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The Critique of Pure Reason

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions “à priori”. III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge “à priori” IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements. V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements “à priori” are contained as Principles. VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason. VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason. § 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time. § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions. § 8. Elucidation. § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic. § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic. I. Of Logic in General II. Of Transcendental Logic III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic Introductory § 3 Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. § 4 Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements. § 5 Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories. § 6

Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general § 9 Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. § 10 Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding. Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations given by Sense. § 11. Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12 The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13 What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14 The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15 All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one Consciousness. § 16 Observation. § 17 In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only legitimate use of the Category. § 18 Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in general. § 20 Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22 Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23 Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements. Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements. Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding. I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance. II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.

Section I—Of Ideas in General. Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas. Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas. I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe. II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Whole given in Intuition. III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes. IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences. Section I. Of the Ideal in General. Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale). Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being. Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God. Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God. Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof. Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason. Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism. Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics. Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis. Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs. Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason. Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason. Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.

    To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes transcendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself; because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of judging completely of our synthetical knowledge à priori. The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the parts of a science like this, is that no conceptions must enter it which contain aught empirical; in other words, that the knowledge à priori must be completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions à priori, yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy; because, though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain, pleasure, desires, inclinations, etc. (which are all of empirical origin), at the foundation of its precepts, yet still into the conception of duty—as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement which should not be made into a motive—these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason. For all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cognition.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.

    For as such a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our synthetical à priori, but of our analytical à priori knowledge, it is of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis à priori, with which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance, of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge à priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an organon; and if this new organon should be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be set forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being completed, is evident. For we have not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition à priori.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · BOOK II. Analytic of Principles

    General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are, understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding. As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the mere form of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its analytic a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law, which, without taking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition about which it is employed, can be discovered à priori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its momenta. Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate content, that of pure à priori cognitions, to wit, cannot imitate general logic in this division. For it is evident that the transcendental employment of reason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to the logic of truth (that is, to analytic), but as a logic of illusion, occupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the name of transcendental dialectic.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic.

    In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in transcendental æsthetic the sensibility) and select from our cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin in the understanding alone. The exercise of this pure cognition, however, depends upon this as its condition, that objects to which it may be applied be given to us in intuition, for without intuition the whole of our cognition is without objects, and is therefore quite void. That part of transcendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no object at all can be thought, is transcendental analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it, without losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all reference to an object, and therefore all truth. But because we are very easily seduced into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the understanding by themselves, and that even beyond the boundaries of experience, which yet is the only source whence we can obtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions may be employed—understanding runs the risk of making, by means of empty sophisms, a material and objective use of the mere formal principles of the pure understanding, and of passing judgements on objects without distinction—objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot be given to us in any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only a canon for judging of the empirical use of the understanding, this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding, and attempt with the pure understanding alone to judge synthetically, affirm, and determine respecting objects in general. In this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical illusion, and this critique we shall term transcendental dialectic—not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This critique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of these two faculties, and invalidate their claims to the discovery and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcendental principles, and show that the proper employment of these faculties is to test the judgements made by the pure understanding, and to guard it from sophistical delusion.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas

    Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions à priori, conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgements—converted into a conception of the synthesis of intuitions—produced the categories which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of particular à priori conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of experience according to principles. The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgement which is determined à priori in the whole extent of its condition. The proposition: “Caius is mortal,” is one which may be obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but my wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under which the predicate of this judgement is given—in this case, the conception of man—and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition of the object thought, and say: “Caius is mortal.”

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.

    If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine of the Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason. Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so much seems necessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So far as the faculty of sense may contain representations à priori, which form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought.

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