Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete
Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592)
I was present one day at Barleduc, when King Francis II., for a memorial of Rene, king of Sicily, was presented with a portrait he had drawn of himself: why is it not in like manner lawful for every one to draw himself with a pen, as he did with a crayon? I will not, therefore, omit this blemish though very unfit to be published, which is irresolution; a very great effect and very incommodious in the negotiations of the affairs of the world; in doubtful enterprises, I know not which to choose: “Ne si, ne no, nel cor mi suona intero.” [“My heart does not tell me either yes or no.”—Petrarch.] I can maintain an opinion, but I cannot choose one. By reason that in human things, to what sect soever we incline, many appearances present themselves that confirm us in it; and the philosopher Chrysippus said, that he would of Zeno and Cleanthes, his masters, learn their doctrines only; for, as to proofs and reasons, he should find enough of his own. Which way soever I turn, I still furnish myself with causes, and likelihood enough to fix me there; which makes me detain doubt and the liberty of choosing, till occasion presses; and then, to confess the truth, I, for the most part, throw the feather into the wind, as the saying is, and commit myself to the mercy of fortune; a very light inclination and circumstance carries me along with it.
“Dum in dubio est animus, paulo momento huc atque Illuc impellitur.” [“While the mind is in doubt, in a short time it is impelled this way and that.”—Terence, Andr., i. 6, 32.] The uncertainty of my judgment is so equally balanced in most occurrences, that I could willingly refer it to be decided by the chance of a die: and I observe, with great consideration of our human infirmity, the examples that the divine history itself has left us of this custom of referring to fortune and chance the determination of election in doubtful things: “Sors cecidit super Matthiam.” [“The lot fell upon Matthew.”—Acts i. 26.] Human reason is a two-edged and dangerous sword: observe in the hands of Socrates, her most intimate and familiar friend, how many several points it has. I am thus good for nothing but to follow and suffer myself to be easily carried away with the crowd; I have not confidence enough in my own strength to take upon me to command and lead; I am very glad to find the way beaten before me by others. If I must run the hazard of an uncertain choice, I am rather willing to have it under such a one as is more confident in his opinions than I am in mine, whose ground and foundation I find to be very slippery and unsure. Yet I do not easily change, by reason that I discern the same weakness in contrary opinions:
“Ipsa consuetudo assentiendi periculosa esse videtur, et lubrica;” [“The very custom of assenting seems to be dangerous and slippery.”—Cicero, Acad., ii. 21.] especially in political affairs, there is a large field open for changes and contestation: “Justa pari premitur veluti cum pondere libra, Prona, nec hac plus pane sedet, nec surgit ab illa.” [“As a just balance, pressed with equal weight, neither dips nor rises on either side.”—Tibullus, iv. 41.] Machiavelli’s writings, for example, were solid enough for the subject, yet were they easy enough to be controverted; and they who have done so, have left as great a facility of controverting theirs; there was never wanting in that kind of argument replies and replies upon replies, and as infinite a contexture of debates as our wrangling lawyers have extended in favour of long suits: “Caedimur et totidem plagis consumimus hostem;” [“We are slain, and with as many blows kill the enemy” (or), “It is a fight wherein we exhaust each other by mutual wounds.” —Horace, Epist., ii. 2, 97.]
the reasons have little other foundation than experience, and the variety of human events presenting us with infinite examples of all sorts of forms. An understanding person of our times says: That whoever would, in contradiction to our almanacs, write cold where they say hot, and wet where they say dry, and always put the contrary to what they foretell; if he were to lay a wager, he would not care which side he took, excepting where no uncertainty could fall out, as to promise excessive heats at Christmas, or extremity of cold at Midsummer. I have the same opinion of these political controversies; be on which side you will, you have as fair a game to play as your adversary, provided you do not proceed so far as to shock principles that are broad and manifest. And yet, in my conceit, in public affairs, there is no government so ill, provided it be ancient and has been constant, that is not better than change and alteration. Our manners are infinitely corrupt, and wonderfully incline to the worse; of our laws and customs there are many that are barbarous and monstrous nevertheless, by reason of the difficulty of reformation, and the danger of stirring things, if I could put something under to stop the wheel, and keep it where it is, I would do it with all my heart: “Numquam adeo foedis, adeoque pudendis Utimur exemplis, ut non pejora supersint.” [“The examples we use are not so shameful and foul but that worse remain behind.”—Juvenal, viii. 183.]
The worst thing I find in our state is instability, and that our laws, no more than our clothes, cannot settle in any certain form. It is very easy to accuse a government of imperfection, for all mortal things are full of it: it is very easy to beget in a people a contempt of ancient observances; never any man undertook it but he did it; but to establish a better regimen in the stead of that which a man has overthrown, many who have attempted it have foundered. I very little consult my prudence in my conduct; I am willing to let it be guided by the public rule. Happy the people who do what they are commanded, better than they who command, without tormenting themselves as to the causes; who suffer themselves gently to roll after the celestial revolution! Obedience is never pure nor calm in him who reasons and disputes.
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Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER X——OF MANAGING THE WILL
“Etenim ipsae se impellunt, ubi semel a ratione discessum est; ipsaque sibi imbecillitas indulget, in altumque provehitur imprudens, nec reperit locum consistendi.” [“For they throw themselves headlong when once they lose their reason; and infirmity so far indulges itself, and from want of prudence is carried out into deep water, nor finds a place to shelter it.”—Cicero, Tusc. Quaes., iv. 18.] I am betimes sensible of the little breezes that begin to sing and whistle within, forerunners of the storm: “Ceu flamina prima Cum deprensa fremunt sylvis et caeca volutant Murmura, venturos nautis prodentia ventos.” [“As the breezes, pent in the woods, first send out dull murmurs, announcing the approach of winds to mariners.”—AEneid, x. 97.] How often have I done myself a manifest injustice to avoid the hazard of having yet a worse done me by the judges, after an age of vexations, dirty and vile practices, more enemies to my nature than fire or the rack? “Convenit a litibus, quantum licet, et nescio an paulo plus etiam quam licet, abhorrentem esse: est enim non modo liberale, paululum nonnunquam de suo jure decedere, sed interdum etiam fructuosum.” [“A man should abhor lawsuits as much as he may, and I know not whether not something more; for ‘tis not only liberal, but sometimes also advantageous, too, a little to recede from one’s right. —“Cicero, De Offic., ii. 18.]
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XI——OF CRIPPLES
I see very well that men get angry, and that I am forbidden to doubt upon pain of execrable injuries; a new way of persuading! Thank God, I am not to be cuffed into belief. Let them be angry with those who accuse their opinion of falsity; I only accuse it of difficulty and boldness, and condemn the opposite affirmation equally, if not so imperiously, with them. He who will establish this proposition by authority and huffing discovers his reason to be very weak. For a verbal and scholastic altercation let them have as much appearance as their contradictors; “Videantur sane, non affirmentur modo;” [“They may indeed appear to be; let them not be affirmed (Let them state the probabilities, but not affirm.)” —Cicero, Acad., n. 27.] but in the real consequence they draw from it these have much the advantage. To kill men, a clear and strong light is required, and our life is too real and essential to warrant these supernatural and fantastic accidents.
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XII. — APOLOGY FOR RAIMOND SEBOND.
Si consilium vis: Permittee ipsis expendere numinibus, quid Conveniat nobis, rebusque sit utile nostris... Carior est illis homo quam sibi; “If thou’lt be rul’d, to th’ gods thy fortunes trust, Their thoughts are wise, their dispensations just. What best may profit or delight they know, And real good, for fancied bliss, bestow; With eyes of pity, they our frailties scan, More dear to them, than to himself, is man;” for to require of him honours and commands, is to require ‘that he may throw you into a battle, set you upon a cast at dice, or something of the like nature, whereof the issue is to you unknown, and the fruit doubtful. There is no dispute so sharp and violent amongst the philosophers, as about the question of the sovereign good of man; whence, by the calculation of Varro, rose two hundred and eighty-eight sects. Qui autem de summo bono dissentit, de tot philosophies ratione disputt. “For whoever enters into controversy concerning the supreme good, disputes upon the whole matter of philosophy.” Trs mihi conviv prope dissentire videntur, Poscentes vario mul turn divers a palato; Quid dem? Quid non dem? Renuis tu quod jubet alter; Quod petis, id sane est invisum acidumque duobus; “I have three guests invited to a feast, And all appear to have a different taste; What shall I give them? What shall I refuse? What one dislikes the other two shall choose; And e’en the very dish you like the best Is acid or insipid to the rest:”
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XXII——OF CUSTOM, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT EASILY CHANGE A LAW RECEIVED
“Honesta oratio est;” [“Fine words truly.”—Ter. And., i. I, 114.] but the best pretence for innovation is of very dangerous consequence: “Aden nihil motum ex antiquo probabile est.” [“We are ever wrong in changing ancient ways.”—Livy, xxxiv. 54] And freely to speak my thoughts, it argues a strange self-love and great presumption to be so fond of one’s own opinions, that a public peace must be overthrown to establish them, and to introduce so many inevitable mischiefs, and so dreadful a corruption of manners, as a civil war and the mutations of state consequent to it, always bring in their train, and to introduce them, in a thing of so high concern, into the bowels of one’s own country. Can there be worse husbandry than to set up so many certain and knowing vices against errors that are only contested and disputable? And are there any worse sorts of vices than those committed against a man’s own conscience, and the natural light of his own reason? The Senate, upon the dispute betwixt it and the people about the administration of their religion, was bold enough to return this evasion for current pay: “Ad deos id magis, quam ad se, pertinere: ipsos visuros, ne sacra sua polluantur;” [“Those things belong to the gods to determine than to them; let the gods, therefore, take care that their sacred mysteries were not profaned.”—Livy, x. 6.]
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER VIII——OF THE ART OF CONFERENCE
The contradictions of judgments, then, neither offend nor alter, they only rouse and exercise, me. We evade correction, whereas we ought to offer and present ourselves to it, especially when it appears in the form of conference, and not of authority. At every opposition, we do not consider whether or no it be dust, but, right or wrong, how to disengage ourselves: instead of extending the arms, we thrust out our claws. I could suffer myself to be rudely handled by my friend, so much as to tell me that I am a fool, and talk I know not of what. I love stout expressions amongst gentle men, and to have them speak as they think; we must fortify and harden our hearing against this tenderness of the ceremonious sound of words. I love a strong and manly familiarity and conversation: a friendship that pleases itself in the sharpness and vigour of its communication, like love in biting and scratching: it is not vigorous and generous enough, if it be not quarrelsome, if it be civilised and artificial, if it treads nicely and fears the shock: “Neque enim disputari sine reprehensione potest.” [“Neither can a man dispute, but he must contradict.” (Or:) “Nor can people dispute without reprehension.” —Cicero, De Finib., i. 8.]
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · BOOK THE THIRD / CHAPTER I——OF PROFIT AND HONESTY
“Manente memoria, etiam in dissidio publicorum foederum, privati juris:” [“The memory of private right remaining even amid public dissensions.”—Livy, xxv. 18.] “Et nulla potentia vires Praestandi, ne quid peccet amicus, habet;” [“No power on earth can sanction treachery against a friend.” —Ovid, De Ponto, i. 7, 37.] and that all things are not lawful to an honest man for the service of his prince, the laws, or the general quarrel: “Non enim patria praestat omnibus officiis.... et ipsi conducit pios habere cives in parentes.” [“The duty to one’s country does not supersede all other duties. The country itself requires that its citizens should act piously toward their parents.”—Cicero, De Offic., iii. 23.] Tis an instruction proper for the time wherein we live: we need not harden our courage with these arms of steel; ‘tis enough that our shoulders are inured to them: ‘tis enough to dip our pens in ink without dipping them in blood. If it be grandeur of courage, and the effect of a rare and singular virtue, to contemn friendship, private obligations, a man’s word and relationship, for the common good and obedience to the magistrate, ‘tis certainly sufficient to excuse us, that ‘tis a grandeur that can have no place in the grandeur of Epaminondas’ courage. I abominate those mad exhortations of this other discomposed soul,
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