The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Aristotle (-384–-322)
[6] That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly. The question at issue always is, Is this Good? because the Will is only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always Aye or No, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and retracted in the later. So far as what must take place in every Moral Action, right or wrong, the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a good Moral Choice, i e.. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it ought. The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor. [7] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30. [8] The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, i.e. the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.
[9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place. Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous]. But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.
[10] The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to act ([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to make ([Greek: techne]). Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]), Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.) [11] It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
[12] Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (i.e. proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich’s instance. All Magnets attract iron A B C are Magnets A B C attract iron. Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal. A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment) All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive faculty) All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.) Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C attract iron. But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.
Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in the same place that for this reason we must conceive ([Greek: noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of all the Individuals. If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity depends entirely upon the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss literally false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction as the term is used by Aristotle, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
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The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI
[43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous], i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each. [44] i.e. of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton]. [45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e. by [Greek: ethismos]). All that is pleasant is to be done, This is pleasant, This is to be done By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, i.e. on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · NOTES / BOOK I
[5] The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima aplos] I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as denoting respectively what is and what may be known. All truth is [Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek: gnorima aemin] which we have received as true. From this appears immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he should ask. But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect. 10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin] Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage, which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition” The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai] occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter II.
And here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from principles, and reasoning to principles:[4] for with good cause did Plato too doubt about this, and enquire whether the right road is from principles or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the judges to the further end, or vice versâ. Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two kinds, what we do know, and what we may know:[5] perhaps then as individuals we must begin with what we do know. Hence the necessity that he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice and moral philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact, and if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in addition of the reason for the fact. And he that has been thus trained either has principles already, or can receive them easily: as for him who neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from Hesiod: He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things; Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion; But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from another Layeth it to heart;—he is a useless man.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK III
[12] These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means literally “a grasping at or after” now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae]. The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI
[46] The consequentia is this: There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and therefore, etc. [47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10, { [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai] { [Greek: to de phylaktikon], { [Greek: to de sæmantikon]. Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon]. [48] Healthiness is the formal cause of health. Medicine is the efficient cause of health. See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein]. [49] [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom. [50] This is another case of an observation being thrown in obiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand. [51] See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii. [52] The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism. [53] See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30. [54] And for the Minor, of course, “This particular action is———.”
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK VI
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.) [55] “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici. [56] The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues. [57] Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs]. [58] It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it.
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