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The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle

Aristotle (-384–-322)

[17] We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by Horace’s use of the term hiatus: “Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?” Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning hiatus; the transference to the present subject is easy. [18] In like manner we talk of laudable ambition, implying of course there may be that which is not laudable. [19] An expression of Bishop Butler’s, which corresponds exactly to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric. [20] That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15. [21] “[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on the Phaedo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then: preparations for the second cautiously,” and he then alludes to this passage. [22] That is, you must allow for the recoil. “Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.”

[23] This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully. The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity. This exactly represents Aristotle’s relation to Pleasure he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had “banished all the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself, he “feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall.” [24] Αἴσθησις is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a “nasty job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”

[1] A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because “particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed, he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the chapter on Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third chapter of this Book. [2] Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in Bishop Butler’s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon II.)

[3] Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of i.e. incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have been depraved, i.e. shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of Self-love to be impaired. [4] [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are [Greek: eneka] that result. From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce, these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, but designed causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or final cause. It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of a man’s being ignorant of his own Motive of action. When the man “drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel between the joints of the harnesss” (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek: eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of [Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King’s death was in fact the result, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.

[5] Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate anger, “It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil.” See the whole Sermon on Resentment. [6] Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, “What man is he that lusteth to live?” [7] The meaning is, that the onus probandi is thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a prima facie case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be a mere petitio principii. I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s reading seems to restrict them to the last argument. [8] i.e. on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character, opinions are in general signs of character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice. “Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason? When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER III. NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES

    7. Men’s actions convince us, that the Rule of Virtue is not their internal Principle. For, if we will not in civility allow too much sincerity to the professions of most men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts, we shall find that they have no such internal veneration for these rules, nor so full a persuasion of their certainty and obligation. The great principle of morality, ‘To do as one would be done to,’ is more commended than practised. But the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice, than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madness, and contrary to that interest men sacrifice to, when they break it themselves. Perhaps CONSCIENCE will be urged as checking us for such breaches, and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preserved. 8. Conscience no Proof of any innate Moral Rule.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES

    The same truth may be proved still more evidently by that reasoning, which proved justice in general to be an artificial virtue. No action can be required of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the action. This motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation: And where an action is not required by any natural passion, it cannot be required by any natural obligation; since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. Now it is evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never should feel any inclination to observe them. This is not the case with the natural virtues. Though there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of humanity. A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: But he has also a natural inclination to it. And if no human creature had that inclination, no one could lie under any such obligation. But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of their obligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions.

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  • Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

    If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of our practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have treated it as an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to the experience of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves allow, just complaints that one cannot find a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty. Although many things are done in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty, so as to have a moral worth. Hence there have at all times been philosophers who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at all in human actions, and have ascribed everything to a more or less refined self-love. Not that they have on that account questioned the soundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary, they spoke with sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature, which, though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of respect, is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to give it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations, whether singly or at the best in the greatest possible harmony with one another.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE / SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE?

    Besides, we must consider, that the chief reason, why men attach themselves so much to their possessions is, that they consider them as their property, and as secured to them inviolably by the laws of society. But this is a secondary consideration, and dependent on the preceding notions of justice and property. A man's property is supposed to be fenced against every mortal, in every possible case. But private benevolence is, and ought to be, weaker in some persons, than in others: And in many, or indeed in most persons, must absolutely fail. Private benevolence, therefore, is not the original motive of justice. From all this it follows, that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has established a sophistry, and rendered it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though necessarily from education, and human conventions.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. IV OF NATURAL ABILITIES

    But though this distinction betwixt voluntary and involuntary be not sufficient to justify the distinction betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues, yet the former distinction will afford us a plausible reason, why moralists have invented the latter. Men have observed, that though natural abilities and moral qualities be in the main on the same footing, there is, however, this difference betwixt them, that the former are almost invariable by any art or industry; while the latter, or at least, the actions, that proceed from them, may be changed by the motives of rewards and punishments, praise and blame. Hence legislators, and divines, and moralists, have principally applied themselves to the regulating these voluntary actions, and have endeavoured to produce additional motives, for being virtuous in that particular. They knew, that to punish a man for folly, or exhort him to be prudent and sagacious, would have but little effect; though the same punishments and exhortations, with regard to justice and injustice, might have a considerable influence. But as men, in common life and conversation, do not carry those ends in view, but naturally praise or blame whatever pleases or displeases them, they do not seem much to regard this distinction, but consider prudence under the character of virtue as well as benevolence, and penetration as well as justice. Nay, we find, that all moralists, whose judgment is not perverted by a strict adherence to a system, enter into the same way of thinking; and that the antient moralists in particular made no scruple of placing prudence at the head of the cardinal virtues. There is a sentiment of esteem and approbation, which may be excited, in some degree, by any faculty of the mind, in its perfect state and condition; and to account for this sentiment is the business of Philosophers. It belongs to Grammarians to examine what qualities are entitled to the denomination of virtue; nor will they find, upon trial, that this is so easy a task, as at first sight they may be apt to imagine.

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  • Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

    With the view of attaining to this, it is of extreme importance to remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all), and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced from the particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain feelings and propensions, nay, even, if possible, from any particular tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily hold for the will of every rational being; this may indeed supply us with a maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective principle on which we may have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an objective principle on which we should be enjoined to act, even though all our propensions, inclinations, and natural dispositions were opposed to it. In fact, the sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the more evident, the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the law or to diminish its validity.

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