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The Analects of Confucius (from the Chinese Classics)

Confucius (-551–-479)

2. Fan Ch'ih did not immediately understand these answers. 3. The Master said, 'Employ the upright and put aside all the crooked;— in this way the crooked can be made to be upright.' 4. Fan Ch'ih retired, and, seeing Tsze-hsia, he said to him, 'A Little while ago, I had an interview with our Master, and asked him about knowledge. He said, 'Employ the upright, and put aside all the crooked;— in this way, the crooked will be made to be upright.' What did he mean?' 5. Tsze-hsia said, 'Truly rich is his saying! 6. 'Shun, being in possession of the kingdom, selected from among all the people, and employed Kao-yao, on which all who were devoid of virtue disappeared. T'ang, being in possession of the kingdom, selected from among all the people, and employed I Yin, and all who were devoid of virtue disappeared.' CHAP. XXIII. Tsze-kung asked about friendship. The Master said, 'Faithfully admonish your friend, and skillfully lead him on. If you find him impracticable, stop. Do not disgrace yourself.' CHAP. XXIV. The philosopher Tsang said, 'The superior man on grounds of culture meets with his friends, and by their friendship helps his virtue.' BOOK XIII. TSZE-LU. CHAP. I. 1. Tsze-lu asked about government. The Master said, 'Go before the people with your example, and be laborious in their affairs.' 2. He requested further instruction, and was answered, 'Be not weary (in these things).' CHAP. II. 1. Chung-kung, being chief minister to the Head of the Chi family, asked about government. The Master said, 'Employ

first the services of your various officers, pardon small faults, and raise to office men of virtue and talents.' 2. Chung-kung said, 'How shall I know the men of virtue and talent, so that I may raise them to office?' He was answered, 'Raise to office those whom you know. As to those whom you do not know, will others neglect them?' CHAP. III. 1. Tsze-lu said, 'The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?' 2. The Master replied, 'What is necessary is to rectify names.' 3. 'So, indeed!' said Tsze-lu. 'You are wide of the mark! Why must there be such rectification?' 4. The Master said, 'How uncultivated you are, Yu! A superior man, in regard to what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve. 5. 'If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with

the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. 6. 'When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot. 7. 'Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires, is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.' CHAP. IV. 1. Fan Ch'ih requested to be taught husbandry. The Master said, 'I am not so good for that as an old husbandman.' He

requested also to be taught gardening, and was answered, 'I am not so good for that as an old gardener.' 2. Fan Ch'ih having gone out, the Master said, 'A small man, indeed, is Fan Hsu! 3. If a superior love propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent. If he love righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit to his example. If he love good faith, the people will not dare not to be sincere. Now, when these things obtain, the people from all quarters will come to him, bearing their children on their backs;— what need has he of a knowledge of husbandry?' CHAP. V. The Master said, 'Though a man may be able to recite the three hundred odes, yet if, when intrusted with a governmental charge, he knows not how to act, or if, when sent to any quarter on a mission, he cannot give his replies unassisted, notwithstanding the extent of his learning, of what practical use is it?'

CHAP. VI. The Master said, 'When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.' CHAP. VII. The Master said, 'The governments of Lu and Wei are brothers.' CHAP. VIII. The Master said of Ching, a scion of the ducal family of Wei, that he knew the economy of a family well. When he began to have means, he said, 'Ha! here is a collection!' When they were a little increased, he said, 'Ha! this is complete!' When he had become rich, he said, 'Ha! this is admirable!' CHAP. IX. 1. When the Master went to Wei, Zan Yu acted as driver of his carriage. 2. The Master observed, 'How numerous are the people!' 3. Yu said, 'Since they are thus numerous, what more shall be done for them?' 'Enrich them,' was the reply.

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    Now I can conceive a person perplexed as to the meaning of our statement, that men must do just actions to become just, and those of self-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery; “for,” he would say, “if men are doing the actions they have the respective virtues already, just as men are grammarians or musicians when they do the actions of either art.” May we not reply by saying that it is not so even in the case of the arts referred to: because a man may produce something grammatical either by chance or the suggestion of another; but then only will he be a grammarian when he not only produces something grammatical but does so grammarian-wise, i.e. in virtue of the grammatical knowledge he himself possesses.

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  • The Prince · Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) · CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

    Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK X / Chapter I.

    I confess I suspect the soundness of this policy; in matters respecting men’s feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts: whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience, they not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, for instance, who deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets the credit of backsliding to it as being universally such as he said it was, the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions. Real accounts, therefore, of such matters seem to be most expedient, not with a view to knowledge merely but to life and conduct: for they are believed as being in harm with facts, and so they prevail with the wise to live in accordance with them. But of such considerations enough: let us now proceed to the current maxims respecting Pleasure.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter IX.

    It is possible of course to take any of these lines either with or without some further view: but in general men speak, and act, and live, each according to his particular character and disposition, unless indeed a man is acting from any special motive. Now since falsehood is in itself low and blameable, while truth is noble and praiseworthy, it follows that the Truthful man (who is also in the mean) is praiseworthy, and the two who depart from strict truth are both blameable, but especially the Exaggerator. We will now speak of each, and first of the Truthful man: I call him Truthful, because we are not now meaning the man who is true in his agreements nor in such matters as amount to justice or injustice (this would come within the province of a different virtue), but, in such as do not involve any such serious difference as this, the man we are describing is true in life and word simply because he is in a certain moral state.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter X.

    Be this as it may, whatever he says such things will he also listen to, since it is commonly held that a man will do what he will bear to hear: this must, however, be limited; a man will not do quite all that he will hear: because jesting is a species of scurrility and there are some points of scurrility forbidden by law; it may be certain points of jesting should have been also so forbidden. So then the refined and gentlemanlike man will bear himself thus as being a law to himself. Such is the mean character, whether denominated the man of Tact or of Easy Pleasantry. But the Buffoon cannot resist the ridiculous, sparing neither himself nor any one else so that he can but raise his laugh, saying things of such kind as no man of refinement would say and some which he would not even tolerate if said by others in his hearing. The Clownish man is for such intercourse wholly useless: inasmuch as contributing nothing jocose of his own he is savage with all who do. Yet some pause and amusement in life are generally judged to be indispensable. The three mean states which have been described do occur in life, and the object-matter of all is interchange of words and deeds. They differ, in that one of them is concerned with truth, and the other two with the pleasurable: and of these two again, the one is conversant with the jocosities of life, the other with all other points of social intercourse.

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