The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Aristotle (-384–-322)
But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and complete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving except in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the sensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a kind of “whole.” From these considerations then it is plain that people are not warranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation: because these terms are not applicable to all things, only to such as are divisible and not “wholes:” I mean that of an act of Sight there is no Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one of these a Movement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there Movement or Generation, because it is, as one may say, “a whole.”[11]
Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about saying “the Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the Faculty resides”), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And this will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is attendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range. And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in the same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good; just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a healthy state. And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.
Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an inherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people at their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or sensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which discerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working: because when that which has the capacity of being acted on and that which is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same result follows naturally. How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that he wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting exertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because that follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which please when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the same reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these Objects with its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing stedfastly at anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the kind it was at first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No wonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects Life, which is itself choice-worthy. (We will take leave to omit the question whether we choose Life for Pleasure’s sake of Pleasure for Life’s sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit not of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working, and again, every Working Pleasure perfects.) And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind, because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected by things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions of Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues, and houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts of Working which are different in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from those of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do the Pleasures which perfect them.
This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between each Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the Pleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who work with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a greater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians who take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points more completely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or architecture, or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit, because they feel Pleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others specifically different are themselves also specifically different. Yet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the Pleasures arising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for instance, people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their attention to conversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a flute; because they take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the Working they are at the time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure attendant on flute-playing destroys the Working of conversation or discourse.
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Book VII. Chapters 12 to 15. (Bekker.)
Next, since Good may be either an active working or a state, those [κινήσεις or γενέσεις] which tend to place us in our natural state are pleasant incidentally because of that tendency: but the active working is really in the desires excited in the remaining (sound) part of our state or nature: for there are Pleasures which have no connection with pain or desire: the acts of contemplative intellect, for instance, in which case there is no deficiency in the nature or state of him who performs the acts. A proof of this is that the same pleasant thing does not produce the sensation of Pleasure when the natural state is being filled up or completed as when it is already in its normal condition: in this latter case what give the sensation are things pleasant per se, in the former even those things which are contrary. I mean, you find people taking pleasure in sharp or bitter things of which no one is naturally or in itself pleasant; of course not therefore the Pleasures arising from them, because it is obvious that as is the classification of pleasant things such must be that of the Pleasures arising from them.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter IV.
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No wonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects Life, which is itself choice-worthy. (We will take leave to omit the question whether we choose Life for Pleasure’s sake of Pleasure for Life’s sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit not of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working, and again, every Working Pleasure perfects.) And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind, because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected by things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions of Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues, and houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts of Working which are different in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from those of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do the Pleasures which perfect them.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Book VII. Chapters 12 to 15. (Bekker.)
Perhaps it even follows, since each state may have active working unimpeded, whether the active workings of all be Happiness or that of some one of them, that this active working, if it be unimpeded, must be choice-worthy: now Pleasure is exactly this. So that the Chief Good may be Pleasure of some kind, though most Pleasures be (let us assume) low per se. And for this reason all men think the happy life is pleasant, and interweave Pleasure with Happiness. Reasonably enough: because Happiness is perfect, but no impeded active working is perfect; and therefore the happy man needs as an addition the goods of the body and the goods external and fortune that in these points he may not be fettered. As for those who say that he who is being tortured on the wheel, or falls into great misfortunes is happy provided only he be good, they talk nonsense, whether they mean to do so or not. On the other hand, because fortune is needed as an addition, some hold good fortune to be identical with Happiness: which it is not, for even this in excess is a hindrance, and perhaps then has no right to be called good fortune since it is good only in so far as it contributes to Happiness. The fact that all animals, brute and human alike, pursue Pleasure, is some presumption of its being in a sense the Chief Good;
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter IV.
Since then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to the Workings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, while those Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain there is a wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to any Working have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it,[12] which, in fact, destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikes writing, or another calculation, the one does not write, the other does not calculate; because, in each case, the Working is attended with some Pain: so then contrary effects are produced upon the Workings by the Pleasures and Pains proper to them, by which I mean those which arise upon the Working, in itself, independently of any other circumstances. As for the Pleasures foreign to a Working, we have said already that they produce a similar effect to the Pain proper to it; that is they destroy the Working, only not in like way. Well then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness, some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in their nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its own proper Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a good Working is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires for what is noble are praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter VII.
Again, pleasure is derived from the actual working out of a present action, from the anticipation of a future one, and from the recollection of a past one: but the highest pleasure and special object of affection is that which attends on the actual working. Now the benefactor’s work abides (for the honourable is enduring), but the advantage of him who has received the kindness passes away. Again, there is pleasure in recollecting honourable actions, but in recollecting advantageous ones there is none at all or much less (by the way though, the contrary is true of the expectation of advantage). Further, the entertaining the feeling of Friendship is like acting on another; but being the object of the feeling is like being acted upon. So then, entertaining the sentiment of Friendship, and all feelings connected with it, attend on those who, in the given case of a benefaction, are the superior party. Once more: all people value most what has cost them much labour in the production; for instance, people who have themselves made their money are fonder of it than those who have inherited it: and receiving kindness is, it seems, unlaborious, but doing it is laborious. And this is the reason why the female parents are most fond of their offspring; for their part in producing them is attended with most labour, and they know more certainly that they are theirs. This feeling would seem also to belong to benefactors.
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter IV.
Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about saying “the Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the Faculty resides”), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And this will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is attendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range. And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in the same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good; just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a healthy state. And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.
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