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Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592)

take which course he will,” said he; “he will repent” Let him be as wise as he will, after all he is but a man Let him be satisfied with correcting himself Let him examine every man’s talent Let it alone a little Let it be permitted to the timid to hope Let not us seek illusions from without and unknown Let us not be ashamed to speak what we are not ashamed to think Let us not seek our disease out of ourselves; ‘tis in us Liberality at the expense of others Liberty and laziness, the qualities most predominant in me Liberty of poverty Liberty to lean, but not to lay our whole weight upon others Library: Tis there that I am in my kingdom License of judgments is a great disturbance to great affairs Life of Caesar has no greater example for us than our own Life should be cut off in the sound and living part Light griefs can speak: deep sorrows are dumb Light prognostics they give of themselves in their tender years Little affairs most disturb us Little knacks and frivolous subtleties Little learning is needed to form a sound mind—Seneca Little less trouble in governing a private family than a kingdom Live a quite contrary sort of life to what they prescribe others Live at the expense of life itself Live, not so long as they please, but as long as they ought Living is slavery if the liberty of dying be wanting Living well, which of all arts is the greatest Llaying the

fault upon the patient, by such frivolous reasons Lodge nothing in his fancy upon simple authority and upon trust Long a voyage I should at last run myself into some disadvantage Long sittings at table both trouble me and do me harm Long toleration begets habit; habit, consent and imitation Look on death not only without astonishment but without care Look upon themselves as a third person only, a stranger Look, you who think the gods have no care of human things Lose what I have a particular care to lock safe up Loses more by defending his vineyard than if he gave it up Love is the appetite of generation by the mediation of beauty Love shamefully and dishonestly cured by marriage Love them the less for our own faults Love we bear to our wives is very lawful Love, full, lively, and sharp; a pleasure inflamed by difficulty Loved them for our sport, like monkeys, and not as men Lower himself to the meanness of defending his innocence Made all medicinal conclusions largely give way to my pleasure Making their advantage of our folly, for most men do the same Malice must be employed to correct this arrogant ignorance Malice sucks up the greatest part of its own venom Malicious kind of justice Man (must) know that he is his own Man after who held out his pulse to a physician was a fool Man can never be wise but by his own wisdom Man may say too much even upon the best subjects Man may with less

trouble adapt himself to entire abstinence Man must approach his wife with prudence and temperance Man must have a care not to do his master so great service Man must learn that he is nothing but a fool Man runs a very great hazard in their hands (of physicians) Mark of singular good nature to preserve old age Marriage Marriage rejects the company and conditions of love Melancholy: Are there not some constitutions that feed upon it? Memories are full enough, but the judgment totally void Men approve of things for their being rare and new Men are not always to rely upon the personal confessions Men as often commend as undervalue me beyond reason Men make them (the rules) without their (women’s) help Men must embark, and not deliberate, upon high enterprises Men should furnish themselves with such things as would float Mercenaries who would receive any (pay) Merciful to the man, but not to his wickedness—Aristotle Methinks I am no more than half of myself Methinks I promise it, if I but say it Miracle: everything our reason cannot comprehend Miracles and strange events have concealed themselves from me Miracles appear to be so, according to our ignorance of nature Miserable kind of remedy, to owe one’s health to one’s disease!

Miserable, who has not at home where to be by himself Misfortunes that only hurt us by being known Mix railing, indiscretion, and fury in his disputations Moderation is a virtue that gives more work than suffering Modesty is a foolish virtue in an indigent person (Homer) More ado to interpret interpretations More books upon books than upon any other subject More brave men been lost in occasions of little moment More solicitous that men speak of us, than how they speak More supportable to be always alone than never to be so More valued a victory obtained by counsel than by force Morosity and melancholic humour of a sour ill-natured pedant Most cruel people, and upon frivolous occasions, apt to cry Most men are rich in borrowed sufficiency Most men do not so much believe as they acquiesce and permit Most of my actions are guided by example, not by choice Mothers are too tender Motive to some vicious occasion or some prospect of profit Much better to offend him once than myself every day Much difference betwixt us and ourselves Must for the most part entertain ourselves with ourselves Must of necessity walk in the steps of another My affection alters, my judgment does not My books: from me hold that which I have not retained My dog unseasonably importunes me to play My fancy does not go by itself, as when my legs move it My humour is no friend to tumult My humour is unfit either to speak or write for beginners My innocence is a

simple one; little vigour and no art My mind is easily composed at distance My reason is not obliged to bow and bend; my knees are My thoughts sleep if I sit still My words does but injure the love I have conceived within Natural death the most rare and very seldom seen Nature of judgment to have it more deliberate and more slow Nature of wit is to have its operation prompt and sudden Nature, who left us in such a state of imperfection Nearest to the opinions of those with whom they have to do Negligent garb, which is yet observable amongst the young men Neither be a burden to myself nor to any other Neither continency nor virtue where there are no opposing desire Neither men nor their lives are measured by the ell Neither the courage to die nor the heart to live Never any man knew so much, and spake so little Never did two men make the same judgment of the same thing Never observed any great stability in my soul to resist passions Never oppose them either by word or sign, how false or absurd Never represent things to you simply as they are Never spoke of my money, but falsely, as others do New World: sold it opinions and our arts at a very dear rate None that less keep their promise (than physicians) No alcohol the night on which a man intends to get children No beast in the world so much to be feared by man as man No danger

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER XX. HAPPY IS THE MAN THAT MAY CHOOSE HIS OWN BUSINESS.

    Every man knows his own constitution; one eases his stomach by vomit—another supports it with good nourishment; he that has the gout forbears wine and bathing, and every man applies to the part that is most infirm. He that shows a gouty foot, a lame hand, or contracted nerves, shall be permitted to lie still and attend his cure; and why not so in the vices of his mind! We must discharge all impediments and make way for philosophy, as a study inconsistent with common business. To all other things we must deny ourselves openly and frankly, when we are sick refuse visits, keep ourselves close, and lay aside all public cares, and shall we not do as much when we philosophize? Business is the drudgery of the world, and only fit for slaves, but contemplation is the work of wise men. Not but that solitude and company may be allowed to take their turns: the one creates in us the love of mankind, the other that of ourselves; solitude relieves us when we are sick of company, and conversation when we are weary of being alone; so that the one cures the other. “There is no man,” in fine, “so miserable as he that is at a loss how to spend his time.” He is restless in his thoughts, unsteady in his counsels, dissatisfied with the present, solicitous for the future; whereas he that prudently computes his hours and his business, does not only fortify himself against the common accidents of life, but improves the most rigorous dispensations of Providence to his comfort, and stands firm under all the trials of human weakness.

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  • The social contract & discourses · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

    That men are actually wicked, a sad and continual experience of them proves beyond doubt: but all the same, I think I've shown that man is naturally good. What then can have depraved him to such an extent, except the changes that have happened in his constitution, the advances he has made, and the knowledge he has acquired? We may admire human society as much as we please; it will be none the less true that it necessarily leads men to hate each other in proportion as their interests clash, and to do one another apparent services, while they are really doing every imaginable mischief. What can be thought of a relation, in which the interest of every individual dictates rules directly opposite to those the public reason dictates to the community in general—in which every man finds his profit in the misfortunes of his neighbour? There is not perhaps any man in a comfortable position who has not greedy heirs, and perhaps even children, secretly wishing for his death; not a ship at sea, of which the loss would not be good news to some merchant or other; not a house, which some debtor of bad faith would not be glad to see reduced to ashes with all the papers it contains; not a nation which does not rejoice at the disasters that befall its neighbours. Thus it is that we find our advantage in the misfortunes of our fellow-creatures, and that the loss of one man almost always constitutes the prosperity of another.

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  • Pascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · SECTION III / OF THE NECESSITY OF THE WAGER

    There must be a strange confusion in the nature of man, that he should boast of being in that state in which it seems incredible that a single individual should be. However, experience has shown me so great a number of such persons that the fact would be surprising, if we did not know that the greater part of those who trouble themselves about the matter are disingenuous, and not in fact what they say. They are people who have heard it said that it is the fashion to be thus daring. It is what they call shaking off the yoke, and they try to imitate this. But it would not be difficult to make them understand how greatly they deceive themselves in thus seeking esteem. This is not the way to gain it, even I say among those men of the world who take a healthy view of things, and who know that the only way to succeed in this life is to make ourselves appear honourable, faithful, judicious, and capable of useful service to a friend; because naturally men love only what may be useful to them. Now, what do we gain by hearing it said of a man that he has now thrown off the yoke, that he does not believe there is a God who watches our actions, that he considers himself the sole master of his conduct, and that he thinks he is accountable for it only to himself? Does he think that he has thus brought us to have henceforth complete confidence in him, and to look to him for consolation, advice, and help in every need of life? Do they profess to have delighted us by telling us that they hold our soul to be only a little wind and smoke, especially by telling us this in a haughty and self-satisfied tone of voice? Is this a thing to say gaily? Is it not, on the contrary, a thing to say sadly, as the saddest thing in the world?

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  • The Brothers Karamazov · Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881) · Chapter IV. Rebellion

    “Well, I know nothing of it so far, and can’t understand it, and the innumerable mass of mankind are with me there. The question is, whether that’s due to men’s bad qualities or whether it’s inherent in their nature. To my thinking, Christ-like love for men is a miracle impossible on earth. He was God. But we are not gods. Suppose I, for instance, suffer intensely. Another can never know how much I suffer, because he is another and not I. And what’s more, a man is rarely ready to admit another’s suffering (as though it were a distinction). Why won’t he admit it, do you think? Because I smell unpleasant, because I have a stupid face, because I once trod on his foot. Besides, there is suffering and suffering; degrading, humiliating suffering such as humbles me—hunger, for instance—my benefactor will perhaps allow me; but when you come to higher suffering—for an idea, for instance—he will very rarely admit that, perhaps because my face strikes him as not at all what he fancies a man should have who suffers for an idea. And so he deprives me instantly of his favor, and not at all from badness of heart. Beggars, especially genteel beggars, ought never to show themselves, but to ask for charity through the newspapers. One can love one’s neighbors in the abstract, or even at a distance, but at close quarters it’s almost impossible.

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  • A Vindication of the Rights of Woman With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects · Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) · Section 10

    But, granting that woman ought to be beautiful, innocent, and silly, to render her a more alluring and indulgent companion—what is her understanding sacrificed for? And why is all this preparation necessary only, according to Rousseau's own account, to make her the mistress of her husband, a very short time? For no man ever insisted more on the transient nature of love. Thus speaks the philosopher. "Sensual pleasures are transient. The habitual state of the affections always loses by their gratification. The imagination, which decks the object of our desires, is lost in fruition. Excepting the Supreme Being, who is self-existent, there is nothing beautiful but what is ideal." But he returns to his unintelligible paradoxes again, when he thus addresses Sophia. "Emilius, in becoming your husband, is become your master, and claims your obedience. Such is the order of nature. When a man is married, however, to such a wife as Sophia, it is proper he should be directed by her: this is also agreeable to the order of nature: it is, therefore, to give you as much authority over his heart as his sex gives him over your person, that I have made you the arbiter of his pleasures. It may cost you, perhaps, some disagreeable self-denial; but you will be certain of maintaining your empire over him, if you can preserve it over yourself; what I have already observed, also shows me, that this difficult attempt does not surpass your courage.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter VII.

    Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the common run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind of man, I mean, to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting it, and who, aping the sick man, does not however suppose himself wretched though he is like a wretched man. So it is too with respect to Self-Control and the Imperfection of it: if a man yields to pleasures or pains which are violent and excessive it is no matter for wonder, but rather for allowance if he made what resistance he could (instances are, Philoctetes in Theodectes’ drama when wounded by the viper; or Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or men who in trying to suppress laughter burst into a loud continuous fit of it, as happened, you remember, to Xenophantus), but it is a matter for wonder when a man yields to and cannot contend against those pleasures or pains which the common herd are able to resist; always supposing his failure not to be owing to natural constitution or disease, I mean, as the Scythian kings are constitutionally Soft, or the natural difference between the sexes.

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