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Politics: A Treatise on Government

Aristotle (-384–-322)

to be procured, 186 Euripides quoted, 72 Family government, of what it consists, 5 Father should not be too young, 232 Females and slaves, wherein they differ, 2; why upon a level amongst barbarians, 3 Forfeitures, how to be applied, 192 Fortune improper pretension for power, 91 Freemen in general, what power they ought to have, 86 Free state treated of, 121; how it arises out of a democracy and oligarchy, 122, 123 Friendship weakened by a community of children, 31 General, the office of, how to be disposed of, 98 Gods, why supposed subject to kingly government, 3 Good, relative to man, how divided, 201 Good and evil, the perception of, necessary to form a family and a city, 4 Good fortune something different from happiness, 202 Government should continue as much as possible in the same hands, 28; in what manner it should be in rotation, 28; what, 66; which best, of a good man or good laws, 98; good, to what it should owe its preservation, 124; what the best, 225 Government of the master over the slave sometimes reciprocally useful, ii Governments, how different from each other, 67; whether more than one form should be established, 76; should endeavour to prevent others from being too powerful— instances of it, 93; how compared to music, in; in general, to what they owe their preservation, 160 Governments, political, regal, family, and servile, their difference from each other, i Governors and governed, whether their virtues are the same or different, 23; whether they should be the same persons or

different, 227 Grecians, their superiority over other people, 213 Guards of a king natives, 96,168; of a tyrant foreigners, 96, 168 Gymnastic exercises, when to be performed, 223; how far they should be made a part of education, 242, 243 Happiness, wherein it consists, 207 Happy life, where most likely to be found, 202 Harmony, whether all kinds of it are to be used in education, 251 Helots troublesome to the Lacedaemonians, 87 Herdsmen compose the second-best democracy, 189 Hippodamus, an account of, 46; his plan of government, 46, 47: objected to, 47, 48 Homer quoted, 95, 116 Honours, an inequality of, occasions seditions, 44 Horse most suitable to an oligarchy, 195 Houses, private, their best form, 221 Human flesh devoured by some nations, 242 Husbandmen compose the best democracy, 189; will choose to govern according to law, 118 Husbandry, art of, whether part of money-getting, 13 Instruments, their difference from each other, 6; wherein they differ from possessions, 6 Italy, its ancient boundary, 218 Jason's declaration, 72 Judge should not act as an arbitrator, 48, 49; which is best for an individual, or the people in general, 98, 99 Judges, many better than one, 102; of whom to consist, 102; how many different sorts are necessary, 141 Judicial part of government, how to be divided, 140 Jurymen, particular powers sometimes appointed to that office, 68 Justice, what, 88; the course of, impeded in Crete, 59; different in different situations, 74 King, from whom to be chosen 60; the guardian of his people 168 King's children, what to be done

with, 100 King's power, what it should be 100; when unequal, 143 Kingdom, what, 78 Kingdoms, their object, 167; how bestowed, 168; causes of their dissolution, 173; how preserved, 173 Kingly government in the heroic times, what, 96 Kingly power regulated by the laws at Sparta in peace, 95; absolute in war, 95 Kings formerly in Crete, 58; their power afterwards devolved to the kosmoi, 58; method of electing them at Carthage, 60 Knowledge of the master and slave different from each other, ii Kosmoi, the power of, 58; their number, 58; wherein inferior to the ephori, 58; allowed to resign their office before their time is elapsed, 59 Lacedamonian customs similar to the Cretan, 57 Lacedaemonian government much esteemed, 41; the faults of it, 53-56; calculated only for war, 56; how composed of a democracy and oligarchy, 124 Lacedaemonian revenue badly raised, 56, 57 Lacedaemonians, wherein they admit things to be common, 33 Land should be divided into two parts, 219 Law makes one man a slave, another free, 6; whether just or not, 9; at Thebes respecting tradesmen, 75; nothing should be done contrary to it, 160 Law and government, their difference, 107, 108 Laws, when advantageous to alter them, 49,50, 52; of every state will be like the state, 88; whom they should be calculated for, 92; decide better than men, 101; moral preferable to written, 102; must sometimes bend to ancient customs, 117; should be framed to the state, 107; the same suit not all governments, 108 Legislator ought to know not only what is best,

but what is practical, n Legislators should fix a proper medium in property, 46 Liberty, wherein it partly consists, 184, 185 Life, happy, owing to a course of virtue, 125; how divided, 228 Locrians forbid men to sell their property, 43 Lycophron's account of law, 82 Lycurgus gave over reducing the women to obedience, 53; made it infamous for any one to sell his possessions, 53; some of his laws censured, 54; spent much time at Crete, 57; supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64 Lysander wanted to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, 143 Magistrate, to whom that name is properly given, 136 Magistrates, when they make the state incline to an oligarchy, 61; when to an aristocracy, 61; at Athens, from whom to be chosen, 64; to determine those causes which the law cannot be applied to, 88; whether their power is to be the same, or different in different communities, 137; how they differ from each other, 138; in those who appoint them, 138; should be continued but a short time in democracies, 161; how to be chosen in a democracy, 185; different sorts and employments, 196 Making and using, their difference, 6 Malienses, their form of government, 131 Man proved to be a political animal, 4; has alone a perception of good and evil, 4; without law and justice the worst of beings, 5 Master, power of, whence it arises, as some think, 5 Matrimony, when to be engaged in, 232 Meals, common, established in Crete and Italy, 218; expense of, should be defrayed by

the whole state, 219 Mechanic employments useful for citizens, 73 Mechanics, whether they should be allowed to be citizens, 74, 75; cannot acquire the practice of virtue, 75; admitted to be citizens in an oligarchy, 75 Medium of circumstances best, 126 Members of the community, their different pretences to the employments of the state, 90; what natural dispositions they ought to be of, 213 Men, some distinguished by nature for governors, others to be governed, 7; their different modes of living, 13; worthy three ways, 226 Merchandise, three different ways of carrying it on, 20 Middle rank of men make the best citizens, 127; most conducive to the preservation of the state, 128; should be particularly attended to by the legislators, 130 Military, how divided, 194 Mitylene, an account of a dispute there, 150 Monarch, absolute, 100 Monarchies, their nature, 95, 96; sometimes elective, 95; sometimes hereditary, 95; whence they sometimes arise, 146; causes of corruption in them, 167; how preserved, 173 Money, how it made its way into commerce, 16; first weighed, 16; afterwards stamped, 16; its value dependent on agreement, 16; how gained by exchange, 19 Money—getting considered at large, 17, 18 Monopolising gainful, 21; sometimes practised by cities, 21 Monopoly of iron in Sicily, a remarkable instance of the profit of it, 21 Music, how many species of it, in; why a part of education, 240; how far it should be taught, 242, 243; professors of it considered as mean people, 244; imitates the disposition of the mind, 246; improves our manners, 246; Lydian, softens the mind,

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes

    Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori. Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, ’tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

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  • Second Treatise of Government · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER. XVIII. / OF TYRANNY.

    The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after the deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws. And a little after, Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them and the commonwealth. Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite.

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  • Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes

    And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

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  • Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Cardinal Bellarmines Books De Summo Pontifice Considered / Book

    Of five Books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three Questions: One, Which is simply the best government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy; and concludeth for neither, but for a government mixt of all there: Another, which of these is the best Government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixt, but which should most participate of Monarchy: the third, whether in this mixt Monarchy, St. Peter had the place of Monarch. Concerning his first Conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that all Governments which men are bound to obey, are Simple, and Absolute. In Monarchy there is but One Man Supreme; and all other men that have any kind of Power in the State, have it by his Commission, during his pleasure; and execute it in his name: And in Aristocracy, and Democracy, but One Supreme Assembly, with the same Power that in Monarchy belongeth to the Monarch, which is not a Mixt, but an Absolute Soveraignty. And of the three sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already established; but the present ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the Law of Nature, and the Divine positive Law, to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof. Besides, it maketh nothing to the Power of any Pastor, (unlesse he have the Civill Soveraignty,) what kind of Government is the best; because their Calling is not to govern men by Commandement, but to teach them, and perswade them by Arguments, and leave it to them to consider, whether they shall embrace, or reject the Doctrine taught. For Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of Soveraigns, not of Pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of Masters of Families, not three sorts of Schoolmasters for their children.

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  • Leviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government

    And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.

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  • Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XXII——OF CUSTOM, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT EASILY CHANGE A LAW RECEIVED

    king, to betake himself wholly to devotion, retires from his administration (which often falls out), his next successor is obliged to do the same, and the right of the kingdom devolves to the third in succession: where they vary the form of government, according to the seeming necessity of affairs: depose the king when they think good, substituting certain elders to govern in his stead, and sometimes transferring it into the hands of the commonality: where men and women are both circumcised and also baptized: where the soldier, who in one or several engagements, has been so fortunate as to present seven of the enemies’ heads to the king, is made noble: where they live in that rare and unsociable opinion of the mortality of the soul: where the women are delivered without pain or fear: where the women wear copper leggings upon both legs, and if a louse bite them, are bound in magnanimity to bite them again, and dare not marry, till first they have made their king a tender of their virginity, if he please to accept it: where the ordinary way of salutation is by putting a finger down to the earth, and then pointing it up toward heaven: where men carry burdens upon their heads, and women on their shoulders; where the women make water standing, and the men squatting: where they send their blood in token of friendship, and offer incense to the men they would honour, like gods: where, not only to the fourth, but in any other remote degree, kindred are not

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