The Critique of Pure Reason
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions “à priori”. III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge “à priori” IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements. V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements “à priori” are contained as Principles. VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason. VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason. § 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time. § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions. § 8. Elucidation. § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic. § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic. I. Of Logic in General II. Of Transcendental Logic III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic Introductory § 3 Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. § 4 Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements. § 5 Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories. § 6
Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general § 9 Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. § 10 Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding. Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations given by Sense. § 11. Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12 The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13 What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14 The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15 All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one Consciousness. § 16 Observation. § 17 In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only legitimate use of the Category. § 18 Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in general. § 20 Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22 Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23 Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements. Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements. Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding. I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance. II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
Section I—Of Ideas in General. Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas. Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas. I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe. II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Whole given in Intuition. III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes. IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences. Section I. Of the Ideal in General. Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale). Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being. Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God. Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God. Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof. Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason. Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism. Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics. Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis. Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs. Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason. Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason. Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · PREFACE
Intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, I issue in the first instance these fundamental principles. Indeed there is properly no other foundation for it than the critical examination of a pure practical reason; just as that of metaphysics is the critical examination of the pure speculative reason, already published. But in the first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as the latter, because in moral concerns human reason can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness, even in the commonest understanding, while on the contrary in its theoretic but pure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second place if the critique of a pure practical Reason is to be complete, it must be possible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative reason in a common principle, for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its application. I could not, however, bring it to such completeness here, without introducing considerations of a wholly different kind, which would be perplexing to the reader. On this account I have adopted the title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals instead of that of a Critical Examination of the pure practical reason.
Read in contextThe Problems of Philosophy · Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) · CHAPTER VII. ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
This illustrates the difference between general propositions known a priori such as 'two and two are four', and empirical generalizations such as 'all men are mortal'. In regard to the former, deduction is the right mode of argument, whereas in regard to the latter, induction is always theoretically preferable, and warrants a greater confidence in the truth of our conclusion, because all empirical generalizations are more uncertain than the instances of them. We have now seen that there are propositions known a priori, and that among them are the propositions of logic and pure mathematics, as well as the fundamental propositions of ethics. The question which must next occupy us is this: How is it possible that there should be such knowledge? And more particularly, how can there be knowledge of general propositions in cases where we have not examined all the instances, and indeed never can examine them all, because their number is infinite? These questions, which were first brought prominently forward by the German philosopher Kant (1724-1804), are very difficult, and historically very important.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF.
[6] We may here take occasion to observe a very remarkable error, which being frequently inculcated in the schools, has become a kind of establishd maxim, and is universally received by all logicians. This error consists in the vulgar division of the acts of the understanding, into CONCEPTION, JUDGMENT and REASONING, and in the definitions we give of them. Conception is defind to be the simple survey of one or more ideas: Judgment to be the separating or uniting of different ideas: Reasoning to be the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other. But these distinctions and definitions are faulty in very considerable articles. For FIRST, it is far from being true, that in every judgment, which we form, we unite two different ideas; since in that proposition, GOD IS, or indeed any other, which regards existence, the idea of existence is no distinct idea, which we unite with that of the object, and which is capable of forming a compound idea by the union. SECONDLY, As we can thus form a proposition, which contains only one idea, so we may exert our reason without employing more than two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to serve as a medium betwixt them. We infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others, and more convincing than when we interpose another idea to connect the two extremes. What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects. Whether we consider a single object, or several; whether we dwell on these objects, or run from them to others; and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception; and the only remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to the conception, and are persuaded of the truth of what we conceive. This act of the mind has never yet been explain’d by any philosopher; and therefore I am at liberty to propose my hypothesis concerning it; which is, that it is only a strong and steady conception of any idea, and such as approaches in some measure to an immediate impression.
Read in contextFundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent, knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from their genuine influence and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical importance, to derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge, i.e., to determine the whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature, we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being. In this way, although for its application to man morality has need of anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it independently as pure philosophy, i.e., as metaphysic, complete in itself (a thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily done); knowing well that unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on their genuine principles, even for common practical purposes, especially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest possible good in the world.
Read in contextThe Problems of Philosophy · Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) · CHAPTER X. ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
We may now take a survey of the sources of our knowledge, as they have appeared in the course of our analysis. We have first to distinguish knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. In each there are two kinds, one immediate and one derivative. Our immediate knowledge of things, which we called acquaintance, consists of two sorts, according as the things known are particulars or universals. Among particulars, we have acquaintance with sense-data and (probably) with ourselves. Among universals, there seems to be no principle by which we can decide which can be known by acquaintance, but it is clear that among those that can be so known are sensible qualities, relations of space and time, similarity, and certain abstract logical universals. Our derivative knowledge of things, which we call knowledge by description, always involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called intuitive knowledge, and the truths so known may be called self-evident truths. Among such truths are included those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethical propositions. Our derivative knowledge of truths consists of everything that we can deduce from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction.
Read in contextThe Problems of Philosophy · Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) · CHAPTER VII. ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
There is another point of great importance, in which the empiricists were in the right as against the rationalists. Nothing can be known to exist except by the help of experience. That is to say, if we wish to prove that something of which we have no direct experience exists, we must have among our premisses the existence of one or more things of which we have direct experience. Our belief that the Emperor of China exists, for example, rests upon testimony, and testimony consists, in the last analysis, of sense-data seen or heard in reading or being spoken to. Rationalists believed that, from general consideration as to what must be, they could deduce the existence of this or that in the actual world. In this belief they seem to have been mistaken. All the knowledge that we can acquire a priori concerning existence seems to be hypothetical: it tells us that if one thing exists, another must exist, or, more generally, that if one proposition is true, another must be true. This is exemplified by the principles we have already dealt with, such as 'if this is true, and this implies that, then that is true', or 'if this and that have been repeatedly found connected, they will probably be connected in the next instance in which one of them is found'. Thus the scope and power of a priori principles is strictly limited. All knowledge that something exists must be in part dependent on experience. When anything is known immediately, its existence is known by experience alone; when anything is proved to exist, without being known immediately, both experience and a priori principles must be required in the proof. Knowledge is called empirical when it rests wholly or partly upon experience. Thus all knowledge which asserts existence is empirical, and the only a priori knowledge concerning existence is hypothetical, giving connexions among things that exist or may exist, but not giving actual existence.
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