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Beyond Good and Evil

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900)

144. When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste; man, indeed, if I may say so, is "the barren animal." 145. Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the SECONDARY role. 146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee. 147. From old Florentine novels—moreover, from life: Buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone.—Sacchetti, Nov. 86. 148. To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion of their neighbour—who can do this conjuring trick so well as women? 149. That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of what was formerly considered good—the atavism of an old ideal. 150. Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes—what? perhaps a "world"? 151. It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have your permission to possess it;—eh, my friends? 152. "Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always Paradise": so say the most ancient and the most modern serpents. 153. What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. 154. Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology.

155. The sense of the tragic increases and declines with sensuousness. 156. Insanity in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule. 157. The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night. 158. Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to our strongest impulse—the tyrant in us. 159. One MUST repay good and ill; but why just to the person who did us good or ill? 160. One no longer loves one's knowledge sufficiently after one has communicated it. 161. Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences: they exploit them. 162. "Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our neighbour's neighbour":—so thinks every nation. 163. Love brings to light the noble and hidden qualities of a lover—his rare and exceptional traits: it is thus liable to be deceptive as to his normal character. 164. Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants;—love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!" 165. IN SIGHT OF EVERY PARTY.—A shepherd has always need of a bell-wether—or he has himself to be a wether occasionally. 166. One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with the accompanying grimace one nevertheless tells the truth. 167. To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame—and something precious. 168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice.

169. To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing oneself. 170. In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in blame. 171. Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of knowledge, like tender hands on a Cyclops. 172. One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one must never confess to the individual. 173. One does not hate as long as one disesteems, but only when one esteems equal or superior. 174. Ye Utilitarians—ye, too, love the UTILE only as a VEHICLE for your inclinations,—ye, too, really find the noise of its wheels insupportable! 175. One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired. 176. The vanity of others is only counter to our taste when it is counter to our vanity. 177. With regard to what "truthfulness" is, perhaps nobody has ever been sufficiently truthful. 178. One does not believe in the follies of clever men: what a forfeiture of the rights of man! 179. The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile "reformed." 180. There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a cause. 181. It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed. 182. The familiarity of superiors embitters one, because it may not be returned. 183. "I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but because I can no longer believe in you." 184. There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the appearance of wickedness. 185. "I dislike him."—Why?—"I am not a match for him."—Did any one ever answer so?

186. The moral sentiment in Europe at present is perhaps as subtle, belated, diverse, sensitive, and refined, as the "Science of Morals" belonging thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and coarse-fingered:—an interesting contrast, which sometimes becomes incarnate and obvious in the very person of a moralist. Indeed, the expression, "Science of Morals" is, in respect to what is designated thereby, far too presumptuous and counter to GOOD taste,—which is always a foretaste of more modest expressions. One ought to avow with the utmost fairness WHAT is still necessary here for a long time, WHAT is alone proper for the present: namely, the collection of material, the comprehensive survey and classification of an immense domain of delicate sentiments of worth, and distinctions of worth, which live, grow, propagate, and perish—and perhaps attempts to give a clear idea of the recurring and more common forms of these living crystallizations—as preparation for a THEORY OF TYPES of morality. To be sure, people have not hitherto been so modest. All the philosophers, with a pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, demanded of themselves something very much higher, more pretentious, and ceremonious, when they concerned themselves with morality as a science: they wanted to GIVE A BASIC to morality—and every philosopher hitherto has believed that he has given it a basis; morality itself, however, has been regarded as something "given." How far from their awkward pride was the seemingly insignificant problem—left in dust and decay—of a description of forms of morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and senses could hardly be fine enough for it!

It was precisely owing to moral philosophers' knowing the moral facts imperfectly, in an arbitrary epitome, or an accidental abridgement—perhaps as the morality of their environment, their position, their church, their Zeitgeist, their climate and zone—it was precisely because they were badly instructed with regard to nations, eras, and past ages, and were by no means eager to know about these matters, that they did not even come in sight of the real problems of morals—problems which only disclose themselves by a comparison of MANY kinds of morality. In every "Science of Morals" hitherto, strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has been OMITTED: there has been no suspicion that there was anything problematic there! That which philosophers called "giving a basis to morality," and endeavoured to realize, has, when seen in a right light, proved merely a learned form of good FAITH in prevailing morality, a new means of its EXPRESSION, consequently just a matter-of-fact within the sphere of a definite morality, yea, in its ultimate motive, a sort of denial that it is LAWFUL for this morality to be called in question—and in any case the reverse of the testing, analyzing, doubting, and vivisecting of this very faith.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IX. WHAT IS NOBLE?

    261. Vanity is one of the things which are perhaps most difficult for a noble man to understand: he will be tempted to deny it, where another kind of man thinks he sees it self-evidently. The problem for him is to represent to his mind beings who seek to arouse a good opinion of themselves which they themselves do not possess—and consequently also do not "deserve,"—and who yet BELIEVE in this good opinion afterwards. This seems to him on the one hand such bad taste and so self-disrespectful, and on the other hand so grotesquely unreasonable, that he would like to consider vanity an exception, and is doubtful about it in most cases when it is spoken of. He will say, for instance: "I may be mistaken about my value, and on the other hand may nevertheless demand that my value should be acknowledged by others precisely as I rate it:—that, however, is not vanity (but self-conceit, or, in most cases, that which is called 'humility,' and also 'modesty')." Or he will even say: "For many reasons I can delight in the good opinion of others, perhaps because I love and honour them, and rejoice in all their joys, perhaps also because their good opinion endorses and strengthens my belief in my own good opinion, perhaps because the good opinion of others, even in cases where I do not share it, is useful to me, or gives promise of usefulness:—all this, however, is not vanity."

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IV. APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES

    111. Our vanity is most difficult to wound just when our pride has been wounded. 112. To him who feels himself preordained to contemplation and not to belief, all believers are too noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them. 113. "You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be embarrassed before him." 114. The immense expectation with regard to sexual love, and the coyness in this expectation, spoils all the perspectives of women at the outset. 115. Where there is neither love nor hatred in the game, woman's play is mediocre. 116. The great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage to rebaptize our badness as the best in us. 117. The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately only the will of another, or of several other, emotions. 118. There is an innocence of admiration: it is possessed by him to whom it has not yet occurred that he himself may be admired some day. 119. Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning ourselves—"justifying" ourselves. 120. Sensuality often forces the growth of love too much, so that its root remains weak, and is easily torn up. 121. It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author—and that he did not learn it better. 122. To rejoice on account of praise is in many cases merely politeness of heart—and the very opposite of vanity of spirit. 123. Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage.

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  • Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · XLIII. MANLY PRUDENCE.

    And thus spake I often to myself for consolation: “Courage! Cheer up! old heart! An unhappiness hath failed to befall thee: enjoy that as thy—happiness!” This, however, is mine other manly prudence: I am more forbearing to the VAIN than to the proud. Is not wounded vanity the mother of all tragedies? Where, however, pride is wounded, there groweth up something better than pride. That life may be fair to behold, its game must be well played; for that purpose, however, it needeth good actors. Good actors have I found all the vain ones: they play, and wish people to be fond of beholding them—all their spirit is in this wish. They represent themselves, they invent themselves; in their neighbourhood I like to look upon life—it cureth of melancholy. Therefore am I forbearing to the vain, because they are the physicians of my melancholy, and keep me attached to man as to a drama. And further, who conceiveth the full depth of the modesty of the vain man! I am favourable to him, and sympathetic on account of his modesty. From you would he learn his belief in himself; he feedeth upon your glances, he eateth praise out of your hands. Your lies doth he even believe when you lie favourably about him: for in its depths sigheth his heart: “What am I?” And if that be the true virtue which is unconscious of itself—well, the vain man is unconscious of his modesty!—

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IX. WHAT IS NOBLE?

    279. Men of profound sadness betray themselves when they are happy: they have a mode of seizing upon happiness as though they would choke and strangle it, out of jealousy—ah, they know only too well that it will flee from them! 280. "Bad! Bad! What? Does he not—go back?" Yes! But you misunderstand him when you complain about it. He goes back like every one who is about to make a great spring. 281.—"Will people believe it of me? But I insist that they believe it of me: I have always thought very unsatisfactorily of myself and about myself, only in very rare cases, only compulsorily, always without delight in 'the subject,' ready to digress from 'myself,' and always without faith in the result, owing to an unconquerable distrust of the POSSIBILITY of self-knowledge, which has led me so far as to feel a CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO even in the idea of 'direct knowledge' which theorists allow themselves:—this matter of fact is almost the most certain thing I know about myself. There must be a sort of repugnance in me to BELIEVE anything definite about myself.—Is there perhaps some enigma therein? Probably; but fortunately nothing for my own teeth.—Perhaps it betrays the species to which I belong?—but not to myself, as is sufficiently agreeable to me."

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IX. WHAT IS NOBLE?

    The vain person rejoices over EVERY good opinion which he hears about himself (quite apart from the point of view of its usefulness, and equally regardless of its truth or falsehood), just as he suffers from every bad opinion: for he subjects himself to both, he feels himself subjected to both, by that oldest instinct of subjection which breaks forth in him.—It is "the slave" in the vain man's blood, the remains of the slave's craftiness—and how much of the "slave" is still left in woman, for instance!—which seeks to SEDUCE to good opinions of itself; it is the slave, too, who immediately afterwards falls prostrate himself before these opinions, as though he had not called them forth.—And to repeat it again: vanity is an atavism.

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  • Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER IV. APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES

    124. He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable. 125. When we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us. 126. A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get round them. 127. In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it—or worse still! under their dress and finery. 128. The more abstract the truth you wish to teach, the more must you allure the senses to it. 129. The devil has the most extensive perspectives for God; on that account he keeps so far away from him:—the devil, in effect, as the oldest friend of knowledge. 130. What a person IS begins to betray itself when his talent decreases,—when he ceases to show what he CAN do. Talent is also an adornment; an adornment is also a concealment. 131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is ESSENTIALLY unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanour. 132. One is punished best for one's virtues.

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