Skip to content
BookLens

The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle

Aristotle (-384–-322)

Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2): Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo Discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentes Verum hic impransi mecum disquirite Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it is red,” etc. [8] As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes Metaphysics. [9] [Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word (Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it. [10] The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas]. [11] Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I chap v sect. iv. [12] That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue. [13] See the letter of Sabina Rentfree. Spectator, 431. [14] Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. [15] The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined. Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure, Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*] Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust, Actions of Lust are more unjust

[*] [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note. [16] [Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker, because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side. I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek: malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not [Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain. The [Greek: akolastos] deliberately pursues pleasure and declines pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite properly. Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be fitly given respectively.

[17] “If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish” Sewell, Sermons to Young Men (Sermon xii.) [18] Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and note on page 128. [19] Let a man be punctual on principle to any one engagement in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance of being needlessly punctilious in trifles. [20] Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle. See Bishop Butler’s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of note on p. 129.

[1] “Owe no man anything, but to love one another for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law.” Romans XIII. 8. [2] [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton]. [3] In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she “two stone bottles found, To hold the liquor that she loved, And keep it safe and sound.” [4] Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s. [5] The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he bestows, but the Good man can feel Friendship only for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other. [6] See note on page 68, 1. 8. [7] See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton]. [8] “For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.” [9] Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.

[1] “Neither the Son of man, that He should repent.” Numbers xxiii. 19. “In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.” Whately, Logic, iii. 10. [2] “I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to Virtue.” (Fuller’s Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix’t Contemplations, viii.)

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter VII.

    Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts unjustly or dissolutely does not wish to attain the habits of these vices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he must become unjust he is to all intents and purposes unjust voluntarily; but he cannot with a wish cease to be unjust and become just. For, to take the analogous case, the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a supposable case he is voluntarily ill because he has produced his sickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There was a time then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let himself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone out of his hand cannot recall it,[14] and yet it rested with him to aim and throw it, because the origination was in his power. Just so the unjust man, and he who has lost all self-control, might originally have helped being what they are, and so they are voluntarily what they are; but now that they are become so they no longer have the power of being otherwise.

    Read in context
  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI

    [9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place. Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous]. But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.

    Read in context
  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter VI.

    Again, no man feels pain in being insolent, but every one who acts through Anger does act with pain; and he who acts insolently does it with pleasure. If then those things are most unjust with which we have most right to be angry, then Imperfect Self-Control, arising from Lust, is more so than that arising from Anger: because in Anger there is no insolence.[15] Well then, it is clear that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Lusts is more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and that the object-matter of Self-Control, and the Imperfection of it, are bodily Lusts and pleasures; but of these last we must take into account the differences; for, as was said at the commencement, some are proper to the human race and natural both in kind and degree, others Brutish, and others caused by maimings and diseases. Now the first of these only are the object-matter of Perfected Self-Mastery and utter absence of Self-Control; and therefore we never attribute either of these states to Brutes (except metaphorically, and whenever any one kind of animal differs entirely from another in insolence, mischievousness, or voracity), because they have not moral choice or process of deliberation, but are quite different from that kind of creature just as are madmen from other men. Brutishness is not so low in the scale as Vice, yet it is to be regarded with more fear: because it is not that the highest principle has been corrupted, as in the human creature, but the subject has it not at all.

    Read in context
  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter IX.

    Still, perhaps, after all it is a matter of difficulty, and specially in the particular instances: it is not easy, for instance, to determine exactly in what manner, with what persons, for what causes, and for what length of time, one ought to feel anger: for we ourselves sometimes praise those who are defective in this feeling, and we call them meek; at another, we term the hot-tempered manly and spirited. Then, again, he who makes a small deflection from what is right, be it on the side of too much or too little, is not blamed, only he who makes a considerable one; for he cannot escape observation. But to what point or degree a man must err in order to incur blame, it is not easy to determine exactly in words: nor in fact any of those points which are matter of perception by the Moral Sense: such questions are matters of detail, and the decision of them rests with the Moral Sense.[24] At all events thus much is plain, that the mean state is in all things praiseworthy, and that practically we must deflect sometimes towards excess sometimes towards defect, because this will be the easiest method of hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.

    Read in context
  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter II.

    The following considerations may also serve to set this in a clear light. There are principally three things moving us to choice and three to avoidance, the honourable, the expedient, the pleasant; and their three contraries, the dishonourable, the hurtful, and the painful: now the good man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respect to all these of course, but most specially with respect to pleasure: because not only is this common to him with all animals but also it is a concomitant of all those things which move to choice, since both the honourable and the expedient give an impression of pleasure. Again, it grows up with us all from infancy, and so it is a hard matter to remove from ourselves this feeling, engrained as it is into our very life.

    Read in context
  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter XIV.

    From this very same mistake they suppose also, that acting Unjustly is equally in the power of the Just man, for the Just man no less, nay even more, than the Unjust, may be able to do the particular acts; he may be able to have intercourse with a woman or strike a man; or the brave man to throw away his shield and turn his back and run this way or that. True: but then it is not the mere doing these things which constitutes acts of cowardice or injustice (except accidentally), but the doing them with certain inward dispositions: just as it is not the mere using or not using the knife, administering or not administering certain drugs, which constitutes medical treatment or curing, but doing these things in a certain particular way. Again the abstract principles of Justice have their province among those who partake of what is abstractedly good, and can have too much or too little of these.[28] Now there are beings who cannot have too much of them, as perhaps the gods; there are others, again, to whom no particle of them is of use, those who are incurably wicked to whom all things are hurtful; others to whom they are useful to a certain degree: for this reason then the province of Justice is among Men.

    Read in context