Ps. ciii, 14. [172] P. 128. l. 5. All that is in the world, etc.—First Epistle of St. John, ii, 16.

[173] P. 128, l. 7. Wretched is, etc.—M. Faugère thinks this thought is taken from St. Augustine's Commentary on Ps. cxxxvii, Super flumina Babylonis. [174] P. 129, l. 6. Qui gloriatur, etc.—1 Cor. i, 31. [175] P. 130, l. 13. Via, veritas.—John xiv, 6. [176] P. 130, l. 14. Zeno.—The original founder of Stoicism. [177] P. 130, l. 15. Epictetus.—Diss., iv, 6, 7. [178] P. 131, l. 32. A body full of thinking members.—See I Cor. xii. [179] P. 133, l. 5. Book of Wisdom.—ii, 6. [180] P. 134, l. 28. Qui adhæret, etc.—1 Cor. vi, 17. [181] P. 134, l. 36. Two laws.—Matthew xxii, 35-40; Mark xii, 28-31. [182] P. 135, l. 6. The kingdom of God is within us.—Luke xvii, 29. [183] P. 137, l. 1. Et non, etc.—Ps. cxliii, 2. [184] P. 137, l. 3. The goodness of God leadeth to repentance.—Romans ii, 4. [185] P. 137, l. 5. Let us do penance, etc.—See Jonah iii, 8, 9. [186] P. 137, l. 27. I came to send war.—Matthew x, 34. [187] P. 137, l. 28. I came to bring fire and the sword.—Luke xii, 49. [188] P. 138, l. 2. Pharisee and the Publican.—Parable in Luke xviii, 9-14. [189] P. 138, l. 13. Abraham.—Genesis xiv, 22-24. [190] P. 138, l. 17. Sub te erit appetitus tuus.—Genesis iv, 7. [191] P. 140, l. 1. It is, etc.—A discussion on the Eucharist. [192] P. 140, l. 34. Non sum dignus.—Luke vii, 6. [193] P. 140, l. 35. Qui manducat indignus.—I Cor. xi, 29.

[194] P. 140, l. 36. Dignus est accipere.—Apoc. iv, II. [195] P. 141. In the French edition on which this translation is based there was inserted the following fragment after No. 513: "Work out your own salvation with fear." Proofs of prayer. Petenti dabitur. Therefore it is in our power to ask. On the other hand, there is God. So it is not in our power, since the obtaining of (the grace) to pray to Him is not in our power. For since salvation is not in us, and the obtaining of such grace is from Him, prayer is not in our power. The righteous man should then hope no more in God, for he ought not to hope, but to strive to obtain what he wants. Let us conclude then that, since man is now unrighteous since the first sin, and God is unwilling that he should thereby not be estranged from Him, it is only by a first effect that he is not estranged. Therefore, those who depart from God have not this first effect without which they are not estranged from God, and those who do not depart from God have this first effect. Therefore, those whom we have seen possessed for some time of grace by this first effect, cease to pray, for want of this first effect. Then God abandons the first in this sense.

It is doubtful, however that this fragment should be included in the Pensées, and it has seemed best to separate it from the text. It has only once before appeared—in the edition of Michaut (1896). The first half of it has been freely translated in order to give an interpretation in accordance with a suggestion from M. Emile Boutroux, the eminent authority on Pascal. The meaning seems to be this. In one sense it is in our power to ask from God, who promises to give us what we ask. But, in another sense, it is not in our power to ask; for it is not in our power to obtain the grace which is necessary in asking. We know that salvation is not in our power. Therefore some condition of salvation is not in our power. Now the conditions of salvation are two: (1) The asking for it, and (2) the obtaining it. But God promises to give us what we ask. Hence the obtaining is in our power. Therefore the condition which is not in our power must be the first, namely, the asking. Prayer presupposes a grace which it is not within our power to obtain. After giving the utmost consideration to the second half of this obscure fragment, and seeking assistance from some eminent scholars, the translator has been compelled to give a strictly literal translation of it, without attempting to make sense. [196] P. 141, l. 14. Lord, when saw we, etc.—Matthew xxv, 37.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • The Republic · Plato (-428–-348) · BOOK II

    Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him. That appears to me to be most true, he said. Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots, and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good; but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth. And again Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us. And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.

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  • The Subjection of Women · John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) · CHAPTER I.

    The Stoics were, I believe, the first (except so far as the Jewish law constitutes an exception) who taught as a part of morality that men were bound by moral obligations to their slaves. No one, after Christianity became ascendant, could ever again have been a stranger to this belief, in theory; nor, after the rise of the Catholic Church, was it ever without persons to stand up for it. Yet to enforce it was the most arduous task which Christianity ever had to perform. For more than a thousand years the Church kept up the contest, with hardly any perceptible success. It was not for want of power over men's minds. Its power was prodigious. It could make kings and nobles resign their most valued possessions to enrich the Church. It could make thousands, in the prime of life and the height of worldly advantages, shut themselves up in convents to work out their salvation by poverty, fasting, and prayer. It could send hundreds of thousands across land and sea, Europe and Asia, to give their lives for the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre. It could make kings relinquish wives who were the object of their passionate attachment, because the Church declared that they were within the seventh (by our calculation the fourteenth) degree of relationship. All this it did; but it could not make men fight less with one another, nor tyrannize less cruelly over the serfs, and when they were able, over burgesses.

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  • A Vindication of the Rights of Woman With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects · Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) · Section 2

    Such, indeed, has been the wretchedness that has flowed from hereditary honours, riches, and monarchy, that men of lively sensibility have almost uttered blasphemy in order to justify the dispensations of providence. Man has been held out as independent of his power who made him, or as a lawless planet darting from its orbit to steal the celestial fire of reason; and the vengeance of heaven, lurking in the subtile flame, sufficiently punished his temerity, by introducing evil into the world. Impressed by this view of the misery and disorder which pervaded society, and fatigued with jostling against artificial fools, Rousseau became enamoured of solitude, and, being at the same time an optimist, he labours with uncommon eloquence to prove that man was naturally a solitary animal. Misled by his respect for the goodness of God, who certainly for what man of sense and feeling can doubt it! gave life only to communicate happiness, he considers evil as positive, and the work of man; not aware that he was exalting one attribute at the expense of another, equally necessary to divine perfection. Reared on a false hypothesis, his arguments in favour of a state of nature are plausible, but unsound. I say unsound; for to assert that a state of nature is preferable to civilization in all its possible perfection, is, in other words, to arraign supreme wisdom; and the paradoxical exclamation, that God has made all things right, and that evil has been introduced by the creature whom he formed, knowing what he formed, is as unphilosophical as impious.

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  • Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XXVI——THAT IT IS FOLLY TO MEASURE TRUTH AND ERROR BY OUR OWN CAPACITY

    I presently pitied the poor people that were abused by these follies. Whereas I now find, that I myself was to be pitied as much, at least, as they; not that experience has taught me anything to alter my former opinions, though my curiosity has endeavoured that way; but reason has instructed me, that thus resolutely to condemn anything for false and impossible, is arrogantly and impiously to circumscribe and limit the will of God, and the power of our mother nature, within the bounds of my own capacity, than which no folly can be greater. If we give the names of monster and miracle to everything our reason cannot comprehend, how many are continually presented before our eyes? Let us but consider through what clouds, and as it were groping in the dark, our teachers lead us to the knowledge of most of the things about us; assuredly we shall find that it is rather custom than knowledge that takes away their strangeness— “Jam nemo, fessus saturusque videndi, Suspicere in coeli dignatur lucida templa;” [“Weary of the sight, now no one deigns to look up to heaven’s lucid temples.”—Lucretius, ii. 1037. The text has ‘statiate videnai’] and that if those things were now newly presented to us, we should think them as incredible, if not more, than any others. “Si nunc primum mortalibus adsint Ex improviso, si sint objecta repente, Nil magis his rebus poterat mirabile dici, Aute minus ante quod auderent fore credere gentes.” [Lucretius, ii. 1032. The sense of the passage is in the preceding sentence.]

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  • Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · LVI. OLD AND NEW TABLES.

    Life is a well of delight, but to him in whom the ruined stomach speaketh, the father of affliction, all fountains are poisoned. To discern: that is DELIGHT to the lion-willed! But he who hath become weary, is himself merely “willed”; with him play all the waves. And such is always the nature of weak men: they lose themselves on their way. And at last asketh their weariness: “Why did we ever go on the way? All is indifferent!” TO THEM soundeth it pleasant to have preached in their ears: “Nothing is worth while! Ye shall not will!” That, however, is a sermon for slavery. O my brethren, a fresh blustering wind cometh Zarathustra unto all way-weary ones; many noses will he yet make sneeze! Even through walls bloweth my free breath, and in into prisons and imprisoned spirits! Willing emancipateth: for willing is creating: so do I teach. And ONLY for creating shall ye learn! And also the learning shall ye LEARN only from me, the learning well!—He who hath ears let him hear! 17. There standeth the boat—thither goeth it over, perhaps into vast nothingness—but who willeth to enter into this “Perhaps”? None of you want to enter into the death-boat! How should ye then be WORLD-WEARY ones! World-weary ones! And have not even withdrawn from the earth! Eager did I ever find you for the earth, amorous still of your own earth-weariness!

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  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER XIV. IT IS ACCORDING TO THE TRUE OR FALSE ESTIMATE OF THINGS THAT WE ARE HAPPY OR MISERABLE.

    The Stoics hold, that all those torments that commonly draw from us groans and ejaculations, are in themselves trivial and contemptible. But these high-flown expressions apart (how true soever) let us discourse the point at the rate of ordinary men, and not make ourselves miserable before our time; for the things we apprehend to be at hand may possibly never come to pass. Some things trouble us more than they should, other things sooner; and some things again disorder us that ought not to trouble us at all; so that we either enlarge, or create, or anticipate our disquiets. For the first part, let it rest as a matter in controversy; for that which I account light, another perhaps will judge insupportable! One man laughs under the lash, and another whines for a fillip. How sad a calamity is poverty to one man, which to another appears rather desirable than inconvenient? For the poor man, who has nothing to lose, has nothing to fear: and he that would enjoy himself to the satisfaction of his soul, must be either poor indeed, or at least look as if he were so. Some people are extremely dejected with sickness and pain; whereas Epicurus blessed his fate with his last breath, in the acutest torments of the stone imaginable. And so for banishment, which to one man is so grievous, and yet to another is no more than a bare change of place: a thing that we do every day for our health, pleasure, nay, and upon the account even of common business.

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