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Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592)

I will not buy it so dear as it costs Perpetual scolding of his wife (of Socrates) Petulant madness contends with itself Philopoemen: paying the penalty of my ugliness Philosophy Philosophy has discourses proper for childhood Philosophy is nothing but to prepare one’s self to die Philosophy is that which instructs us to live Philosophy looked upon as a vain and fantastic name Phusicians cure by by misery and pain Physic Physician worse physicked Physician: pass through all the diseases he pretends to cure Physician’s “help”, which is very often an obstacle Physicians are not content to deal only with the sick Physicians fear men should at any time escape their authority Physicians were the only men who might lie at pleasure Physicians: earth covers their failures Pinch the secret strings of our imperfections Pitiful ways and expedients to the jugglers of the law Pity is reputed a vice amongst the Stoics Plato angry at excess of sleeping than at excess of drinking Plato forbids children wine till eighteen years of age Plato said of the Egyptians, that they were all physicians Plato says, that the gods made man for their sport Plato will have nobody marry before thirty Plato: lawyers and physicians are bad institutions of a country Plays of children are not performed in play Pleasing all: a mark that can never be aimed at or hit Pleasure of telling (a pleasure little inferior to that of doing Possession begets a contempt of what it holds and rules Practical Jokes: Tis unhandsome to fight in play Preachers very

often work more upon their auditory than reasons Preface to bribe the benevolence of the courteous reader Prefer in bed, beauty before goodness Preferring the universal and common tie to all national ties Premeditation of death is the premeditation of liberty Prepare ourselves against the preparations of death Present Him such words as the memory suggests to the tongue Present himself with a halter about his neck to the people Presumptive knowledge by silence Pretending to find out the cause of every accident Priest shall on the wedding-day open the way to the bride Proceed so long as there shall be ink and paper in the world Profession of knowledge and their immeasurable self-conceit Profit made only at the expense of another Prolong his life also prolonged and augmented his pain Prolong your misery an hour or two Prudent and just man may be intemperate and inconsistent Prudent man, when I imagine him in this posture Psalms of King David: promiscuous, indiscreet Public weal requires that men should betray, and lie Puerile simplicities of our children Pure cowardice that makes our belief so pliable Put us into a way of extending and diversifying difficulties Pyrrho’s hog Quiet repose and a profound sleep without dreams Rage compelled to excuse itself by a pretence of good-will Rage it puts them to oppose silence and coldness to their fury Rash and incessant scolding runs into custom Rather be a less while old than be old before I am really so Rather complain of ill-fortune than be ashamed of victory Rather prating of another

man’s province than his own Reading those books, converse with the great and heroic souls Reasons often anticipate the effect Recommendation of strangeness, rarity, and dear purchase Refusin to justify, excuse, or explain myself Regret so honourable a post, where necessity must make them bold Remotest witness knows more about it than those who were nearest Represented her a little too passionate for a married Venus Reputation: most useless, frivolous, and false coin that passes Repute for value in them, not what they bring to us Reserve a backshop, wholly our own and entirely free Resolved to bring nothing to it but expectation and patience Rest satisfied, without desire of prolongation of life or name Restoring what has been lent us, wit usury and accession Revenge more wounds our children than it heals us Revenge, which afterwards produces a series of new cruelties Reverse of truth has a hundred thousand forms Rhetoric: an art to flatter and deceive Rhetoric: to govern a disorderly and tumultuous rabble Richer than we think we are; but we are taught to borrow Ridiculous desire of riches when we have lost the use of them Right of command appertains to the beautiful-Aristotle Rome was more valiant before she grew so learned Rowers who so advance backward Rude and quarrelsome flatly to deny a stated fact Same folly as to be sorry we were not alive a hundred years ago Satisfaction of mind to have only one path to walk in Satisfied and pleased with and in themselves Say of some compositions that they stink of

oil and of the lamp Scratching is one of nature’s sweetest gratifications Season a denial with asperity, suspense, or favour See how flexible our reason is Seek the quadrature of the circle, even when on their wives Seeming anger, for the better governing of my house Send us to the better air of some other country Sense: no one who is not contented with his share Setting too great a value upon ourselves Setting too little a value upon others Settled my thoughts to live upon less than I have Sex: To put fools and wise men, beasts and us, on a level Shake the truth of our Church by the vices of her ministers Shame for me to serve, being so near the reach of liberty Sharps and sweets of marriage, are kept secret by the wise She who only refuses, because ‘tis forbidden, consents Shelter my own weakness under these great reputations Short of the foremost, but before the last Should first have mended their breeches Silence, therefore, and modesty are very advantageous qualities Silent mien procured the credit of prudence and capacity Sins that make the least noise are the worst Sitting betwixt two stools Slaves, or exiles, ofttimes live as merrily as other folk Sleep suffocates and suppresses the faculties of the soul Smile upon us whilst we are alive So austere and very wise countenance and carriage—of physicians So many trillions of men, buried before us So much are men enslaved to their miserable being So that I could have said no worse behind their

backs So weak and languishing, as not to have even wishing left to him Socrates kept a confounded scolding wife Socrates: According to what a man can Soft, easy, and wholesome pillow is ignorance and incuriosity Solon said that eating was physic against the malady hunger Solon, that none can be said to be happy until he is dead some people rude, by being overcivil in their courtesy Some wives covetous indeed, but very few that are good managers Sometimes the body first submits to age, sometimes the mind Souls that are regular and strong of themselves are rare Sparing and an husband of his knowledge Speak less of one’s self than what one really is is folly Spectators can claim no interest in the honour and pleasure Stilpo lost wife, children, and goods Stilpo: thank God, nothing was lost of his Strangely suspect all this merchandise: medical care Strong memory is commonly coupled with infirm judgment Studied, when young, for ostentation, now for diversion Studies, to teach me to do, and not to write Study makes me sensible how much I have to learn Study of books is a languishing and feeble motion Study to declare what is justice, but never took care to do it Stumble upon a truth amongst an infinite number of lies Stupidity and facility natural to the common people Style wherewith men establish religions and laws Subdividing these subtilties we teach men to increase their doub Such a recipe as they will not take themselves Suffer my judgment to be made captive by prepossession

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer: the Wisdom of Life · Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) · Section 4.—Honor.

    There is no truth, then, in such pretexts. It can be urged with more justice that as, when you snarl at a dog, he snarls in return, and when you pet him, he fawns; so it lies in the nature of men to return hostility by hostility, and to be embittered and irritated at any signs of depreciatory treatment or hatred: and, as Cicero says, there is something so penetrating in the shaft of envy that even men of wisdom and worth find its wound a painful one; and nowhere in the world, except, perhaps, in a few religious sects, is an insult or a blow taken with equanimity. And yet a natural view of either would in no case demand anything more than a requital proportionate to the offence, and would never go to the length of assigning death as the proper penalty for anyone who accuses another of lying or stupidity or cowardice. The old German theory of blood for a blow is a revolting superstition of the age of chivalry. And in any case the return or requital of an insult is dictated by anger, and not by any such obligation of honor and duty as the advocates of chivalry seek to attach to it. The fact is that, the greater the truth, the greater the slander; and it is clear that the slightest hint of some real delinquency will give much greater offence than a most terrible accusation which is perfectly baseless: so that a man who is quite sure that he has done nothing to deserve a reproach may treat it with contempt, and will be safe in doing so. The theory of honor demands that he shall show a susceptibility which he does not possess, and take bloody vengeance for insults which he cannot feel. A man must himself have but a poor opinion of his own worth who hastens to prevent the utterance of an unfavorable opinion by giving his enemy a black eye.

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  • The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer: the Wisdom of Life · Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) · Section 4.—Honor.

    True appreciation of his own value will make a man really indifferent to insult; but if he cannot help resenting it, a little shrewdness and culture will enable him to save appearances and dissemble his anger. If he could only get rid of this superstition about honor—the idea, I mean, that it disappears when you are insulted, and can be restored by returning the insult; if we could only stop people from thinking that wrong, brutality and insolence can be legalized by expressing readiness to give satisfaction, that is, to fight in defence of it, we should all soon come to the general opinion that insult and depreciation are like a battle in which the loser wins; and that, as Vincenzo Monti says, abuse resembles a church-procession, because it always returns to the point from which it set out. If we could only get people to look upon insult in this light, we should no longer have to say something rude in order to prove that we are in the right. Now, unfortunately, if we want to take a serious view of any question, we have first of all to consider whether it will not give offence in some way or other to the dullard, who generally shows alarm and resentment at the merest sign of intelligence; and it may easily happen that the head which contains the intelligent view has to be pitted against the noodle which is empty of everything but narrowness and stupidity. If all this were done away with, intellectual superiority could take the leading place in society which is its due—a place now occupied, though people do not like to confess it, by excellence of physique, mere fighting pluck, in fact; and the natural effect of such a change would be that the best kind of people would have one reason the less for withdrawing from society. This would pave the way for the introduction of real courtesy and genuinely good society, such as undoubtedly existed in Athens, Corinth and Rome. If anyone wants to see a good example of what I mean, I should like him to read Xenophon's Banquet.

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  • The Consolation of Philosophy · Boethius (480–524) · SONG III. The Insatiableness of Avarice. / IV.

    'There is in Virtue a dignity of her own which she forthwith passes over to those to whom she is united. And since public honours cannot do this, it is clear that they do not possess the true beauty of dignity. And here this well deserves to be noticed—that if a man is the more scorned in proportion as he is despised by a greater number, high position not only fails to win reverence for the wicked, but even loads them the more with contempt by drawing more attention to them. But not without retribution; for the wicked pay back a return in kind to the dignities they put on by the pollution of their touch. Perhaps, too, another consideration may teach thee to confess that true reverence cannot come through these counterfeit dignities. It is this: If one who had been many times consul chanced to visit barbaric lands, would his office win him the reverence of the barbarians? And yet if reverence were the natural effect of dignities, they would not forego their proper function in any part of the world, even as fire never anywhere fails to give forth heat. But since this effect is not due to their own efficacy, but is attached to them by the mistaken opinion of mankind, they disappear straightway when they are set before those who do not esteem them dignities. Thus the case stands with foreign peoples. But does their repute last for ever, even in the land of their origin? Why, the prefecture, which was once a great power, is now an empty name—a burden merely on the senator's fortune; the commissioner of the public corn supply was once a personage—now what is more contemptible than this office? For, as we said just now, that which hath no true comeliness of its own now receives, now loses, lustre at the caprice of those who have to do with it. So, then, if dignities cannot win men reverence, if they are actually sullied by the contamination of the wicked, if they lose their splendour through time's changes, if they come into contempt merely for lack of public estimation, what precious beauty have they in themselves, much less to give to others?'

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  • The social contract & discourses · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

    That men are actually wicked, a sad and continual experience of them proves beyond doubt: but all the same, I think I've shown that man is naturally good. What then can have depraved him to such an extent, except the changes that have happened in his constitution, the advances he has made, and the knowledge he has acquired? We may admire human society as much as we please; it will be none the less true that it necessarily leads men to hate each other in proportion as their interests clash, and to do one another apparent services, while they are really doing every imaginable mischief. What can be thought of a relation, in which the interest of every individual dictates rules directly opposite to those the public reason dictates to the community in general—in which every man finds his profit in the misfortunes of his neighbour? There is not perhaps any man in a comfortable position who has not greedy heirs, and perhaps even children, secretly wishing for his death; not a ship at sea, of which the loss would not be good news to some merchant or other; not a house, which some debtor of bad faith would not be glad to see reduced to ashes with all the papers it contains; not a nation which does not rejoice at the disasters that befall its neighbours. Thus it is that we find our advantage in the misfortunes of our fellow-creatures, and that the loss of one man almost always constitutes the prosperity of another.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter IV.

    Honour then and dishonour are specially the object-matter of the Great-minded man: and at such as is great, and given by good men, he will be pleased moderately as getting his own, or perhaps somewhat less for no honour can be quite adequate to perfect virtue: but still he will accept this because they have nothing higher to give him. But such as is given by ordinary people and on trifling grounds he will entirely despise, because these do not come up to his deserts: and dishonour likewise, because in his case there cannot be just ground for it. Now though, as I have said, honour is specially the object-matter of the Great-minded man, I do not mean but that likewise in respect of wealth and power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear himself with moderation, fall out how they may, and neither in prosperity will he be overjoyed nor in adversity will he be unduly pained. For not even in respect of honour does he so bear himself; and yet it is the greatest of all such objects, since it is the cause of power and wealth being choice-worthy, for certainly they who have them desire to receive honour through them. So to whom honour even is a small thing to him will all other things also be so; and this is why such men are thought to be supercilious.

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  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER V. ANGER IS NEITHER WARRANTABLE NOR USEFUL.

    It is high time to convince the world of the indignity and uselessness of this passion, when it has the authority and recommendation of no less than Aristotle himself, as an affection very much conducing to all heroic actions that require heat and vigor: now, to show, on the other side, that it is not in any case profitable, we shall lay open the obstinate and unbridled madness of it: a wickedness neither sensible of infamy nor of glory, without either modesty or fear; and if it passes once from anger into a hardened hatred, it is incurable. It is either stronger than reason, or it is weaker. If stronger, there is no contending with it; if weaker, reason will do the business without it. Some will have it that an angry man is good-natured and sincere; whereas, in truth, he only lays himself open out of heedlessness and want of caution. If it were in itself good the more of it the better; but in this case, the more the worse; and a wise man does his duty, without the aid of anything that is ill. It is objected by some, that those are the most generous creatures which are the most prone to anger. But, first, reason in man is impetuous in beasts. Secondly, without discipline it runs into audaciousness and temerity; over and above that, the same thing does not help all. If anger helps the lion, it is fear that saves the stag, swiftness the hawk, and flight the pigeon: but man has God for his example (who is never angry) and not the creatures. And yet it is not amiss sometimes to counterfeit anger; as upon the stage; nay, upon the bench, and in the pulpit, where the imitation of it is more effectual than the thing itself.

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